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Abstract 
 
On 19 December 1967, France formally imposed a veto on British entry to 
the European Community. The Labour government of Harold Wilson had 
applied for membership of the Community in May of that year, but the 
French, in accordance with the views of their President, Charles de Gaulle, 
implacably opposed enlargement negotiations. Yet just three and a half 
years later, in June 1971, accession negotiations between Britain and the 
Community recorded agreement on the critical issues, thereby removing the 
major diplomatic obstacles to British membership. Why this turnaround in 
fortunes occurred, and what contribution the governments of Harold Wilson 
and Edward Heath made to it, are the questions at the heart of this thesis. 
 
In its analysis of these historic events, this thesis provides numerous new 
findings. It re-interprets British actions in relation to the controversial 
‘Soames affair’ of February 1969. It demonstrates the impact of The Hague 
summit upon the cost of British membership, and shows how this influenced 
internal debate about the case for joining the Community. Fresh light is shed 
upon the critical phase of the accession negotiations between January and 
June 1971, both in regard to Pompidou’s actions and motivations, and the 
role of the May 1971 Heath-Pompidou summit in the successful outcome.  
 
The thesis is based primarily upon British governmental sources held at the 
National Archives. The private papers of key participants have also been 
consulted, as well as parliamentary debates, political diaries, memoirs, and 
3 
 
newspapers. In addition, the papers for the presidency of Georges 
Pompidou, deposited at the Archives Nationales, are employed to illuminate 
French actions at the two pivotal moments of the accession negotiations: the 
impasse of March 1971; and the Heath-Pompidou summit two months later. 
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Introduction 
  
 
On 8 May 1967, Harold Wilson began a three day debate in the House of 
Commons on his government’s decision to apply for membership of the 
European Communities.1 His speech was an 85 minute tour d’horizon of the 
potential consequences of British accession. Reaching his peroration, Wilson 
declared that, in asking the House to endorse the application, he was asking 
it ‘to take an historic decision’.2 Sitting opposite Wilson was the man who, 
until recently, had been perhaps the most recognised champion of a British 
future in Europe, Edward Heath, leader of the Conservative Party. Just six 
years earlier, Heath had been the head of the British negotiating team during 
the first attempt to join the Community between 1961 and 1963. For this very 
reason, he questioned the proposition that Labour’s application was ‘historic’, 
and suggested that British membership should be seen as a ‘part of the wide 
sweep of European history’.3 To Heath, it was both natural and logical that 
Britain should be at the centre of the movement towards greater unity in 
Europe. In the coming years, as the 1967 application met with short-term 
failure, was then revived and finally brought to a successful conclusion, both 
men would seek to denigrate the value of the other’s contribution.4 Such 
                                                            
1
 Hansard, House of Commons Debates (hereafter HCD), vol.746, 8 May 1967, col.1061; 
Time Magazine, ‘The Possibility of an Instant Jump’, 12 May 1967 (page number 
unspecified), available at: 
http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,843728,00.html?artId=843728?contType=
article?chn=us, accessed on 16 July 2010. Hereafter, the European Communities will be 
referred to in the singular, European Community or EC. 
2
 Hansard, HCD, vol.746, 8 May 1967, col.1097. 
3
 Hansard, HCD, vol.746, 9 May 1967, col.1282. 
4
 For example: E. Heath, Old World, New Horizons: The Godkin Lectures at Harvard 
University, 1967 (London: Oxford University Press, 1970), pp.2-3; and Wilson, Hansard, 
HCD, 5th series, vol.823, 28 October 1971, esp. col.2081. 
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politicking was purely superficial; one of the most important factors in the 
ultimate success of the application was the consistency of purpose to that 
end shown by successive Labour and Conservative governments, for which 
Harold Wilson and Edward Heath are primarily responsible. 
 
Wilson’s pursuit of early British entry to European Community was to be 
curtailed by a French veto in December 1967. Three and a half years later, 
however, in the summer of 1971, it became clear that accession negotiations 
between Britain and the Community were heading for a successful outcome. 
The purpose of this thesis is to examine the roles played by the governments 
of Harold Wilson and Edward Heath respectively in securing the ultimate 
success of the application. This Introduction will briefly review the 
development of Britain’s relationship with the European Community from its 
origins in the early 1950s, through to 1967. It will then go on to explain the 
contribution of the thesis to the existing literature and the methodology which 
has guided the research upon which it is based. 
 
Britain and the European Community, 1950-67 
 
The European Community of the late 1960s and early 1970s was based 
upon three Communities formed during the 1950s. The first, the European 
Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), was the product of an initiative in June 
1950 by the French foreign minister, Robert Schuman. He proposed an 
organisation which would pool Europe’s coal and steel industries within a 
supranational framework (one where national powers of decision are 
10 
 
transferred to shared international institutions). Schuman’s plan was 
principally targeted at the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG), but four other 
countries - Belgium, Italy, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands – also 
participated and the ECSC came into being in July 1952.5 The same six 
countries (hereafter referred to as ‘the Six’) went on to prepare a Treaty 
establishing a European Defence Community (EDC). The initiative once 
again came from France, on this occasion to deal with the vexed question of 
German rearmament, and once more, supranational principles were integral 
to it. In 1954, however, the French National Assembly rejected the treaty, 
throwing the nascent movement towards European unity into temporary 
crisis.6 But the momentum was regained the next year, when the foreign 
ministers of the Six met in Messina, Italy, and agreed to investigate the 
possibility of a European customs union and a European atomic energy 
authority. The ‘Spaak committee’ was established, under the chairmanship of 
Belgian Foreign Minister, Paul-Henri Spaak, to produce detailed proposals. 
At an historic ceremony in Rome in March 1957, the Six signed two treaties, 
one establishing the European Economic Community (EEC), the other a 
European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom).7 The EEC was to be the 
most important of the three Communities, providing not simply a customs 
                                                            
5
 On Schuman Plan see: J. Gillingham, Coal, Steel and the Rebirth of Europe, 1945-55 ; 
A.S. Milward, The Reconstruction of Western Europe, 1945-51 (London: Methuen & Co., 
1984), pp.362-420; W.I. Hitchcock, France Restored: Cold War Diplomacy and the Quest for 
Leadership in Europe (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1998), pp.116-132. 
6
 On France and the EDC: V. Gavin. ‘Power Through Europe: The Case of the European 
Defence Community in France (1950-54), French History, 23/1, 69-87; Hitchcock, France, 
pp.169-202; L. Risso, The French and Italian Political Parties and the rearmament of West 
Germany, 1949-55 (Cambridge: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2007). 
7
 On the creation of the EEC see W. Asbeek Bruce, Tariffs, Trade and European Integration: 
From Study Group to Common Market (London: Macmillan, 1997); W. Kaiser, Christian 
Democracy and the Origins of European Union (Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, 
2007), esp. pp.290-303; A.S. Milward, The European Rescue of the Nation State, 2nd edn 
(London: Routledge, 2000), pp.119-223; A. Moravscik, The Choice for Europe: Social 
Purpose and State Power from Messina to Maastricht (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 
1998), pp.86-158. On Euratom: Moravscik, Choice, pp.86-158. 
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union, but a prospective common market (a customs union plus other forms 
of market integration, such as agriculture and transport).8    
 
At each stage in this process, Britain had the option to participate, but 
successive governments declined to do so.9 With each Community, the 
reasons for not doing so had their own specificity, but two main explanations 
lay at the heart of all the decisions. The first was London’s preference for a 
global foreign policy orientation, prioritising its Commonwealth and US 
relationships above its European role.10 The second was a preference for 
intergovernmental rather than supranational organisations in Europe.11 In the 
case of the EEC, Commonwealth concerns featured particularly strongly: 
participation in a European customs union seemed likely to mean the end of 
Commonwealth trade preferences, thus seriously undermining the political 
                                                            
8
 On terminology: in 1967 the institutions of the three Communities were merged to become 
the European Communities, but frequently referred to as just the European Community or 
EC. In British discourse, however, the terms EEC and ‘Common Market’ were still frequently 
used into the early 1970s. Stephen George, An Awkward Partner: Britain in the European 
Community, 3rd edn, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), p.2.  
9
 There is a rich literature on the British government’s response to the Schuman Plan. See: 
E. Dell, The Schuman Plan and the Abdication of British Leadership in Europe (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1995); C. Lord, Absent at the Creation: Britain and the Formation of 
the European Community, 1950-52 (Aldershot: Dartmouth Publishing, 1996); A.S. Milward, 
The United Kingdom and the European Community, Volume 1: The Rise and Fall of a 
National Strategy, 1945-63 (London: Franck Cass, 2002), pp.48-77; J.W. Young, Britain, 
France and the Unity of Europe, 1945-51 (Leicester: Leicester University Press, 1984). On 
the decision not to join the EEC: J. Ellison, Threatening Europe: Britain and the Creation of 
the European Community, 1955-58 (London: Macmillan, 2000), pp.13-36; W. Kaiser, Using 
Europe, Abusing the Europeans: Britain and European Integration, 1945-63 (London: 
Macmillan, 1993), pp.28-60; Milward, United, pp.177-216. On Euratom, see Milward, United, 
pp.217-228. 
10
 Milward, United, esp.2-3. Milward in fact goes further and argues that throughout the 
1950s British policy towards Europe was determined by a ‘national strategy’, based on 
Britain’s US and Commonwealth relationships, as the best means to advance British security 
and prosperity in the long-term. See Milward, United, pp.1-9. 
11
 Ibid., p.212; G.C. Peden, ‘Economic Aspects of British Perceptions of Power’, in E. di 
Nolfo (ed.), Power in Europe? II: Great Britain, France, Germany and Italy and the Origins of 
the EEC 1952-57 (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1992), pp.156; Young, Britain and European Unity, 
p.29.  
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cohesion of the grouping.12 Within the Foreign Office, there was also a strong 
conviction that the attempt to create a European customs union would go the 
same way as the EDC, and be rejected by the French National Assembly.13 
While this confidence of failure has been strongly criticised by historians, it is 
very unlikely that an expectation of success would have altered the British 
decision.14 The psychological adjustment necessary for British policy-makers 
to join the Six was at this stage too great, and would only be made after 
witnessing the success of the EEC and the damage that its success seemed 
likely to inflict upon British interests. 
 
Having initially tried, and failed, to deflect the work of the Spaak committee 
into the intergovernmental Organisation for European Economic Cooperation 
(OEEC), which already existed for the purposes of trade liberalisation, 
London produced a more constructive proposal aimed at averting the danger 
of British exclusion from tariff-free trade among the Six whilst also enabling it 
to maintain Commonwealth preferences. This was a plan for a European 
Free Trade Area, in which the EEC would participate as a single bloc.15 
Ellison argues that the proposal marked a genuine advance in British policy 
towards Europe, but that the seeds of its downfall lay in the fact that it 
threatened to unbalance the hard won agreements of the Six enshrined in 
the Treaty of Rome.16 The return to power in France of General Charles de 
Gaulle, the wartime leader of the Free French and self-defined opponent of 
                                                            
12
 Ellison, Threatening, pp.33-34. 
13
 Ibid., pp.17-18; Kaiser, Using, p.42. 
14
 For criticisms see: Kaiser, Using, p.60; Milward, United, pp.180-181. 
15
 Ellison, pp.37-92; Kaiser, Using, pp.61-87; Milward, United, pp.230-264; M. Schaad, ‘Plan 
G – A ‘Counterblast’? British Policy towards the Messina Countries’, Contemporary 
European History, 7/1 (1998), pp.39-60. 
16
 Ellison, Threatening, pp.221-241. 
13 
 
integration, initially created doubts about the survival of the EEC, but these 
quickly proved unfounded. By mid-1958, talks over the Free Trade Area were 
already running into difficulties, and in December de Gaulle delivered the 
coup de grace, terminating the negotiations with the justification that Britain 
would not adhere to a common tariff. Britain went on to form the European 
Free Trade Association (EFTA) with six other OEEC members (Austria, 
Denmark, Norway, Portugal, Sweden and Switzerland), but this did little to 
grapple with the economic and political consequences of British exclusion 
from the EEC.17  
 
The precise reasons for, and timing of, Prime Minister Harold Macmillan’s 
decision to seek membership of the EEC have been extensively debated. 
Explanations vary from the desire to access the large and rapidly growing 
industrial markets of the Six, to the hope of creating an alternative to the 
Anglo-American relationship as a basis for Britain’s international role, and, 
conversely, a wish to ensure that British influence in Washington did not 
diminish.18 Account must also be taken of the gradual decline of the 
Commonwealth as a political asset, as a wave of decolonisation markedly 
reduced the scope of Britain’s extra-European responsibilities.19 Within 
Cabinet, however, significant reservations remained and Macmillan was 
forced to proceed cautiously. The decision taken by ministers in the summer 
                                                            
17
 On the formation of EFTA, see Kaiser, Using, pp.100-107. 
18
 For the economic motivation see Moravscik, Choice, pp 172-175. On the desire to create 
an alternative to the Anglo-American relationship see N. Ashton, Kennedy, Macmillan and 
the Cold War: The Irony of Interdependence (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002), pp. 
123-127. On the desire to maintain the US-UK relationship, Kaiser, Using, pp.129-135; and 
Milward, United, pp.310-311. 
19
 R. Hyam, ‘Winds of Change: The Empire and Commonwealth’, in W. Kaiser and G. 
Staerck, British Foreign Policy, 1955-64: Contracting Options (London: Macmillan, 2000), 
pp.190-208. 
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of 1961 was to seek negotiations in order to determine whether terms were 
available that would permit British entry. In particular, London wanted to 
avoid disruptive changes to its agricultural and Commonwealth trade 
policies.20 
    
From the outset, it was clear that one of the principal dangers to the success 
of the negotiations lay in the ambiguous attitude of France.21 Ludlow argues 
that the conditional nature of the application, and a failure to make important 
concessions more quickly, undermined the best hope that London had of 
averting a veto by de Gaulle: to reach agreement on the major issues before 
his domestic position had been strengthened by the constitutional changes of 
autumn 1962.22 Macmillan made two attempts to forge a high-level 
understanding with de Gaulle: the first at Chateau de Champs in June 1962, 
and the second at Rambouillet in December of the same year. Historians 
have closely examined whether, and to what extent, Macmillan may have 
advanced the idea of an Anglo-French nuclear accord as a tacit quid pro quo 
for de Gaulle facilitating British entry.23 At a press conference on 14 January 
1963, however, de Gaulle declared his opposition to enlargement in dramatic 
fashion. By virtue of its ‘nature’, ‘structure’ and ‘economic situation’, Britain 
was distinct from the Six, and its entry to the Community would be followed 
by that of other European states which also did not share the cohesion of the 
                                                            
20
 Ludlow, Dealing with Britain: The Six and the First UK Application to Join the EEC 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), pp.37-42; Milward, United, pp.340-351. 
21
 Kaiser, Using, pp.165-67. 
22
 Ludlow, Dealng, pp.247-49.  
23
 Ashton, Kennedy, p.143; F. Bozo, Two Strategies for Europe: De Gaulle, the United 
States and the Atlantic Alliance (Oxford: Rowman and Littlefield, 2001), pp.87-90; W. Kaiser, 
‘The Bomb and Europe: Britain, France and the EEC Entry Negotiations, 1961-63’, Journal 
of European Integration History, 1/1 (1995), pp.65-85.  
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Six. The result would be a progressive metamorphosis of the EEC into a 
colossal Atlantic Community under American leadership. This was 
unacceptable to France, which wished the Community to remain a purely 
European ‘construction’.24  
 
Three main explanations have been advanced for the veto. Bozo argues that 
the president wished to focus upon building a European system, centred 
upon Franco-German cooperation, able to strike positions independent to 
those of the US. De Gaulle saw Britain as too closely associated with 
American policies, rendering its membership of the Community contrary to 
his vision.25  Moravcsik, by contrast, emphasises France’s desire to 
safeguard the Community’s nascent Common Agricultural Policy (CAP): ‘de 
Gaulle vetoed British membership above all because Britain, a country with a 
domestic agricultural structure entirely different from that of France, was 
almost certain to block generous financing for the CAP’.26 Underlining the 
inter-relationship between political and economic considerations, Milward 
explains de Gaulle’s decision in terms of a clash between British and French 
strategies, with the British application threatening both French agricultural 
interests and its leadership of the Community.27  
 
While the failure of the first application was a bitter blow for Macmillan, one 
man emerged from the Brussels talks with his reputation enhanced: Britain’s 
                                                            
24
 Ludlow, Dealing, p.207-08. 
25
 Bozo, Two, pp.89-94. 
26
 Moravcsik, Andrew, ‘De Gaulle Between Grain and Grandeur: The Political Economy of 
French EC Policy, 1958-70 (Part 2), Journal of Cold War Studies, 2/3 (2000), pp.4-68. 
27
 Milward, United, pp.463-483. 
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chief negotiator, Edward Heath.28 While much ink has been spilt on the 
subject of Heath and Europe, a satisfactory interpretation regarding the 
nature and development of his views is still outstanding. The most 
convincing, for reason of their caution, remain those of Campbell and Young 
respectively.29 Many writers have seen his views as a product of early 
experiences travelling in 1930s Europe (including civil war Spain and Nazi 
Germany), followed by his involvement in the campaign to liberate North-
Western Europe in the latter stages of the Second World War.30 More 
problematic is the thesis, be it implied or explicit, that there was a broad 
continuity in Heath’s convictions from the late 1940s onwards. For those who 
advance this view, his maiden speech to the House of Commons, calling for 
British participation in the Schuman Plan, is commonly cited in 
corroboration.31 There are, however, a number of problems with this.32 Most 
important, it is all too rarely noted that Heath was speaking in support of a 
Motion tabled by the Conservative leadership (Winston Churchill and 
Anthony Eden), and while this by no means indicates that Heath was not 
sincere in what he said, it raises questions about his motivations and 
whether his maiden speech really can be taken as a reflection of his strong 
                                                            
28
 P. Ziegler, Edward Heath: The Authorised Biography (London: HarperCollins, 2010), 
p.131; J. Campbell, Edward Heath: A Biography (London: Pimlico, 1993), pp.131-32. 
29
 Campbell, Heath, pp.112-225; J.W. Young, ‘The Heath Government and British entry into 
the European Community’, in S. Ball and A. Seldon (eds), The Heath Government, 1970-74, 
pp.259-263. For the literature on this subject see: U. Kitzinger, Diplomacy and Persuasion: 
How Britain Joined the Common Market (London: Thames and Hudson, 1973), pp.147-150; 
D. MacShane, Heath (London: Haus Publishing, 2006), pp.33-49; N. Rossbach, Heath, 
Nixon and the Rebirth of the Special Relationship: Britain the US and the EC, 1969-74 
(London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), pp.16-23; Oxford Dictionary of National Biography 
(hereafter DNB) (author: Douglas Hurd); Hugo Young, This Blessed Plot: Britain and Europe 
from Churchill to Blair (London: Macmillan, 1998), pp.214-222; Ziegler, Heath, esp. pp.68-
70. 
30
 For example: Campbell, pp.115; Young, Blessed, pp.216-220; Ziegler, Heath, p.68.   
31
 ONDB entry for Heath (author: D. Hurd); MacShane, Heath, pp.33-38; Ziegler, Heath, 
pp.68-69. And including Heath’s memoirs: E. Heath, Course of My Life (London: Hodder and 
Stoughton, 1998), pp.144-145. 
32
 Hansard, HCD, 5th Series, 26 June 1950, vol.476, cc1959-1964. 
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commitment to European unity at this stage.33 Furthermore, there were a 
number of more senior Conservative ‘Europeans’ at this time (Bob Boothby, 
Harold Macmillan and Duncan Sandys being notable among them), often 
referred to as the ‘Tory Strasbourgers’, who favoured a more dynamic policy 
towards the continent but who did not support British membership of a 
European customs union in the mid-1950s.34 Similarly, there is no evidence 
that Heath supported participation in the EEC at the outset. And while in his 
memoirs Heath explains away this apparent lacuna by reference to his 
government responsibilities, Kitzinger (writing in the early 1970s) records that 
some MPs recalled that as Chief Whip in the mid-1950s, Heath ‘cheerfully 
sat on the more ardent Europeans’.35 Both Campbell and Young present the 
1961-63 accession negotiations as the critical event which focussed Heath’s 
mind upon the objective which would ultimately define his political legacy.36 It 
was the experience of the Brussels negotiations, which did most to engender 
Heath’s subsequent determination to take Britain into the Community.37 In 
this context, his statement at the final meeting of the negotiators on 29 
January 1963 has acquired a symbolic resonance: ‘We in Britain are not 
going to turn our backs on the mainland of Europe or on the countries of the 
Community. We are part of Europe by geography, tradition, history, culture 
                                                            
33
 For Eden’s speech see Hansard, HCD, 5th series, 26 June 1950, cc1907-1924. 
34
 On the Conservative Europeans, see M. Ceadel, ‘British Parites and the European 
Situation, 1950-57’, in Nolfo, Power, pp.322-325; Milward, United, pp.94-102; and J.W. 
Young, ‘Churchill’s ‘No’ to Europe: The ‘Rejection’ of European Union by Churchill’s Post-
War Government, 1951-52’, The Historical Journal, 28, 4 (1985), pp.923-37. For Boothby’s 
speech in support of the Conservative Motion on the Schuman Plan, Hansard, HCD, 27 
June 1950, 5th series, vol.476, cols.2112-2122; on Macmillan’s views in the early and mid-
1950s, P. Catterall, ‘Macmillan and Europe, 1950-56: The Cold War, the American Context 
and the British Approach to European Integration’, Cercles 5 (2002), esp. pp.95-100, 
available at www.cercles.com, accessed on 3 June 2010; on Sandys, ONDB entry for 
Duncan Sandys (author: N. Piers Ludlow). 
35
 Heath wrote: ‘by convention, government Whips cannot speak in the House of Commons 
... and Ministers do not trespass outside their areas of responsibility’. Heath, Course, p.145. 
36
 Campbell, Heath, pp.112-115; Young, ‘Heath’, p.260. 
37
 Ziegler, Heath, p.131. 
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and civilisation. We shall continue to work with all our friends for the true 
unity and strength of this continent’.38 
 
At the time of Labour’s election victory in October 1964, Harold Wilson, who 
was hitherto identified with support for the Commonwealth, was an unlikely 
candidate to renew Britain’s pursuit of EEC membership. At the time of the 
first application, and in keeping with the official position of the Labour 
leadership (Wilson was then Shadow Chancellor), his approach had been 
steeped in ambiguity.39 In the Commons debate on the decision to enter into 
negotiations, Wilson acknowledged the historic significance of the event, 
comparing it to the repeal of the Corn Laws in the nineteenth century, yet 
conceded that ‘in the sphere of world politics the importance of this issue 
transcends even that of the Free Trade issue of 1846’.40 He went on to veer 
between easy political point scoring and more positive engagement with the 
fundamental questions: thus, on the need to safeguard New Zealand 
exports, he remarked that ‘if there has to be a choice we are not entitled to 
sell our friends and kinsmen down the river for a problematical and marginal 
advantage in selling washing machines in Dusseldorf’, but on the question of 
supranationalism that, ‘The whole history of political progress is a history of 
gradual abandonment of national sovereignty. ... We abrogated it – some 
would say that we did not abrogate it enough—when we joined the United 
Nations. One cannot talk about world government in one breath and then 
                                                            
38
 Ludlow, Dealing, p.226. 
39
 P. Ziegler, Wilson: The Authorised Life of Lord Wilson of Rievaulx (London: HarperCollins, 
1995), pp.130-132.  
40
 Hansard, HCD, 5th Series, vol.645, 3 August 1961, cols.1651-1652. 
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start drooling about the need to preserve national sovereignty in the next’.41  
Labour’s 1964 election manifesto hedged the issue: it did not rule out entry in 
principle, but insisted that five conditions (protection for Commonwealth, 
EFTA and domestic agricultural interests, as well as freedom to pursue 
national economic planning and a national foreign policy) would need to be 
satisfied if Britain were to join.42  
 
Whatever Wilson’s true views at this stage, there were obvious reasons why 
he should want to give the European issue a wide berth for some time after 
the 1964 election: the first application had provoked fissures within the 
Labour Party, and Wilson was naturally anxious to avoid provoking new 
tensions (he had witnessed first-hand the consequences of Labour division in 
the 1950s), especially given that the government’s majority was just four.  
And having been out of power for thirteen years, the principal interest of the 
new Labour prime minister was always likely to be domestic affairs. Parr and 
Young both point to movement in Wilson’s thinking in early 1966, but Parr 
also contends that the decisive event in propelling Wilson towards the 
second application was the July 1966 sterling crisis, which forced the 
government to restrict public spending, to the detriment of its domestic 
agenda, and encouraged the prime minister to embark upon this new policy 
initiative.43 If the July sterling-crisis acted as a short-term trigger, the 
fundamental reasons for the application were rooted in the growing 
pressures upon Britain’s international position and influence. If these had 
                                                            
41
 Ibid., col.1665 and col.1667. 
42
 J.W. Young, The Labour Governments: 1964-70: International Policy (Manchester: 
Manchester University Press, 2003), pp.142-143. 
43
 H. Parr, Britain’s Policy towards the European Community: Harold Wilson and Britain’s 
World Role, 1964-67 (Abingdon: Routledge, 2006), pp.62-100; Young, Labour, pp.146-47.   
20 
 
been apparent in 1961, the situation had only been compounded by the 
continuing lag in British economic performance relative to France and 
Germany.44 Labour had entered government promising Commonwealth 
rejuvenation, but it was soon confronted with the reality of an increasingly 
disparate and diffuse organisation, prone to crises and with little scope for 
meaningful British leadership.45 The weakness of the balance of payments 
also forced the government to envisage major changes in Britain’s defence 
posture ‘East of Suez’, which had acquired symbolic importance as the last 
vestige of Britain’s global role.46 Europe appeared increasingly to be the 
framework within which Britain would have to operate. It was thus that 
between January and March 1967, Wilson and his fervently pro-membership 
Foreign Secretary, George Brown, embarked upon a tour of Community 
capitals to determine whether the conditions existed that would enable 
Britain to join.47 In the spring of 1967, the Labour Cabinet intensively debated 
whether to make a renewed application and after much dispute, Wilson was 
able to overcome the ministerial doubters by arguing that there was no 
alternative to British membership in the long-term.48 By implication, it was 
better for Labour to take the decision, than to leave the subject free for Heath 
and the Conservatives to make electoral capital from the issue. On 2 May 
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1967, Wilson announced the decision to the House of Commons.49 A three 
day debate commenced a week later and culminated in a massive display of 
support, with the application being approved by 488 to 62.50 
 
At a press conference shortly afterwards on 17 May, de Gaulle signalled his 
continuing scepticism towards the British membership bid. His words 
seemed less dogmatic than in January 1963; he remarked that he did not 
wish to ‘prejudice the issue of negotiations’, and that there had ‘never been 
any question of a veto’. The question was whether Britain’s desire to join the 
Six was ‘possible within the framework of the Common Market as it now 
exists, or could be achieved only within another framework should this be 
desired’. Wilson pushed on, travelling to Grand Trianon the following month 
in an attempt to do what Macmillan had not – persuade de Gaulle to permit 
British entry. He found the General in ‘gloomy and apocalyptic mood’, his 
attitude seemingly more inflexible than his May statement had revealed. 
London’s close relationship with Washington was once more cited as critical. 
Wilson raised the possibility of Franco-British cooperation in defence and 
technology, but de Gaulle remained implacable.51  
 
In July George Brown presented the British application at a meeting of the 
Western European Union (WEU, an intergovernmental organisation, 
constituted by Britain and the Six, the main focus of which was defence 
questions). Brown’s speech laid particular stress on a British desire to 
develop European political unity (i.e. cooperation in foreign policy). More 
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controversially, however, he stated that Britain would wish to participate in 
the Community’s negotiations on the financing of the CAP which was due to 
be settled at the end of 1969.52 British concern on this score stemmed from 
the probability that existing Community rules would result in London making 
large contributions to the common agricultural fund, but because of the small 
scale of British agriculture, receiving very little in return.53 It was a brave but 
perhaps foolhardy move to declare this objective so openly in advance of 
negotiations; as has been seen, given the benefit which France derived from 
the policy, few British requests were more likely to stir opposition to 
enlargement in Paris than a desire to participate in the detailed formulation of 
CAP finance.54 The question was also raised by the Commission in its 
October Opinion on the applications for membership, pointing to the need for 
‘balance’ between the contributions of Britain and other member-states, 
without undermining the principles upon which the existing system was 
based.55   
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How far this influenced de Gaulle’s veto of the second application is, as with 
the first, a matter of debate.56 In 1967, however, France would not even 
permit enlargement negotiations to begin. Capitalising upon the Wilson 
government’s decision to devalue sterling on 18 November, de Gaulle once 
again declared his opposition to enlargement in present circumstances at a 
press conference in the Élysée on 27 November.57 The Commission’s 
Opinion had laid particular stress upon Britain’s financial problems which de 
Gaulle was also able to use in support of his contention that ‘The Common 
Market is incompatible with the state of Sterling ... combined with the 
Pound’s character as an international currency and the enormous external 
debts weighing on it’.58 The French veto on negotiations was then formally 
manifested at a meeting of the EC Council of Ministers on 19 December 
where the ‘friendly Five’ continued to back the membership applications, but 
as the Communiqué of the meeting made clear: ‘One member state ... 
expressed the opinion that this enlargement would modify profoundly the 
nature and ways of administering the Communities’. Accordingly, the Council 
was not in a position to invite the candidates to begin negotiations, but the 
applications would remain on its agenda.59       
 
From veto to success: the contribution of this thesis to the 
historiography of British EC entry 
                                                            
56
 On the motives for the 1967 veto, see: Bossuat, ‘De Gaulle et la Second Candidature 
Britannique aux Communautés Européennes’, in W. Loth (ed), Crises and Compromises: 
The European Project, 1963-69 (Baden-Baden: Nomos-Verlag, 2001), pp.511-538; 
Moravcsik, ‘Between’, pp.4-34; Parr, ‘Saving’, 425-454.  
57
 The Times, 28 November 1967, p.1. On the decision to devalue sterling see C.R. Schenk, 
The Decline of Sterling: Managing the Retreat of an International Currency, 1945-1992 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), pp.155-205. 
58
 Kitzinger, Second, pp.245-256 and 314-315. 
59
 On the December Council meeting see Ludlow, European, pp.142-145. For the 
Communiqué see Kitzinger, Second, pp.317-19. 
24 
 
 
The story of the decision to apply, and the prosecution of the second 
application up to the December 1967 French veto, has been the subject of 
numerous recent studies.60 The purpose of this thesis is to carry forward the 
story from the veto, through the decision to open enlargement negotiations in 
June 1970, to the point at which, in the early summer of 1971, it became 
clear that the negotiations, and therefore the application, were going to 
succeed. The dominant theme in British diplomacy throughout this period 
was the question of French opposition to enlargement. As will be seen, 
despite the resignation of de Gaulle in April 1969, and the decision of his 
successor Georges Pompidou to lift the veto on enlargement negotiations at 
The Hague summit, it remained far from clear that France’s opposition to 
enlargement was at an end. Subsequent developments fostered this 
apprehension further, and when the accession negotiations reached impasse 
in the spring of 1971, it appeared possible that a French technical veto – 
which would insist upon terms that the British government would be unable 
to accept – might replace the political veto of December 1967. At a summit 
meeting between Heath, Prime Minister since the general election of June 
1970, and Pompidou dispelled such doubts and led to the resolution of the 
principal issues during two crucial ministerial negotiating meetings the 
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following month. It was the combination of these events in May-June 1971 – 
the revelation of France’s political commitment to enlargement, and the 
settlement of the main negotiating problems – which meant that in the early 
summer of 1971 it became clear that the application was going to succeed, 
and it is this fact which explains the decision to conclude the thesis at the 
end of June 1971. While a ‘clearing-up’ phase of the negotiations continued 
until January 1972, during which the complicated question of fisheries had to 
be resolved, the political atmosphere in which these talks took place was 
transformed.61 Consequently, from July 1971, the main focus in the 
government’s pursuit of entry shifted from the diplomatic aspects of entry to 
the pursuit of parliamentary ratification. But this year-long domestic battle 
must await separate treatment. It is the diplomacy of British entry, from the 
veto of 1967 to the decisive negotiating meetings of June 1971, which is the 
centrepiece of the present study. Alongside this, a secondary line of enquiry 
will be the motivation for joining the EC during both the Wilson and Heath 
governments, thus extending the historiographical debates surrounding the 
determinants of British European policy since 1945.  
 
The literature examining British policy and diplomacy in the period 1968-71 
can broadly be divided between those that focus upon Harold Wilson (up to 
the general election of June 1970), and those that look at Heath’s 
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contribution to British entry thereafter.62 The exceptions to this rule can be 
found in studies that adopt a bilateral or multi-national perspective.63 One 
aim of this thesis is to demonstrate the artificiality of the Wilson-Heath 
division. In less specialised literature, the myth still persists of a ‘third 
application’, tabled by Heath immediately after the general election. More 
fundamental, is the narrative of Heath’s decisive, even indispensable, role in 
the success of the application, implicitly (and necessarily) distinguishing him 
from Wilson.64 The parameters of this thesis are designed to highlight that 
the success of the application cannot be reduced to Heath and the 
negotiations of 1970-72, but needs to be viewed as part of a political context, 
shaped by both the events of 1967 (already recounted) and particularly by 
developments in 1968-70.  In this, it builds upon the work of other diplomatic 
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historians writing about the late 1960s, but as part of the first wave of writers 
to deal with the archives on Heath and the second application, the thesis 
seeks to influence future British historiography by demonstrating that the 
balance in the narrative of EC entry ought to rest as much upon this earlier 
period as the eye-catching events of 1971.   
 
For the more specialised reader, the thesis also presents a number of 
significant new findings. The first three chapters deal with revival of the 
application under Harold Wilson. Currently, the principal work on this subject 
is Pine’s Harold Wilson and Europe: Pursuing Membership of the European 
Community. While Pine’s is certainly a very valuable account of the period in 
question, this thesis revises her analysis in two important ways. Chapter 1 
shows that British policy and tactics during de Gaulle’s final months in power 
were more contested than her study reveals. By the end of 1968, a debate 
was emerging over future policy, which gathered momentum as a result of 
the ‘Soames affair’ of February 1969, and which had its heart the possibility 
of significant alterations to London’s existing approach. This internal debate 
was only stayed by the resignation of de Gaulle in April 1969. Chapter 2 then 
presents a new analysis of British diplomacy in the lead up to The Hague 
summit, in which as much attention is paid to the question of Community 
finance as to the withdrawal of the French veto on enlargement negotiations. 
It will show what has not before been seen: that in the lead up to the summit, 
Britain sought to influence the Five in the hope of preventing agreement on a 
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permanent regulation.65 The failure of this diplomacy, and subsequent 
attempts to influence the detailed definition of the regulation, ensured that 
Community finance would be one of the central battlegrounds of the 
enlargement negotiations. Chapter 3, while broadly consistent with existing 
interpretations of Wilson’s European views, provides new insights into his 
approach to the EEC application on the eve of negotiations. It emphasises 
the altered context brought about by the deterioration in public opinion 
towards the EEC application in early 1970, as well as the potentially 
formidable balance of payments implications of joining which were 
highlighted by the February 1970 white paper. In spite of this, and some 
equivocal statements made in the context of the forthcoming general 
election, the chapter shows that Wilson’s determination to bring about a 
successful conclusion to the application was unabated. 
 
The second half of the thesis explores Heath’s role in the success of the 
accession negotiations, which began on 30 June 1970, just twelve days after 
the general election. While there is a significant body of literature on this 
subject already, much of it was written without access to official archives. Of 
the two that are, Con O’Neill’s report is based only upon Foreign Office files 
and is written from a Foreign Office perspective. In particular, his treatment 
of the crucial period between May and June 1971 suggests that he was not 
privy to the record of the critical Heath-Pompidou summit (the record of 
which was not transmitted beyond Downing Street), with the result that his 
explanation of this crucial meeting and its impact upon the decisive 
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negotiating meetings in June is in need of substantial revision.66 Rücker has 
examined the accession negotiations within a trilateral Anglo-French-German 
perspective, and is therefore complementary to this study; her work on the 
British side being limited by the fact that she does not utilise either Cabinet 
minutes and memoranda, or the files of the European Integration Department 
in the Foreign Office.67  
 
Chapter 4 will thus explore the EEC related dynamics within the Heath 
government, and its early exchanges with the Six in the period June to 
December 1970. Little has previously been written about the how the EEC 
application played out within the Conservative Cabinet, and the chapter will 
show that the case for British entry was brought into question by the issue of 
British payments to the Community budget, just as it had been under Wilson, 
and that Heath sought to deal with this internal difficulty in a very similar way 
to his predecessor: by deferring it.  
 
In its final two chapters, this thesis will itself increasingly adopt an Anglo-
French perspective. It does so because it is clear that the success of the 
negotiations in Brussels rested on a bilateral reconciliation between London 
and Paris. Here, the thesis employs the presidential papers of Georges 
Pompidou to gain an all-important French primary source perspective on a 
story which has until now largely been told using British sources. Chapters 5 
and 6 thus explain the development of the negotiations in the crucial six 
months of January to June 1971. Chapter 5 will show how and why an 
                                                            
66
 Hannay, Britain’s. 
67
 Rücker, ‘triangle’. 
30 
 
impasse arose in the accession negotiations during the first quarter of 1971. 
It will argue that it was deliberately inspired by Pompidou, partly to 
demonstrate the need for a summit meeting with Heath. It will also examine 
the British reaction to the impasse, and the secret Anglo-French 
conversations which resulted in a meeting of seminal importance to the 
negotiations: the Heath-Pompidou summit of May 1971. Chapter 6 will then 
provide a detailed analysis of the summit, surpassing previous accounts of 
how it led to the resolution of the major negotiating problems in June. 
 
The research on which this thesis is based primarily rests upon British official 
sources held at The National Archives. This includes minutes and 
memoranda of Cabinet and Cabinet committees, the files for the Prime 
Minister’s office, the Cabinet Office, Foreign and Commonwealth Office and 
Treasury. It also makes use of Hansard parliamentary debates and 
command papers, the private papers of a number of key ministers and 
officials, interviews with witnesses, memoirs and diaries. As has been noted, 
the presidential papers of Georges Pompiodou (including those of his 
technical adviser, Jean-René Bernard) are utilised in Chapters 5 and 6 to 
explain Pompidou’s approach to the accession negotiations. In keeping with 
the approach of the thesis as a whole, however, the greater weight of 
analysis will continue to fall upon British attitudes, policies and diplomacy.
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Chapter 1 
 
 ‘Poker with the General’1 
Britain, Europe and de Gaulle 
January 1968 to April 1969 
 
 
The French veto of December 1967 provoked a Community crisis that was 
both deeper and longer than that which followed the veto of 1963, with the 
result that the question of EC enlargement remained at the forefront of 
European affairs throughout 1968 and into 1969.2 The crisis of the Six 
offered scope for Britain to play an activist role in European diplomacy, to 
maintain the momentum gained during 1967, and to attempt to preserve the 
isolation of France because of its veto. Much of this has been recounted in 
existing studies, yet British policy in 1968-69 was also more contested than 
has previously been revealed.3 From late 1968, the new ambassador to 
Paris, Christopher Soames, began to advocate a more conciliatory approach 
to France, ideas which soon began to find interest in London.4 When Charles 
de Gaulle then stunned the British by proposing Anglo-French talks with a 
view to the possibility of  major changes in the existing architecture of West 
European politics, the question of British policy towards France was posed in 
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a more acute and immediate form.5 London’s response, by informing the 
Five of the French proposal, was to create a sensation, and reflected the 
dominance of FCO thinking at the time. Yet de Gaulle’s ideas were to give 
impetus to those who favoured changes in British diplomatic tactics. Indeed, 
by April 1969, a major debate was beginning about Britain’s future European 
strategy, with thoughts of reviving the French offer of talks increasingly 
ascendant.6 The debate was only cut short by de Gaulle’s resignation on 28 
April, as the prospect of early entry to the Community came to the fore. 
 
This chapter revises existing understanding of British policy during the veto 
period and proceeds in three stages.7 In the first part, it will examine internal 
thinking on Britain’s approach to Europe and how best to respond to 
France’s opposition to enlargement in the year from January 1968 to January 
1969. It will then re-examine the Soames affair, emphasising both Wilson’s 
uncertainty about how to handle the French approach, and his subsequent 
use of it as a means to contribute to French isolation. The final part of the 
chapter will show that Wilson was among those who began to question the 
wisdom of London’s reaction to de Gaulle’s offer, and will delineate how this 
debate unfolded between March and April 1969. 
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British policy after the veto, January 1968-February 1969 
 
In February 1968 Cabinet carried out a fundamental appraisal of British 
foreign policy, concluding, as it had done in the previous year, that there was 
no satisfactory alternative to full membership of the European Community.8 
The review was triggered in January 1968 by expressions of unease 
regarding the direction of British diplomacy in the post-veto context.9 In the 
month following the Community Council meeting of 18-19 December, at 
which France had made clear it was unwilling to allow negotiations with 
Britain to be opened, Foreign Secretary George Brown had been involved in 
an ongoing effort to co-ordinate with the Five and isolate France over the 
question of enlargement.10 This activity had culminated in the Benelux 
proposals of January 1968, calling for consultations between the Six and the 
applicant states over Community policies and for joint ‘action’ in areas which 
fell outside existing Community competences.11 To some ministers, this 
concentration on relations with the Five seemed of dubious value in a context 
where British entry to the EC appeared impossible for some time to come. It 
was argued that in the new situation created by the French veto, Britain 
might do better to focus on its relationships with partners other than the 
Five.12 There seemed plenty of alternative diplomatic avenues to pursue: 
relations with the United States and the Commonwealth were both in need of 
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attention following the decision to accelerate withdrawal from East of Suez; 
EFTA continued to provide Britain with economic advantages in Western 
Europe, and there was ongoing potential for improving trade links with the 
countries of Eastern Europe.13 While the Cabinet minutes do not specify 
which ministers raised concerns, there were a number of individuals who had 
felt uneasy about the original decision to apply (including senior figures such 
as Barbara Castle, Richard Crossman and Denis Healey) and for whom the 
French veto might have appeared a good reason to lessen the priority 
currently accorded to diplomatic action with the Five.14 In his diary, Benn 
records that there were ‘a lot’ of ministers who expressed misgivings and that 
he too ‘urged that we should pause and reflect [on] what our view should 
be’.15   
 
From the outset there was, however, little prospect of the review leading to 
changes in the Community focus of British foreign policy. The question of 
whether or not to seek membership had been exhaustively examined in the 
spring of 1967, and the decision to do so had been taken in full 
consciousness that a French veto was possible, even likely.16 Wilson had 
secured Cabinet support by arguing that Community membership offered the 
only satisfactory framework for British foreign policy over the long-term, that 
an application at some stage was therefore inevitable, and that French 
opposition should not be seen as an impediment to doing so in the short-
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term.17 It was easy to extend this logic into the post-veto situation: if EC 
membership was the ultimate objective, Britain should simply keep pressing 
its application until France gave way. And it was a policy supported by the 
four most senior ministers: Wilson, Brown, Roy Jenkins (the Chancellor of 
the Exchequer) and Michael Stewart (First Secretary of State).18 Any attempt 
to alter the direction of policy would have to overcome this consensus at the 
top of government. 
 
The basis of the review was a paper submitted to Cabinet by Brown, 
representing a synthesis of Foreign Office thinking about the future of British 
power.19 The FO had been a consistent supporter of British entry to the 
Community since the early 1960s, but the importance ascribed to Europe 
within the overall framework of British foreign policy had gradually increased 
as Britain’s economic strength and political influence had declined.20 The 
essence of the Foreign Office view was that Britain could no longer play a 
major international role on its own, and that it needed to be associated with 
‘a much larger power system than we ourselves possess’.21 That power 
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system should be Western Europe. An increased concentration on Europe 
did not, however, weaken the FO’s commitment to the more traditional 
mainspring of British foreign policy: Atlanticism.22 The aim of partnership 
between Europe and the United States was still integral to British strategy. 
Reflecting this thinking, Brown’s paper argued that Britain should seek ‘to 
produce a Western Europe which is stronger and more cohesive than at 
present and which, generally speaking, expects to act in harmony with the 
United States’. The EC represented ‘the basis of such an effort’ and Britain 
‘should bend every effort to join the European Communities at the earliest 
possible moment’. To this end, London should both support, and participate 
in, diplomatic initiatives such as the Benelux proposals. This would reduce 
British ‘isolation’ in the interim, and, potentially, if sufficient pressure could be 
exerted, France ‘might come to think that the damage to them of keeping us 
out is greater than the risks of letting us in’.23 Presenting the paper to 
Cabinet, Brown underlined his hope that Western Europe would develop ‘into 
a power-structure able to exert world-wide influence in defence of its 
interests’.24  
 
The Defence Secretary, Denis Healey, was given the first opportunity to 
respond. He agreed with Brown that British policy must be ‘Europe-based’, 
but he stopped short of the conclusion that Britain must therefore join the 
Community. Britain’s principal objectives should be prosperity and security at 
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the lowest cost, to which end Community entry represented just ‘one means’. 
He doubted whether the EC could be turned into an organisation ‘through 
which we could influence world affairs’, and felt that in future London should 
concentrate less on the objective of entry. For Healey, it was still ‘premature’ 
to try and reach conclusions about future policy, but ‘careful thought’ needed 
to be given to the subject moving forward.25 There was little Cabinet 
discussion beyond this (a reflection less of the support for Brown’s paper, 
than an inability on the part of the sceptics to present a coherent critique 
around which others could rally). One of the potential critics, Crossman, was 
not present, and only Castle appears to have made a significant contribution. 
In her diary, she recalled ‘burst[ing] out with one of my usual diatribes’, only 
to be met with ‘deathly silence’ from her colleagues.26 Castle’s account 
accords with the minutes of the meeting, which do not attribute comments to 
individuals, but in which there does appear to be a solitary, sceptical 
intervention. It was argued that ‘membership of the EEC was now blocked for 
some years and was not necessarily the best option open to us’. The 
Kennedy Round had significantly mitigated the harmful effects of the 
Community’s common external tariff, and Britain should not overlook the 
advantages it accrued from EFTA and the Commonwealth. If, as Castle’s 
diary suggests, silence did follow, it was then filled by a repetition of the 
argument that there was no ‘viable alternative’ to Community membership 
and that ‘neither EFTA nor the Commonwealth could be sufficiently 
strengthened’.27 The outcome was captured in Wilson’s summary that ‘we’ve 
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had a pretty uneventful, not to say dull, debate’: Brown’s paper was 
approved, but it had by no means received a resounding endorsement.28 
 
Shortly after, in mid-March 1968, Brown was to resign from Cabinet over 
Wilson’s handling of the gold crisis.29 His replacement, Michael Stewart, had 
been foreign secretary between 1964 and 1966, during which period he had 
pressed Wilson to look more favourably at the prospect of Community 
membership.30 He thus seemed certain to be a continuity figure as far as 
Europe was concerned, albeit with a more sober style (both literally and 
metaphorically) than his colourful predecessor.31 Stewart’s principal adviser 
with regard to European policy would be Patrick Hancock, himself only 
promoted to the post of deputy under secretary in the FO in February 1968. 
With the resignation of the man who would have led Britain’s negotiations 
with the Community had they opened in 1967, Con O’Neill, in March, 
Hancock became the lead official concerned with British-EC relations.32  
 
Under Brown, the Foreign Office had been looking to make progress on the 
Benelux proposals.33 Hopes of early advances had been frustrated, however, 
by Germany’s desire to investigate the possibility of a trade arrangement 
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between the Community and the applicant countries.34 The FO was 
instinctively sceptical about this prospect, believing that France would ensure 
that any negotiations were protracted and potentially desultory, and that in 
the meantime attention would be deflected from the question of British 
membership.35 But the fact that Bonn was the principal sponsor of the idea 
meant that London could not simply adopt a sceptical attitude. Throughout 
1968, Germany proved reluctant to let arguments over enlargement damage 
its bilateral relationship with France, or hinder the internal development of the 
Community.36  Thus, British reluctance with regard to the trade arrangement 
would reduce the pressure on Bonn to support initiatives such as the 
Benelux proposals. In addition, Anthony Crosland, the president of the Board 
of Trade, urged that Whitehall should not discount the possibility that such an 
arrangement might offer Britain some advantage.37 Britain therefore made 
clear that it was prepared to consider any proposal emanating from the 
Community, provided it had the support of the Six as a whole and was linked 
to eventual British accession.38 With Belgium, Italy and the Netherlands also 
insisting that a trade arrangement must be linked to British entry, the months 
from March to September witnessed a protracted attempt to induce Paris to 
declare its position.39 It was not until the Council of Ministers meeting on 27 
September that the new French Foreign Minister, Michel Debré, finally 
conceded that his government was unwilling to permit a link between a trade 
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deal and British accession.40 As a result, while Germany continued to 
harbour hopes of resuscitating the plan, the Benelux countries and Italy now 
felt free to pursue other avenues, and the opportunity presented itself for 
Britain to play a more assertive role in the post-veto diplomacy.41 
 
On 3 October, the Belgian Foreign Minister, Pierre Harmel, took the initiative 
by advocating a modified version of the Benelux proposals. The Harmel plan 
called in particular for an attempt to establish new procedures for 
cooperation on European political and defence issues within the Western 
European Union (WEU).42 The proposal was first discussed on a Seven-
power basis at the Rome meeting of WEU on 21-22 October.43 Stewart 
reported to London that the French approach had been ‘completely negative 
in substance and offensive in tone’.44 In consequence, representatives of 
Britain and the Five met without France for the first time since the veto crisis 
of January 1963, and discussed how Harmel’s ideas should be taken 
forward. Stewart now took the lead in pressing for continued action without 
France, and at a further meeting in New York on 14 November it was agreed 
that the Italians should prepare a report on the establishment of new 
procedures for political consultation to be considered at the next WEU 
meeting in February 1969.45 
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The reasons for British participation in the Harmel plan remained 
fundamentally the same as those which had motivated British support for the 
Benelux proposals: to maintain the momentum behind Britain’s application to 
join the Community and to apply pressure to France over its continued 
opposition to enlargement.46 This was intimately connected to another 
tactical objective: to prevent the Community developing in ways that would 
make subsequent British accession more difficult (for instance, through 
agreement on a permanent mechanism for financing of the CAP).47 In the 
Foreign Office, this situation came to be known as the ‘double veto’; France 
was able to block British entry to the EC, but by continuing to press its 
application, Britain would seek to hold-up the Community’s internal 
development.48 
 
One historian has recently labelled British diplomacy between late 1968 and 
early 1969 as ‘Wilson’s anti-French approach’.49 It is more accurate to refer 
to a Foreign Office anti-French approach, spearheaded by the powerful 
combined intellects of Patrick Hancock and the head of the European 
Integration Department, John Robinson.50 Throughout 1968, it was the FO 
which took the lead in formulating and implementing British policy towards 
Europe, and, as will be seen shortly, this was not always synonymous with 
Wilson’s thinking. By the close the year, differences between Downing Street 
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and the Foreign Office were increasingly visible. In the early autumn, 
however, the FO line remained unchallenged. Its approach to the linked 
questions of British policy towards Europe and relations with France are 
captured in two minutes written by Hancock. The first, in July 1968, before 
the launch of the Harmel Plan, advocated sustained diplomatic activity in 
order to keep the question of British EC membership alive:    
 
The fact that France will continue to oppose any step which might 
facilitate our membership of the Communities is not an argument 
against our maintaining pressure. Indeed we need to do so. We must 
continue to stick pins into the French from time to time. Our European 
policy will not succeed unless and until there is a complete change in 
French policy. Until this change comes about our interest lies in the 
Community making as little progress as possible. While we must be 
careful not to avow it, a stagnant Community will increase pressure on 
France to change her policy on British membership.51 
 
Then, in October 1968, once the Harmel plan had been launched, Hancock 
updated his analysis: 
 
we must continue to maintain that all we do in Europe is open to the 
French. But there can be little question now of France either taking part 
or abandoning her efforts to obstruct what we are trying to do. Relations 
with France are consequently going to become increasingly difficult 
during the months ahead, and are likely to reach a dead end as regards 
Europe when [at the next WEU meeting] ... France makes clear her 
opposition to Britain’s participation on an equal footing in action outside 
the Treaties [of Rome]. There will be nothing to be gained by attempting 
to disguise this. France for her own reasons is out to damage our 
interests. But to the greatest extent possible we should try to identify 
French damage of our interests with her damage of European interests. 
Her tactics have helped us in this so far, and could continue to do so.52 
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While relations with France would become an increasing point of tension 
between Downing Street and the FCO, the first signs of disharmony arose 
over a different question: Wilson’s support for a re-launch of the Fouchet 
Plan. The Fouchet Plan was originally a French initiative, dating back to 
1961, for a new European political community.53 At that time, it provoked 
considerable discord within the Six due to the intergovernmental nature of 
the proposed Community, over its relationship with NATO, and the question 
of British participation (which de Gaulle opposed).54 The Fouchet 
negotiations came to a halt in April 1962, never to be revived, and at a press 
conference the following month de Gaulle spoke indignantly about federalism 
and alleged intrigues on the part of Britain and the US.55 Historians have 
differed in their explanations for Wilson’s attraction to the idea in 1968. 
Möckli depicts it as a mechanism to ‘demonstrate Britain’s European 
posture’, to isolate de Gaulle, and to influence internal French politics in a 
way that would reduce the likelihood that the president, when he retired, 
would be succeeded by a Gaullist.56 Pine, on the other hand, contends that it 
was a contingency plan, which Britain could launch if the Harmel initiative 
were to fail, thereby maintaining the momentum in Britain’s relations with the 
Community.57 The argument here is that neither explanation accurately 
captures Wilson’s motivations. The prime minister was not attempting to 
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influence electoral politics in France; his fear was that, whatever the British 
might do, de Gaulle would be succeeded by someone that shared his 
attitude towards enlargement and would seek to maintain the veto.58 At the 
same time, Wilson’s championing of the initiative was not contingent upon 
the success or failure of the Harmel plan: his return to the issue in 
November, having initially raised it in September, was motivated by a view 
that the WEU initiative was too limited.59 During Cabinet’s discussion of the 
Harmel plan in mid-October, Wilson had urged Stewart to consider ways of 
‘giving greater content to the proposals for collaboration’. Fouchet attracted 
him precisely because it was more far-reaching than the Harmel plan – the 
aim being to establish Britain so firmly within the framework of European 
integration that it would appear impossible for any successor to de Gaulle to 
maintain his opposition to enlargement.60 As Wilson explained to the 
ambassador designate to Paris, Christopher Soames, shortly before he took 
up the post, Britain’s purpose should be to ‘pursue policies designed to break 
down the resistance of the General’s principal lieutenants and therefore to 
soften up the resistance of a successor regime’.61 If successful, it also 
offered the domestic advantage of enabling Wilson to trump Edward Heath 
and the Conservative party. 
 
                                                            
58
 On Wilson’s concern that de Gaulle’s successor may seek to maintain the veto on British 
entry see TNA/PREM13/2113, Palliser to Maitland (record of a discussion between Wilson 
and Stewart), 12 September 1968; and handwritten comment on paragraph 6 of draft 
memorandum attached to Hancock to Soames, 7 January 1969. 
59
 See Pine, Harold, pp.101-02; TNA/PREM13/2113, Palliser to Maitland (record of a 
discussion between Wilson and Stewart), 12 September 1968; TNA/PREM13/2627, Wilson 
handwritten minute, on Paris to FCO, tel.1105, 26 November 1968. 
60
 TNA/CAB128/43, CC(68)42nd, 17 October 1968. TNA/CAB130/398, MISC224(68)1st 
Meeting, 16 October 1968. 
61
 TNA/PREM13/2641, Note for the record, meeting between Wilson and Soames, 10 
September 1968. 
45 
 
The Foreign Office, however, was sceptical about the idea. Its reservations 
were rooted in tactics rather than principle. In particular, officials doubted the 
wisdom of injecting a new and potentially divisive proposal into an already 
fractured European context. Given the controversy provoked by the original 
Fouchet negotiations, and the present reluctance of Germany to take 
meaningful steps without France, such an initiative could do more harm than 
good.62 To the FO, it seemed better to proceed cautiously on the basis of 
Harmel’s ideas, thus maintaining the pressure on France, rather than to risk 
potentially greater controversy, a danger inherent in the Fouchet Plan, and 
end up with nothing. While Downing Street acknowledged the FO’s argument 
about the divisiveness of the original Fouchet proposals, it could not accept 
its more general analysis.63 Wilson wrote to Stewart conceding that any 
initiative would have to be proposed under a different name, but his basic 
support for the idea remained unchanged. With this top level intervention, the 
FO began work on a draft Cabinet paper setting out the case for a new 
British initiative.64  
 
The tensions over future policy towards France were stimulated above all by 
the persistent advice from Christopher Soames who was installed as 
ambassador to Paris in September.65 A former Conservative Cabinet minister 
(and the son-in-law of Winston Churchill), Soames was a ‘heavyweight’ 
political ambassador and an impassioned believer in British membership of 
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the Community.66 The inspiration for his appointment is usually accredited to 
George Brown, but Wilson’s private secretary at the time, Michael Palliser, 
maintains that the idea was originally that of Wilson, who then ‘sold’ it to 
Brown.67 Soames had high hopes of his mission, stressing to Wilson in July 
that ‘we should not rule out the possibility of a volte-face by the General in 
the next year or so’. Wilson entertained little such optimism, but supported 
Soames’s desire for an improved atmosphere in Franco-British relations.68 
Stewart was less enthusiastic about the appointment than his predecessor; 
when Wilson told him that it appeared Soames would be a ‘rumbustuous’ 
ambassador, the foreign secretary expressed ‘some apprehension lest 
Soames might try to play too active a part in the formulation of policy’. Wilson 
diminished the concern, explaining that Soames appeared to understand the 
‘limitations’ which the job entailed.69 Yet the foreign secretary’s misgivings 
soon proved well founded: on 13 November, the new ambassador wrote a 
lengthy letter to him commenting upon a growing sense of isolation in 
France, the possibility of moves towards a more amicable relationship with 
the United States, and the opportunities it might provide for progress in 
Franco-British relations. He urged that thought should be given to new 
initiatives in the political, defence and monetary fields with the aim of 
including France.70  
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For the time being, while there was little prospect of Soames’s thinking 
leading to any alterations in FCO strategy, dominated as this was by 
Hancock and Robinson, it attracted interest in Downing Street.71 On 23 
December, Palliser wrote to Wilson recording a conversation he had held 
with the ambassador the previous day. Soames, he explained, was 
‘frustrated’ with what he saw as a Foreign Office predilection for trying to 
isolate France and desired an opportunity to try and ‘re-open the dialogue’ 
between London and Paris. He was dismissive about the possibility of the 
Harmel plan ending successfully, and suggested that once this was shown to 
be the case (which he believed it would be at the WEU meeting in early 
1969), Britain should break with the existing strategy of co-ordinating with the 
‘smaller’ powers and focus upon building closer relationships with France 
and Germany. With his first meeting with de Gaulle due at the start of 
February, Soames hoped for authority to ‘probe in a fairly substantive 
fashion’. If the French president were to show an interest, Soames hoped it 
might be possible to work towards a meeting between Wilson and de Gaulle 
the following autumn. Although Palliser felt that there was ‘some confusion in 
his [Soames’s] mind between his natural and instinctive desire for action and 
the question [of] whether any action of the kind he envisages can be 
productive’, he nonetheless felt that Soames’s ‘instinctive political feeling 
about this situation is probably right’. Wilson’s private secretary also thought 
that ‘Soames’s despair about the rigidity of Foreign Office thinking is a bit 
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exaggerated: but equally it has some truth in it’.72 Wilson’s attitude fell 
between that of Palliser and the Foreign Office. His primary concern 
continued to be that de Gaulle’s successor should deem a veto unthinkable, 
and to this end recognised the benefit in isolating France over enlargement; 
he was nonetheless attracted by the idea of a rapprochement with Paris.73 
The prime minister scribbled on Parlliser’s minute, ‘very useful ... I have a lot 
of sympathy with Soames’s views’.74 
 
At the turn of the year, future policy towards France and a possible re-launch 
of the Fouchet plan became linked in Downing Street thinking, as the latter 
initiative came to be seen as one potential basis for a more positive 
approach to France.75 To this end, the proposal would need to be drafted 
and presented in such a way as to make it clear that London genuinely 
desired French participation. It should also make German participation 
easier, by reducing the scope for Paris to be outwardly critical.76 At the same 
time, Wilson remained realistic: while French involvement represented the 
ideal, his first objective was to ensure an advance in Britain’s European 
position, whether or not France was involved.77 And it was not only in 
Downing Street that this kind of approach was now gaining currency. On 19 
December, Lord Chalfont, a Minister of State in the FCO with responsibility 
for Europe, wrote to Stewart to advocate a shift in British tactics. Like 
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Soames, Chalfont was pessimistic about the prospects for the Harmel plan 
and argued that if the February meeting of WEU failed to bring progress, 
Britain should continue attempts to develop new forms of cooperation in 
areas outside the Treaties of Rome, but at the same time look to ‘shift the 
emphasis of our policy from a small-power operation (Benelux plus possibly 
Italy) to a big-power operation (France, and Germany, plus possibly Italy)’. 
This, he noted, would be consistent with Wilson’s support for a new British 
initiative as well as the ideas being advanced by Soames.78 While Stewart 
expressed some backing for Chalfont’s ideas, he had difficulty in seeing how 
‘a big-power operation’ could be realised and requested further advice.79 In 
Downing Street, Wilson authorised Palliser to tell Chalfont that he thought his 
approach was ‘just about right’.80  
 
By the beginning of February, however, the thought being given to a British 
Fouchet plan began to subside. The FCO remained cautious about the 
chances of it succeeding, and it emerged from discussions with Italian 
representatives that Rome was considering launching a similar initiative of its 
own.81 In a letter to Downing Street, Maitland suggested that it would be 
better to encourage the Italians to take the lead. There appeared to be 
growing domestic pressure upon the German Chancellor, Kiesinger, to 
modify his consistently conciliatory attitude towards de Gaulle, and a major 
proposal from another Community member would confront him with further 
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difficulties.82 Wilson fully agreed. Alongside the FCO rationale, it also meant 
that he did not yet have to ‘climb out on the limb of a British initiative’, with 
the attendant risk of a second European rebuff.83 More generally, February 
seemed certain to be an important month. The WEU ministerial meeting in 
Luxembourg was scheduled for 6 February, and an attempt would be made 
to take decisions on the Harmel plan. Six days after that, Wilson would be in 
Bonn for summit talks with Kiesinger. The linkage between these two events 
was clear: if France took an obstructive line in Luxembourg, the 
circumstances would be propitious for the prime minister to advocate Anglo-
German cooperation in overcoming French obstruction. The fact that Bonn 
was desirous of an Anglo-German declaration of friendship (yet further 
evidence of Kiesinger’s domestic difficulties), appeared to strengthen the 
British hand.84 In preparation for this, Donald Maitland, Private Secretary to 
the Foreign Secretary, suggested that Stewart should make it clear to the 
German Foreign Minister, Willy Brandt, that if the Luxembourg meeting 
‘failed’ to produce ‘a really significant step forward’, London would ‘regard it 
as very important that the German and British Governments should take 
some significant steps themselves, and the right moment to discuss this 
would be when the prime minister goes to Bonn’.85 This was, in effect, the 
Hancock-Robinson approach at its most persuasive: the opportunity to 
isolate de Gaulle by splitting the Franco-German tandem. And Wilson was 
delighted with it. He expressed strong approval both for the ‘general strategy 
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and its detailed working out’.86 Presented with such an opportunity, Wilson 
lost sight of his earlier interest in a more constructive approach to France. 
But it did not take long for the question to reappear, as de Gaulle now moved 
to centre stage. 
 
The ‘Soames affair’, February 1969 
 
It was Soames’s first private conversation with the French president since his 
arrival in Paris and little can have prepared him for the intrigue that it would 
create. During a forty-five minute conversation on 4 February, the sole focus 
of which was ‘Britain and Europe in the longer run’, de Gaulle suggested to 
Soames the possibility of Britain and France commencing talks about 
potentially significant changes to the political and economic organisation of 
Western Europe.87 The early part of the conversation gave little indication of 
anything new in the General’s mind. As Soames put it, de Gaulle opened 
with a ‘classic lecture on our pro-American fixation’.88 Soames sought to 
impress upon him the extent of Britain’s commitment to the Community, and 
asked whether it was ‘necessary for us to leave NATO to prove that we were 
European’. De Gaulle said that ‘he was not looking for that, but that once 
there was a truly independent Europe there would be no need for NATO as 
such’. The ‘essence of a European entity’ must be independence.89 It was at 
this point that de Gaulle shocked Soames; he suggested a fresh look at 
Franco-British relations and how they might relate to Europe unity. The 
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president remarked that ‘he had had no part in the creation of the Common 
Market, neither did he have any particular faith in it’, and he was convinced 
that if enlargement took place ‘it could no longer be the same’. He would be 
happy to see the Community change ‘into a looser form of a free trade area 
with arrangements by each country to exchange agricultural produce’. 
Alongside this, there would be an ‘inner political association’ made up of 
Britain, France, Germany and Italy. But the first step must be for Britain and 
France to hold bilateral talks with a view to determining whether they ‘saw 
things sufficiently in common’. His proposal should be kept secret until the 
decision was taken to begin talks, at which point it would be made public. ‘If 
things progressed the right way’, de Gaulle said that he would ‘welcome’ 
talks with Wilson.90 Eleven years earlier, this was exactly the offer the Harold 
Macmillan had hankered after. 
  
The British response to de Gaulle’s proposals has attracted significant 
scholarly attention and the main details of what went on to become the 
‘Soames affair’ are well known.91 Alongside the question of how to reply, the 
situation in London was complicated by Wilson’s forthcoming visit to Bonn. 
Stewart recommended very early that he should inform Kiesinger of the 
General’s offer, with the result that in the week between receiving Soames’s 
report and Wilson’s departure for Germany, London debated intensively how 
to handle the presidential approach. The decision was eventually taken to 
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hide nothing from Kiesinger and to give the governments of the Belgium, 
Italy, Luxembourg and the Netherlands full information too.92 De Gaulle’s 
request for secrecy was thus disregarded. Matters were compounded by 
Britain’s failure to inform the French government of its actions until the 
evening of 12 February – after Wilson had spoken to Kiesinger.93 The 
accusation of a British breach of confidence was perhaps inevitable, but 
worse was to follow when France learnt from sources within the Five what 
the British had said. London was now also to be confronted with an 
accusation of distortion, a claim which, as will be seen, was by no means 
unfounded.94 The crisis was completed on 21 February when the British, 
believing that a tendentious French leak was imminent, took the decision 
themselves to leak a full account of de Gaulle’s offer.95 At a meeting with 
Debré the next day, Soames faced a charge of ‘diffusion, deformation and 
sensationalism’.96 
 
Within the existing literature, two main themes predominate on these events. 
First is the question of de Gaulle’s intentions and whether his offer marked a 
new approach or was simply a restatement of long-held ideas.97 Second is 
whether the British response reflected poor judgement or was appropriate to 
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the circumstances.98 The focus in this chapter will be different. Rather than 
entering the debate about the propriety of British actions, it will demonstrate 
that the internal debate about how to respond both reflected existing tensions 
over British policy towards France, and catalysed them, leading in time to the 
decision to begin new studies about economic alternatives to full 
membership of the EC.  
 
In the week between 5 and 12 February, the Whitehall debate divided along 
familiar lines. On one side, Stewart and Hancock were mistrustful of de 
Gaulle’s motivations, and favoured a flat rejection of the proposed talks, as 
well as full divulgence to Kiesinger.99 Against this, Palliser and Soames 
wanted to probe the French proposal further and to provide Kiesinger with 
much more limited information.100 The split was quickly established. Stewart, 
who was in Luxembourg preparing for the ministerial meeting of WEU, sent a 
long telegram to Wilson warning against ‘any response to de Gaulle’s 
approach which could be interpreted as positive or as showing interest’.101 
Setting out his reasons, the foreign secretary argued that de Gaulle: 
 
has given us his terms of reference: the disappearance of NATO: the 
destruction of the existing Communities: a four-power political 
directorate in Europe. This is not a basis for discussion as far as we are 
concerned, nor even for probing his intentions further. Indeed, these 
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are conditions which in our own interest and that of our relations with 
the Five we should go on record as rejecting.102 
 
The danger which preoccupied the Foreign Office was that de Gaulle might 
use the offer to undermine Britain’s relations with the Five. Should London 
respond favourably, Paris would be able to argue that Britain was not truly 
committed to the Community and would prefer to see it transformed into a 
free trade area.103 Whilst Palliser and Soames were alive to this risk, both 
suggested that de Gaulle had an ‘open mind’ about where the talks might 
lead.104 Palliser’s ‘preliminary reaction’ to Wilson was that:  
 
we should clearly not turn him down flat; that we should consider to 
what extent it would be of advantage to us to move cautiously down the 
road he is opening before us; and to what extent we should consult 
other governments in Europe before or while doing so .... Playing poker 
with the General, though fascinating, is not always a profitable 
enterprise. But on the present occasion my hunch is that there may be 
something genuine underlying the old man’s thinking. And we should 
be well advised not to ignore the possibilities that it might conceivably 
open to us.105  
 
Wilson’s view once more reflected conflicting predilections. Upon reading 
Soames’s account, his first instinct was to look for tactical motivations. He 
speculated whether the offer was intended to dissuade him from ‘taking too 
hard’ an ‘anti-French’ line with Kiesinger, or, with the first visit to Europe of 
the new US President, Richard Nixon, due at the end of February, whether 
he might try to claim that he was genuinely desirous of an end to the 
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enlargement impasse.106 With this in mind, Wilson welcomed Stewart’s 
recommendation that he should inform Kiesinger of the approach. Yet he 
also agreed with Palliser’s desire to ‘probe’ the proposal further: ‘Certainly 
we sh[ould]d follow up – and given encouragement it is getting time for me to 
see him again’.107  
 
On 6 February, Soames met Debré, who went ‘over the ground’ with him a 
second time. The French foreign minister remarked that, ‘It might well be that 
the Treaty of Rome would prove to have been just a stage in economic 
development of Europe’. Soames felt that de Gaulle had been ‘none too 
sanguine’ about Anglo-French talks reaching a positive conclusion, but 
Debré warned of ‘a grave peril in the fact that France and Britain seemed to 
be vying with each other to woo Germany’; ‘this was extremely dangerous for 
both of us’. He believed it to be ‘in France’s interest to reach an accord with 
Britain and he recommended me [Soames] to put this in the balance against 
any pessimistic impression that I might have drawn from the General’s words 
or demeanour’.108 Upon receiving Soames’s account, Palliser provided a 
further commentary for Wilson. Drawing upon Debré’s remark about a 
contest for German favour, Palliser now judged that ‘the French are 
obviously very anxious to put an oar in before you go to Bonn’, but 
maintained that Stewart’s advice reflected ‘the continuing reluctance in the 
FCO to face the fact that European unity is meaningless unless all three of 
the big European powers ... form part of it’. Thus, Palliser’s basic advice 
remained unchanged: 
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I do not see how we can possibly refuse to talk to the French: nor that 
we need be scared that we must inevitably be taken for a ride if we do 
so. We can talk on the basis of our ideas, and they will talk on the basis 
of theirs. This may produce a dialogue of the deaf but if we refuse the 
dialogue altogether, surely it is we who are inevitably in the wrong.109 
  
 
It was also on 6 February that the Harmel plan was discussed at the 
Luxembourg meeting of WEU. The outcome was better than most in 
Whitehall had expected. While France, represented by State Secretary Jean 
de Lipkowski, adopted a sceptical attitude, it did not actively obstruct a 
decision, with the result that agreement was reached to institute new 
procedures for political consultation within WEU.110 While Stewart conceded 
that it marked only a ‘very modest step’ and that ‘determination’ would be 
needed to make it effective, it was nonetheless the first positive product of 
British diplomacy since the veto (to complement the negative achievement of 
holding-up internal Community development).111 By appearing to show that 
existing tactics were working, it also strengthened the argument for 
maintaining existing policies, and increased the perceived risks of any 
diversion. 
 
A Downing Street meeting was held on 10 February to discuss Wilson’s 
general approach to the summit with Kiesinger. Alongside the prime minister, 
Stewart, Hancock, Palliser, Chalfont, Denis Greenhill (the new Permanent 
Under-Secretary at the FCO), and Cabinet Secretary Burke Trend were all 
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present. De Gaulle’s proposals were the first item to be considered. While 
the minutes do not reveal the finer details of the discussion, agreement was 
reached that ‘in the spirit of consultation on political matters’ which had been 
apparent at the Luxembourg WEU meeting, ‘it would be desirable to inform 
Dr. Kiesinger (and the Governments of the Five) of the French approach; and 
to tell the French that this was being done’. While this did not represent a 
final decision, it shows that Stewart’s early advice on this matter was 
ascendant. On the question of how to respond to de Gaulle, however, the 
foreign secretary’s view – that Britain ‘should go on record as rejecting’ – had 
not prevailed. The meeting thus also agreed that ‘It could made clear to 
Kiesinger that we were not disposed to return a flat negative to the French 
proposal’. Thus, if Anglo-French talks were held, ‘we should do so in 
consultation with the Germans (and our other European allies) and we would 
make it clear at the outset that we did not accept General de Gaulle’s 
approach to N.A.T.O. or his concept of seeking some alternative 
arrangement to the E.E.C.’ Soames had expressed a desire to return to 
London to discuss the General’s approach, but Stewart made clear that he 
was against this. Hancock would instead go to Paris and inform the 
ambassador about current thinking in London.112 
 
At a meeting with Soames later that day, Hancock produced an FCO paper 
setting out how Wilson should speak to Kiesinger. If followed, it meant 
providing the German Chancellor with much of the detail, including de 
Gaulle’s comments about NATO and what the Foreign Office continued to 
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call ‘a Four Power European political directorate’ – even though this term had 
not been used by de Gaulle.113 Hancock’s record of the conversation states 
that Soames ‘was very upset’, and insisted that ‘he must come to London at 
once’. The ambassador was, however, informed that Stewart was opposed 
to this. Soames argued that the proposed course of action ‘would kill the 
French approach dead ... before it had been probed. What was the use of his 
mission in Paris?’ But Hancock responded firmly:  
 
what he [Soames] was involved in was a long haul. Even if, as he 
wished, he was allowed to probe the French position, it was not likely 
that any advantage to our European situation would accrue. Meanwhile 
we had to safeguard ourselves against the dangers to which the French 
approach exposed us. If this killed the French approach, that was a risk 
we must accept.114 
 
Soames immediately sent a telegram to London imploring Wilson and 
Stewart to rethink a course of action, ‘which ... would amount to a betrayal 
of General de Gaulle’s confidence’. He urged that Kiesinger be given only 
a much more cursory account, and that he should be given instructions to 
advise Debré about what was being done on 11 February (the day before 
the Bonn summit).115 Palliser also made a final appeal, advising Wilson to 
consider, ‘in the light of Soames’s views’, whether ‘You really wish to 
speak as fully as this to Kiesinger’, and ‘If you do’, whether ‘Your 
relationship with Gen. de Gaulle ... can stand the strain’.116  
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Wilson’s predicament was clear: on the one hand, suspicion towards de 
Gaulle, but on the other a genuine interest in bilateral talks. He travelled to 
Germany on 11 February still undecided about how to proceed.117 Stewart 
sent a telegram to reach the prime minister at the British embassy in 
Bonn. ‘The more I have thought about this since you left for the airport’, 
the foreign secretary explained, ‘the more convinced I have become that 
you should not leave Bonn without telling Kiesinger the whole story’.118 
There is no formal record of how the decision was eventually taken. The 
official team accompanying Wilson included Trend, Greenhill, Hancock, 
Palliser and Robinson.119 Many years later, in an interview with Hugo 
Young, Robinson recalled an evening discussion in the embassy, in which 
Wilson, ‘swirling the brandy’, insisted that he would ‘go to Paris to talk to 
de Gaulle and poke Kiesinger in the eye’.120 In the sober light of day, 
however, his judgement was the reverse. On the morning of 12 February, 
he sent Stewart a telegram informing him of his decision ‘to put Kiesinger 
fully in the picture’.121 
 
Having reached this decision, there can be little doubt that Wilson 
implemented Foreign Office advice to the letter. In his memoirs, he 
deflected any responsibility for the crisis which followed, insisting that he 
had resisted the aggressive tactics (as far as France was concerned) of 
the FCO, and that his account to Kiesinger constituted ‘a few simple 
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sentences with no overtones of the kind that had been proposed’.122 The 
official records, however, reveal a different picture. In his telegram to 
Stewart, informing the foreign secretary of his decision to give Kiesinger a 
full account, Wilson explained that he would outline the French proposals 
‘in such a way as to point up the essentially anti-Atlantic nature of the de 
Gaulle approach, with an eye to the talks that Kiesinger and I are shortly 
to have with Nixon’.123 This was pure FCO orthodoxy: not only was he 
seeking to protect the British position, he would also seek to gain an 
advantage by further isolating de Gaulle. During the summit, he thus told 
Kiesinger that ‘de Gaulle’s basic proposition was that both N.A.T.O. and 
the E.E.C. should disappear’. Yet neither statement was accurate: de 
Gaulle’s comments on NATO had not formed part of his proposals at all – 
rather, they had been made in response to an earlier question from 
Soames about whether it was necessary for Britain to leave NATO in 
order to demonstrate that it was European. De Gaulle had said this was 
unnecessary, but expressed a vague and undefined hope that eventually 
there would be ‘no need for NATO as such’.124 With regard to the EC, de 
Gaulle had said that if enlargement were to take place, the Community 
would have to become ‘a looser form of free trade area’, which was not 
necessarily the same thing as it disappearing. Wilson underlined to 
Kiesinger that Britain’s ‘basic position was in total contradiction’ to that of 
France: London, he said, wanted ‘to join the Community, not bury it’. To 
compound matters, Wilson also used the term ‘directorate’ to describe de 
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Gaulle’s proposed ‘inner political association’, and the phrase was 
repeated in the instructions sent to other Community ambassadors and 
Washinton.125 
 
The length of time with which it took Wilson to reach a decision explains why 
France was not informed of British actions until after he told Kiesinger. Once 
the prime minister had made up his mind, the FCO sent instructions to 
Soames, but these did not reach the ambassador until close to eight o’clock 
that evening, by which point Debré was not available. He thus spoke to 
Hervé Alphand, the Secretary General of the Quai d’Orsay, explaining that 
London considered the French proposals to be ‘significant and far-reaching’, 
but in view of Wilson’s trip to Germany and the recent decision to begin 
political consultations within the WEU, it was ‘too much to ask that we should 
not tell Dr. Kiesinger and our other partners’.126 Nonetheless, and a point 
which is often lost in the concentration on the subsequent Anglo-French 
fallout, Soames made clear that that London, on the understanding that it 
held to its existing stance on NATO and its application for membership of the 
Community, was prepared to enter into the conversations which de Gaulle 
had proposed.127 At this stage, Alphand could only impress upon Soames 
that the British decision would be likely to ‘anger’ both de Gaulle and 
Debré.128  
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The situation deteriorated as France learnt of the British accounts from the 
Five. It was not until 22 February that Soames spoke formally to Debré, with 
the foreign minister stating on three occasions that Britain and France found 
themselves ‘in a field of ruins’. Soames reminded him that London was ready 
to enter into talks, but Debré reacted bitterly: ‘how can we possibly talk ... 
This was the reality of the thing ... Did I see myself having another talk with 
the General now?’ Attacking what he believed to be one of the dominant 
strands of thinking in London – that once de Gaulle retired, French policies 
would change – Debré said that these hopes were ‘an illusion’. ‘When the 
time came for the General to disappear from the scene, the government 
might lose its guiding spirit but it would be the same policies’. Returning to 
the question of bilateral talks, he underlined that ‘There was nothing we 
could now do. The book had been opened in good faith on 4 February and it 
had been closed on 22 February’.129 
 
The decision to review, March to April 1969 
 
For the next two months, London would be preoccupied with the question of 
whether the book should be re-opened. The debate took on new dynamics, 
as differences of view between Downing Street and the Foreign Office were 
added to by tensions within the FCO. External developments also played an 
important role. One was Nixon’s visit to Paris at the start of March, during 
which the new US president made no secret of his intention to repair Franco-
American relations, lavishing praise on de Gaulle’s ‘wisdom and vision’. More 
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significant, however, was de Gaulle’s reciprocity of American goodwill, 
describing the meeting as ‘a success ... for both countries’, as well as 
indicating that he would pay a return visit to Washington the following 
year.130 The positive atmospherics provided yet further evidence that de 
Gaulle’s thinking might be shifting, inevitably casting doubt upon the wisdom 
of Wilson’s actions in Bonn. Another relevant factor was the Franco-German 
summit in Paris on 14 March. British reports suggested that an accord had 
been reached on the need to resume the development of the Community, 
whatever the disagreements over British membership.131 While this did not 
reflect a change in German policy, it did point to the failure of Wilson’s tactics 
in Bonn, and the difficulties in attempting to undercut Franco-German unity. 
Brandt also revealed that France had advocated fresh studies of a free trade 
arrangement between the EEC and EFTA.132 This could be interpreted in two 
ways: it might simply be a return to the Franco-German idea of February 
1968 or it might suggest de Gaulle’s proposals to Soames had reflected a 
more considered approach. 
  
With ‘the dust ... beginning to settle’ on the dramatic events of February, 
Soames wrote to Wilson to set out his thoughts for the future. He explained 
that a ‘number of influential Frenchmen’ had made known to him their desire 
to assist in bringing about a dialogue between London and Paris. One was 
Edgar Faure, a man with long-standing connections to de Gaulle; another 
was the senior Quai d’Orsay official, Jacques de Beaumarchais. Soames 
now asked for clarity: did Wilson want him ‘to encourage these sentiments’? 
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If he did, Soames suggested that he might return to London for a more 
detailed discussion.133 In a covering note, Palliser, who was shortly to leave 
Downing Street to take up a senior role in the Paris Embassy, suggested that 
if Wilson’s response was negative, Soames might ‘begin to wonder about the 
usefulness of continuing in Paris’. The loss of this high profile political 
ambassador less than a year into the job would mark another notable 
embarrassment for the prime minister’s European policy. Shortly thereafter, 
Palliser wrote to the FCO to say that Wilson’s reply to Soames’s question 
‘would certainly be “Yes”’, and suggesting that the ambassador be asked to 
return to London for a meeting the following week.134  
 
Downing Street’s desire to bring Soames back to London led to the first signs 
of tension within the FCO. Hancock was opposed to Soames being brought 
back so quickly and told Maitland and Greenhill that any alteration in policy 
towards France would be a decision ‘of great moment’ which ought not to be 
taken ‘in a hurry’. Further internal study was needed. Certain that the 
urgency was not coming from the prime minister, Hancock concluded: ‘Do let 
us try to do this thing properly and with due consideration. Let us not be 
rushed into hasty decisions just because Mr. Palliser is leaving No. 10 at 
Easter’.135 On this occasion, however, Hancock’s views did not prevail. 
Greenhill intervened: with Stewart due to see Debré in April, the permanent-
under secretary thought it right to discuss the situation with Soames in 
advance, insisting that there was ‘no question of rushing into decisions which 
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have not been thought out’.136 Stewart agreed; such conversations did not 
mean ‘premature decisions’. Soames was thus asked to return to London 
and, beforehand, to provide the FCO with a written assessment of ‘the 
prospects for our relations with France’.137  
 
Soames’s assessment appeared to show some change in the ambassador’s 
attitudes. While he continued to favour a more positive approach to relations 
with France, his view about where this might lead was now, it appeared, 
more cautious: ‘we will never get as far as we would like along the European 
road while the General is in power, I think we should see how far we can get 
while holding fast to our principles in the hope that we will be able to travel 
farther and faster when he is gone. The alternative of waiting till he goes 
before moving at all is in my view fraught with greater risks’.138 It would be 
unwise, however, to accept Soames’s new advice at face value.139 After all, 
his experience at the end of 1968, and even more in February 1969, can 
have left him with little doubt that there was deep opposition to his views 
within the FCO. If he was to receive authority to play the sort of pro-active 
role which he desired, there was thus every reason to couch the case for 
doing so in terms that were more consistent with Foreign Office thinking. As 
will be seen shortly, it is possible that the ambassador’s private views 
remained in conflict with the attitudes of Stewart and Hancock. 
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Soames’s intervention again exposed the growing tensions within the FCO. 
His more moderate line made little impression upon those opposed to a 
change in policy towards France. In preparation for Soames’s visit to 
London, Robinson prepared a departmental brief which was strongly critical 
of the ideas set out by the ambassador. On a number of occasions, 
Robinson hinted at the possibility that de Gaulle’s intention may have been to 
reach agreement with Britain on a new European framework (a free trade 
area with an ‘inner’ political association), only to then present the Five with a 
choice between progress on those lines, or acceptance of French opposition 
to enlargement and a return to the Community’s internal development. The 
clear danger was that the Five would choose to protect what they had, and 
the Six would resume normal progress as they had done after the 1961-63 
negotiations. Robinson continued: 
 
Mr. Soames’ letter of 11 March leaves the impression that the aim 
should be above all to start talks with the French. This is not the prime 
aim. It is not an end in itself. It is no use starting talks with the French 
unless we and they are much clearer about what the talks should cover 
and what they should aim at. We have little idea indeed of what de 
Gaulle has in mind. It may be no more than to use talks with us as a 
means to resume development of the Communities. 
 
‘It is not for us to try again’, Robinson concluded, ‘It is the task of our 
Embassy in Paris to persuade the French that their interest lies in an 
agreement with us which takes full account of the N.A.T.O. and the 
European objectives of France’s allies including ourselves’.140  
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Once more it was Greenhill that spearheaded the dissent: ‘I have some 
reservations about our tactics in the next few months and hope that we can 
consider carefully what the Sec[retar]y of State should say to M. Debré in 
Washington’.141 In this, he was supported by a figure already known to be in 
sympathy with Soames’s thinking. Chalfont saw Robinson’s brief as a 
‘reasonable basis for talks with Mr Soames’, but thought it ‘too rigid in its 
approach to the French’. Recalling his minute to Stewart of 19 December, 
which had called for a greater emphasis upon ‘big-power’ relations, Chalfont 
observed that he had ‘for some time advocated a policy in which France and 
Germany are associated with us as being the only one likely to lead to a 
constructive development with Europe’, and suggested that Soames’s visit 
be seen ‘as the first step in a thorough reappraisal of our European policy’.142 
 
Up to this point, the Downing Street-FCO debate had focussed upon Anglo-
French relations and how to improve them, but, as Chalfont’s minute 
indicated, in the light of de Gaulle’s proposals it was increasingly difficult to 
separate strategy from broader questions about the nature of British 
European policy. This tension would come to the surface even more during 
the meeting between Wilson, Stewart and Soames held on 26 March. Having 
been advised by Palliser not to let Soames think that he could appeal to 
Wilson over Stewart’s head, Wilson tried where possible to show a united 
front with his foreign secretary – insisting, for instance, that London had had 
little alternative but to handle de Gaulle’s approach as it did – but Stewart’s 
suspicion about the underlying motivation for improved Anglo-French 
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contacts exposed the differences that were fast emerging between himself 
and the prime minister. When Wilson suggested that London might begin by 
proposing conversations with France on ‘less sensitive issues’, such as the 
Middle East or the civil war in Nigeria, Stewart interjected, warning that while 
the Middle East could be a profitable area for talks, he ‘foresaw difficulty’ in 
discussing European issues ‘without arousing suspicions amongst our other 
European partners’. More fundamentally, ‘there remained the question of 
differences between us about relations with the United States and the future 
of the Common Market’.143 Wilson insisted that these issues should ‘be left 
on one side ... while we sought to restore a normal Anglo-French 
relationship’, but he was unable to conceal that his personal view was at 
odds with that of the foreign secretary: ‘We should not regard it as our 
responsibility to act as the custodian of United Sates relations with other 
countries: even less should we feel obliged to take a harder line about them 
than the U.S. Government themselves’. Similarly, British actions in February 
‘had provided sufficient evidence to the Five of our loyalty to their 
interests’.144  Later in the meeting, Wilson returned to a theme he had 
invoked with the French president at their meeting at Grand Trianon in 1967, 
the growing strength of the Federal Republic of Germany:  
 
he would like to see some discussion with General de Gaulle of the 
future power complex in Europe. He had had some interesting 
exchanges about this in the past with the General. He was not thinking 
of existing political or economic structures but of the longer term issues 
and of the problem of where the real power in Europe would lie if 
appropriate action were not taken in time. 
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Soames intervened to caution Wilson about how much could be expected 
given current French bitterness: while ‘relatively low level exchanges ... were 
undoubtedly possible’, ‘high-level’ contacts seemed unlikely. In keeping with 
his new, more cautious approach, Soames argued that a Franco-British 
dialogue should be seen as a means to improve the prospects for eventual 
British accession to the EC. For now at least, Wilson endorsed this analysis: 
in an argument reminiscent of his earlier support for the Fouchet plan, Wilson 
explained that ‘what seemed important was to get ... [de Gaulle’s] potential 
successors into the right posture for a more satisfactory Anglo-French 
relationship. In short, we were concerned with making a worthwhile 
investment in the post-de Gaulle period’. The first step would be for Stewart 
to request a private conversation with Debré at the forthcoming NATO 
meeting in Washington.145 
 
The modus vivendi was not long preserved, as the tensions within the FCO 
erupted into a full frontal assault on the logic which had underpinned British 
European policy since the veto. Hancock, who was shortly to leave the 
department in preparation for his next posting as ambassador to Rome, 
submitted a lengthy minute to Greenhill entitled ‘Some Political Aspects of 
our European Policy’. Convinced that some in London wished to revive de 
Gaulle’s February proposals, and that his departure from the FCO would 
significantly reduce his ability to resist this, Hancock sought to re-establish 
the principles which had hitherto guided British diplomacy – in his view, with 
success. He therefore gave the minute a wide distribution, including to the 
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private secretaries of Stewart and Chalfont, to his successor Thomas 
Brimelow, and to Downing Street. Hancock began by underlining the reasons 
for the British application in the first place: ‘It appears that in the future our 
political influence with the U.S. and Germany and with the world at large can 
best be exerted as part of the influence of an integrated Western Europe’. 
From here it followed that London should look sceptically upon the ideas 
(such as de Gaulle had put to Soames) for a free trade area in Europe: ‘An 
economic arrangement short of full membership of the E.E.C., whether or not 
the latter continued in existence, would involve foregoing the political 
advantage which we seek. In such an arrangement our political influence 
would not be exerted’. It was very ‘unlikely’, Hancock thought, that the Five 
would be willing to back any such proposal: ‘we could still expect the 
Germans, and Italians and Benelux to prefer the present integrated structure 
to a looser form’. If, however, and ‘contrary to present expectation’, such a 
proposal were to emerge from a consensus within the Community, that 
‘would be hard for us to reject’; but in those circumstances ‘the political 
question would still remain for separate solution’. From these premises, 
Hancock went on to tackle the question of future policy towards France. The 
prescription again was for more of the same: 
 
It is lucky that good relations with France are of less importance to us 
than good relations with America or Germany. For it is clear that, in 
present circumstances, we could hardly have good relations with all 
three countries. Our present policy is not compatible with good relations 
with General de Gaulle. Nor is his policy compatible with good relations 
with us. If we pursue our policy, as we ought to do, it will continue to be 
at the expense of our relations with France. While we may perhaps 
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hope to mitigate the Anglo-French quarrel, it is a basic quarrel which 
will exist until French policy changes.146 
 
Greenhill’s resistance to this sort of thinking had been growing and he was 
unwilling to let these arguments pass unchallenged; he hit back with a 
minute of his own, copied to all those that had been included on Hancock’s 
circulation list. ‘Mr. Hancock’s model minute ... is “magnifique” but is it really 
“la guerre”?’ While waiting for the French veto to be removed, Greenhill 
argued, public support for the government’s European policy was at risk of 
dissipating. And should this happen, ‘the opportunity for a constructive 
European policy both economically and politically involving a wider European 
grouping than the Six would be lost’. He thus advocated beginning a discreet 
‘search for a new [economic] organisation’. Addressing Hancock’s argument 
that an alternative economic framework would leave unanswered the 
question of how Britain could best exert political influence, Greenhill 
commented ‘Yes, indeed, but if we were following a new, wider economic 
road a lot of the obstacles at present existing to political progress (e.g. the 
opposition of the French and the hesitation of the Germans) would be 
removed’.147  
 
After reading Hancock’s minute, Wilson reacted furiously: ‘We’ve paid 
enough price for this nonsense. When does Hancock go to Rome?’ Picking 
up on Greenhill’s rejoinder, he continued: ‘More power to Denis’s elbow. We 
sh[oul]d review’. This review should be informed both by the forthcoming 
meeting with Soames and ‘the first step’ thereafter, Stewart’s meeting with 
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Debré.148 Moreover, with the receipt of further reports about the de Gaulle-
Kiesinger talks, Wilson instructed the Cabinet Office to produce an ‘up-to-
date’ study of the Munchmeyer plan – a free trade area proposal, dating back 
to the early 1960s, in which the EEC would join EFTA as a single unit.149 In 
London, such ideas had not been examined with intent since 1965, in the 
context of ‘bridge building’ between the EEC and EFTA.150 Now, against the 
background of de Gaulle’s proposals, and perhaps also French advocacy of 
such an arrangement to the Germans, Wilson was ready to look at it anew. 
The instruction was not born out of any desire to undermine the Community. 
Wilson first and foremost wanted to be prepared, should it be possible to 
resuscitate talks with France. More generally, however, the divisions on this 
issue had their roots in differing attitudes to relations with France, not 
divergent views on the nature of the EC. Thus, Palliser and Soames, both of 
whom were passionate supporters of British entry to the Community, had 
been at the forefront of those wishing to talk to de Gaulle. Against this stood 
Hancock and Robinson, both of whom considered Britain and France to be in 
a competition for influence in which only one could emerge as victor.151 While 
it may be that Greenhill, who was a newcomer to European policy, may have 
hoped to see a looser arrangement emerge, for Wilson, the critical question 
was not the form that the future organisation of Europe should take, but the 
fact that Britain should be part of it. Where in February he had allowed his 
suspicion of de Gaulle to win out over his desire to enter into talks, now, and 
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despite what he had said to Soames in March, Wilson was coming to regret 
his actions in Bonn. The request for a fresh study of the Munchmeyer plan 
was thus driven by a hope that talks with de Gaulle might still be possible, 
the aim being precisely that which had inspired the application for 
membership in 1967: to establish a place for Britain at the centre of 
European affairs on an equal footing to France and Germany.  
 
Wilson’s irritation at having followed FCO advice in February was further 
reinforced when he read the record of Stewart’s meeting with Debré in 
Washington. The foreign secretary restated that London still wanted talks, 
but Debré underlined the difficulty this posed given de Gaulle’s current mood. 
In February the president ‘had attached such importance to his ideas that he 
wanted to discuss them personally with the prime minister’. France had no 
intention of carrying on negotiations ‘behind the backs’ of the Five ... It was a 
case of examining ideas and objectives together’. If the talks led to nothing, 
‘no one would ever have known, whereas if progress had been made we 
could have moved ahead’. British actions had resulted in ‘a bad atmosphere 
and a lack of trust’, and ‘the line was down for the time being’. When Stewart 
suggested that, as foreign ministers, they could still talk to each other, Debré 
drew a clear distinction between general conversations and a dialogue of the 
sort originally proffered by de Gaulle. At the end of the meeting, Stewart 
proposed that they should meet again to consider ‘the solid problems facing 
us such as the Middle East and Nigeria’. Debré agreed, but insisted that it 
would not be possible until after the forthcoming French referendum. 
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Thereafter, ‘things might be expected to resume their course’.152 Reporting 
back to London, Stewart explained that Debré ‘seemed to be making the 
point that nothing was certain until after the referendum and that the situation 
might well be different thereafter’.153 After reading the account, Wilson wrote 
to his new private secretary, Edward Youde: ‘presumably Debré is right in 
stressing the referendum’. They should wait for that and then recall Soames 
for a further meeting. With Debré’s remark about the sincerity of de Gaulle’s 
approach clearly in mind, Wilson scribbled indignantly, ‘All this confirms my 
view that before, during and after the event ... we were taken for a ride by 
that oaf Hancock’.154 
 
With Wilson preferring to await the outcome of the French referendum before 
taking further action, Youde did not communicate his support for Greenhill’s 
8 April minute to the FCO. In the light of Stewart’s meeting with Debré, 
however, Chalfont wrote to the foreign secretary to lend his support to the 
PUS’s analysis, and to recommend that he initiate a departmental paper ‘on 
the possibilities of some new approach’.155 On the morning of 15 March, 
Stewart discussed this suggestion with Hancock and agreed to Chalfont’s 
idea.156 The decision does not indicate any change in the thinking of the 
foreign secretary; it was born of a recognition that the support for a re-
examination of these questions had now reached a point where it could no 
longer be resisted. On 18 April, Chalfont charged Robinson with beginning 
work on an initial paper, which would provide the basis for further 
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discussion.157 The purpose of the study was to examine economic 
alternatives to full membership of the European Community.158 Then, on 23 
April, Robinson minuted Brimelow to inform him of rumours about potential 
alterations in British European policy, with the Paris embassy thought to be 
one of the sources.159 An indication of the possible veracity of this claim, and 
evidence that Soames’s views may have been less cautious than he wished 
the FCO to believe, is provided by the diary of the publisher and newspaper 
proprietor, Cecil King. After a discussion of ‘the Soames affair’ with the 
ambassador in Paris on 21 April, King recorded Soames’s view that ‘he 
could, after a suitable lapse of time, raise the matter with de Gaulle again’.160  
 
Within days, however, the debate in London was dissipated. On 28 April, 
following the rejection of his proposed constitutional changes by the French 
public, Charles de Gaulle resigned the presidency of the Fifth Republic. 
While the manifold implications of this event extend far beyond the purview 
of this thesis, the overriding significance for Britain was unmistakeable. The 
front-page of The Times put it succinctly: ‘British hopes on Common Market 
entry raised’.161 Wilson nonetheless reserved his position; he wanted first to 
see who de Gaulle’s successor would be, and emphasised that, whoever 
took over, the priority would have to be France’s internal problems.162 Within 
the FCO, however, there was a clear conviction that de Gaulle’s departure 
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should lead to significant alterations in French foreign policy. As Stewart 
reported to Cabinet on 1 May: 
 
The whole concept of General de Gaulle’s policies, which had placed 
France in self-imposed isolation, was so contrary to the general trend in 
Europe and indeed to France’s own best interests, that it was unlikely 
that they could be continued by any political figure who did not enjoy 
the General’s special position and exceptional hold over public 
opinion.163 
 
Robinson’s paper on European policy, which was supposed to serve as the 
basis for further discussion within the department, had been submitted on the 
same day that de Gaulle resigned. A minute from Chalfont to Stewart now 
quietly wound-up the nascent review.164 It was inconceivable that any future 
president would have the political strength or the will to contemplate changes 
such as de Gaulle had put to Soames. On Robinson’s conclusion, a forceful 
and detailed exposition of the case for maintaining Britain’s existing policy 
and tactics, Chalfont informed Stewart (with little sense of irony): ‘you will 
wish to know ... that we are ready with detailed arguments, if they are 
needed, to substantiate the view that there is no realistic and advantageous 
alternative for us to membership of the Communities’.165 More revealing than 
this predictable conclusion was its annex, which examined ‘Allegations of 
Francophobia in the Foreign Office’. A distinction was drawn between 
‘Francopobia, in the sense of simply not liking France or the French’, which 
was strongly denied, and ‘“Degaullophobia”, [which] has a respectable 
ancestry from Mr. Churchill’s war-time days’. The annex argued that the 
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‘catalogue’ of de Gaulle’s ‘major actions’ towards Britain in the 1960s meant 
that ‘Degaullophobia has been much more often justified than not’, before 
concluding with a prescription for the future: ‘The important fact now is that 
de Gaulle’s resignation has drawn a line under the account’, and ‘it will be 
particularly important for H.M.G. to show by their actions in the new situation 
that they are not motivated by any permanent hostility towards France’.166 
 
Conclusion 
 
In February 1968, Cabinet’s review of foreign policy concluded with the 
analysis that there was ‘no satisfactory alternative’ to British membership of 
the European Community. Britain should therefore seek to join the Six ‘at the 
earliest possible moment’.167 For the remainder of the year, this logic had 
been central to Foreign Office attempts to concert with the Five, above all in 
relation to the Harmel plan, and to maintain the ‘double veto’. For Wilson, the 
principal goal was to ensure that any successor to de Gaulle would feel 
unable to sustain French opposition to enlargement.168 But this did not, as 
Möckli suggests, make Wilson’s policy ‘anti-French’.169 On the contrary, had 
he been able to feel confident in February 1969 that de Gaulle was making a 
genuine offer, or had his visit to Bonn not been so imminent, there is a good 
chance that the conversations which the French president suggested to 
Soames would have commenced. Yet in the Foreign Office, there was a 
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culture of antagonism towards France.170 Among Stewart, Hancock and 
Robinson, the levels of mistrust towards de Gaulle were such that they were 
bound to look askance at any proposals he might make.171 Wilson’s 
behaviour in Bonn was partially a product of such suspicion, alongside the 
desire to bring Germany into a common front against the French veto, but as 
his subsequent actions reveal, his personal attitude towards de Gaulle was 
by no means hostile.172 At the same time, the attempt to revive the French 
proposals was not motivated by attraction to a looser organisation, but simply 
by the opportunity to advance the objective which had dominated his 
European policy since 1967: to forge a more satisfactory role in Western 
Europe, as the basis for Britain’s international influence more generally. De 
Gaulle’s resignation raised the prospect of early progress towards this goal 
by entry to the EC. By helping to sustain the internal Community crisis which 
followed the French veto, the Wilson government had, just as the prime 
minister hoped, sharply restricted any successor’s room for manoeuvre. 
There was therefore reason for optimism in the spring of 1969, as the eyes of 
Europe now fixed upon the Élysée. 
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Chapter 2 
 
The Price of Success  
Britain, Pompidou and The Hague Summit 
May to December 1969 
 
 
On 20 June 1969, Georges Pompidou became the new president of France.1 
For those wishing to see a revival of European integration, Pompidou’s 
Gaullist background made him a less natural choice than his principal rival 
for the Élysée, Alain Poher, but the change of leadership in Paris inevitably 
raised hopes that the divisive politics of the de Gaulle years could now be 
consigned to the past.2 For pro-market opinion in Britain, these hopes 
focussed above all upon the question of enlargement. On 15 May Pompidou 
was reported to have told a group of Gaullist deputies that: ‘Britain must 
come into Europe. General de Gaulle understood this well. It is desirable that 
Britain should come into Europe sooner or later – and the sooner the better’.3 
From Paris, Soames stressed that ‘too much should not be read into these 
remarks’, and that they should be viewed ‘in the context of the electoral 
campaign’.4 In a minute to Wilson just before the vote, Stewart also noted 
that Pompidou had been ‘careful not to commit himself to the proposition that 
EEC membership is the right form for our association with Europe’. 
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Nonetheless, there remained a clear expectation that Pompidou would prove 
to be a more flexible interlocutor than de Gaulle: ‘the element of irrational 
prejudice should disappear from French policy’, Stewart argued, ‘and French 
interests should be interpreted in a much more normal way’.5 
 
Over the next six months, a more flexible French approach did emerge. At 
the much heralded summit meeting of the Six at The Hague in December 
1969, Pompidou lifted the Gaullist veto on enlargement negotiations. In 
return for this, he secured the agreement of his partners to a permanent 
system for financing the CAP. The outcome thus brought good and bad news 
for Britain: on one side, the opening to negotiations marked a very important 
step forward, albeit it was not yet possible to be sure that French opposition 
to British membership had been eradicated; on the other, a permanent 
settlement of the system for financing the CAP represented a defeat for the 
objective that George Brown had enunciated at the WEU in July 1967: British 
participation in the negotiations leading to the definitive financial regulation.6 
During 1968, one purpose of the FCO’s ‘double veto’ strategy was to prevent 
the Community developing in ways that would make subsequent British 
accession more difficult.7 By settling the finance question on the basis of 
existing principles, a very large obstacle had been placed in the path to 
British accession, one which would make the process of negotiation much 
more complicated.  Accordingly, in June 1970, the objective of avoiding such 
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an agreement was made a priority for the coming months.8 In the final weeks 
before The Hague summit, London made a last ditch attempt to stiffen the 
Five, and particularly Germany, against conceding a permanent regulation, 
or at least one that would not prove ‘unalterable’ during future accession 
negotiations.9 The attempt failed, and the deal struck at the summit 
presented Britain with a daunting new obstacle to entry at the very moment 
that the veto on negotiations was lifted. Britain’s state of preparedness for 
this difficult yet promising moment of movement in its relations with the 
Community is the subject of this chapter. It begins by examining Whitehall 
attitudes towards the prospective revival of Britain’s application in the 
summer of 1969, focussing in particular upon the concerns raised by the cost 
of membership. It will then move on to examine how London sought to 
advance its European objectives at a diplomatic level, before finally 
examining the attempts which were made to influence the deal reached at 
The Hague. 
 
Whitehall and the revival of the second application, June to July 1969 
 
After years of dealing with de Gaulle, British hopes for a more forthcoming 
French attitude towards enlargement were nourished by the figures 
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Pompidou appointed to key posts in his new government. The orthodox 
Gaullist, Michel Debré, had been replaced as foreign minister by the 
‘convinced European’ Maurice Schumann, a ‘well known if not too well 
known anglophile’.10 At the same time, Schumann’s lack of political weight 
was also judged by the Paris embassy to be an indication that ‘Pompidou 
clearly intends to keep close personal control over foreign affairs’. The filling 
of other important posts with ‘well known “Europeans”’, including Jacques 
Duhamel as Minister of Agriculture, provided further ‘clear evidence of M. 
Pompidou’s desire for a more flexible European policy’. There were, 
however, continuing grounds for caution. The Gaullist majority in the national 
assembly suggested that Pompidou would ‘have to move with 
circumspection towards any form of change’, with the corollary that while 
Britain must continue to state its desire for negotiations, ‘we must recognise 
that excessive haste, or the appearance of undue pressure, are likely to slow 
down rather than accelerate the wind of change in France’.11 Britain’s 
embassies in the Five had similarly warned that France’s partners in the 
Community would allow time for Paris to change course. But with all this 
taken into account, it was generally hoped that a positive reply to Britain’s 
application might be forthcoming by the end of the year.12  
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It was in these unprecedented circumstances, just four days after Pompidou 
became president, that Sir James Marjoribanks, head of the British mission 
to the Community institutions in Brussels, and Britain’s ambassadors to the 
Six, returned to the London for a two day Foreign Office conference on the 
way ahead in Britain’s approach to Europe. Stewart attended the meeting at 
intervals, and in his absence Lord Chalfont was in the chair. The room was 
also packed with officials closely concerned with British European policy. 
From the FCO: Greenhill, Brimelow, and Robinson. From the Cabinet Office, 
Deputy Secretary and Chair of the Official Committee on the Approach to 
Europe (EURO), Roger McIntosh. And from Downing Street, the prime 
minister’s Foreign Affairs Private Secretary, Edward Youde.13 The 
conference of Britain’s ambassadors to the Community proved highly 
important in determining British tactics for the next six months. It focussed 
upon three main questions: should Britain take any further initiatives in 
relation to enlargement? How should London approach the task of improving 
Anglo-French relations? And what stance should London adopt over the 
agricultural finance deadline? It was easily agreed that no new initiatives 
were required to advance application. Time would be needed for France to 
change direction, and the British line should remain that ‘we were waiting for 
a reply and hoped to receive one soon’. Particular attention focused on 
whether it was necessary to clarify British views on the future extension of 
integration into new fields (such as monetary cooperation). Greenhill 
observed that the department lacked a clear view on this, for which a paper 
was being prepared, but for the present a precise statement of its thinking 
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did not seem necessary. For now, it would simply be desirable for the 
government to convey, in general terms, its readiness to participate in further 
Community development.14 
 
With memories of the Soames affair still relatively fresh, relations with France 
would be an important but sensitive task. In his minute to Wilson immediately 
prior to the French election, Stewart had argued that: ‘Our general objective 
should be to develop relations, to common advantage no less good than we 
enjoy with other friendly European countries’. At the same time, the element 
of suspicion in Anglo-French relations was not easily dissipated, as Stewart’s 
later remarks revealed: 
 
We should give no appearance of wishing to visit the sins of General de 
Gaulle on M. Pompidou. In practice, however, we should approach the 
implementation of this principle with a certain caution, related to the 
extent to which de Gaulle’s more unacceptable policies may actually 
survive.15 
 
At the ambassador’s conference, Stewart gave Soames instructions to tell 
Schumann that Britain wanted ‘to open up a dialogue of a friendly character’. 
Yet vigilance seemed necessary on two counts. First, London should not be 
drawn into any form of pre-negotiation with Paris. This might result in being 
asked to pay twice, ‘once for opening [accession] negotiations and once for 
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concluding them’.16 Second, the Five should be ‘informed of anything which 
affected their interests’, a line reminiscent of the one Stewart pushed in 
February 1969.17 
 
Potentially the most difficult of all issues that the ambassadors discussed 
was agricultural finance. Officials were conscious of the 31 December 
deadline for the Six to agree a permanent system for financing the CAP. The 
question of Britain and agricultural finance in the EC dated back to the first 
enlargement negotiations, but the scale of the problem had grown steadily 
worse since then. In January 1962, the Six had agreed Regulation 25 
stipulating that levies on extra-Community agricultural imports would 
increasingly be apportioned to an EEC agricultural fund, with a view to a 
permanent system from 1970 whereby all levies would belong, as of right, to 
the Community.18 The fund (Fonds Europeen d’Orientation et de Garantie 
Agricole, abbreviated as FEOGA) was used to finance CAP support policies 
and by 1967 90% of levies were being transferred to it. This alone, however, 
did not meet the full scale of CAP expenditure, and the Six made an 
additional ‘fixed key’ contribution (the key being roughly proportional to each 
member states’ share of Community GDP).19 Due to Britain’s large non-EEC 
food imports, the prospect of paying upwards of 90% of levy receipts to the 
Fund was a source of acute concern.20 It was primarily a balance of 
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payments problem: studies carried out in 1967 suggested that by the end of 
a transitional period Britain’s net contribution would be over £190 million 
annually.21 Given the UK’s persistent balance of payments difficulties, 
transfers of such a magnitude seemed extremely onerous; in 1967, the year 
of devaluation, Britain ran a current account deficit of £294 million.22 The 
British also felt their prospective contribution to be inequitable. The 1967 
calculations put Britain’s likely gross contribution at nearly 37% of the 
Community total. This would have been by some margin the largest of any 
member state – more than twice Germany’s and nearly three times that of 
France, despite having an economy smaller than both. When receipts from 
the fund were taken into account, the British contribution appeared even 
more unfair. The small size of the UK agricultural sector meant that Britain 
would receive relatively little in CAP expenditure. The 1967 estimates 
suggested it would claw back just £45 million, a mere 7% of the total.23 
 
This was the background to Brown’s declaration of the British wish to 
participate in the definitive negotiations when he presented the application to 
the Six in July 1967.24 While de Gaulle’s veto soon intervened, it also 
checked the Community’s own advance, so that by the time of Pompidou’s 
election in June 1969 a definitive regulation was still outstanding and 
arrangements for 1970 onwards were in abeyance. Given the advantages 
                                                            
21
 TNA/CAB134/2817 EURO(67)65 (Part Revise), Agricultural Guidance and Guarantee 
Fund, 6 June 1967. 
22
 David Butler and Gareth Butler, Twentieth Century British Political Facts, 1900-2000 
(London: Macmillan, 2000), p.417. 
23
 TNA/CAB134/2817 EUR(O)(67)65 (Part Revise), Agricultural Guidance and Guarantee 
Fund, 6 June 1967; also see Parr, Britain’s, p. 134. 
24
 Kitzinger, Second, p.195. For a detailed account of the preparation and content of the 
statement as a whole see Parr, Britain’s, p.161-64.  
88 
 
that the current system gave to France, it was clear that one of Pompidou’s 
first Community priorities would be to secure agreement on a permanent 
regulation which to a great extent preserved the existing system. Any such 
agreement would pose a major problem for Britain: since 1967, sterling’s 
devaluation and the mushrooming cost of CAP operations (FEOGA 
expenditure had increased from $494m in 1966/7 to an estimated $2,437m in 
1968/9), requiring increased key contributions from all member states, meant 
that the balance of payments problem seemed likely to be worse.25 When 
combined with a short-term deterioration in the balance of trade (as a result 
of tariff changes), the overall burden might appear so large that Cabinet and 
parliament would baulk at joining. CAP finance arrangements thus became a 
key issue in Foreign Office planning. 
 
It was felt to be imperative that the Six should not agree a definitive 
regulation by the end of the year. At this stage, however, such an outcome 
was considered unlikely. The ambassador to Bonn, Roger Jackling, argued 
that the Germans would not be ready for decisions by December and that a 
temporary agreement would necessarily follow.26 In a recent conversation 
with Wilson, Brandt had envisaged a one or two year extension of current 
arrangements.27 Crucial in any temporary agreement would be the review 
clause, stipulating how far the existing financial system could be altered in 
definitive negotiations. Britain would want a very open review, enabling 
significant changes to be made to existing rules. France, by contrast, would 
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inevitably look for a restrictive review, guaranteeing the system that it found 
so advantageous. The British approach was clearly defined in the conference 
conclusions, and it was one that would have dramatic consequences in the 
coming months: 
 
It will be essential for us to be in on the negotiation of definitive 
agricultural finance arrangements. ... But even the French recognise 
that definitive arrangements are not likely to be negotiated this year. 
The Six will probably agree interim arrangements for a further period 
(e.g. 1-3 years) with a review provision. Our interest would be served by 
a good review provision and a short new interim period. It would be 
important not to change our 1967 position - that we were ready to come 
to terms with the common agricultural policy, and looked forward to 
taking part as a full member in negotiation of definitive arrangements.28 
 
Differences of view emerged over how Britain should act while the Six were 
negotiating. Soames felt that Britain should not intervene as this would upset 
relations with France. Against this, however, Jackling and Evelyn 
Shuckburgh, the outgoing Ambassador to Rome, advocated discussions with 
German and Italian officials on how the CAP might be modified. Their advice 
reflected the dissatisfaction felt by those governments with the current 
operations of the CAP and the possibility that existed for an alliance with 
Britain on reform.29 The foreign secretary came down on the side of Jackling 
and Shuckburgh: studies on the balance of payments cost of accepting the 
CAP were currently being undertaken by EURO; once complete, Britain 
should ‘try discreetly to further our objectives by bilateral contacts with the 
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Six’.30 Concern over friction with France took second place to the objective of 
reducing future contributions to the CAP. 
 
At the Treasury, the prospective revival of the EC application was viewed 
with misgivings. Treasury officials accepted that the principle of joining the 
Community was settled (provided satisfactory terms could be negotiated), 
but felt reservations about the wisdom of attempting to do so in the short 
term. The principal reason was again the balance of payments implications. 
In July 1969, Frank Figgures, a second secretary (immediately below 
permanent secretary), and the senior Treasury official concerned with 
European policy, set out his views in a minute to the private office of 
Chancellor Roy Jenkins: 
 
(i) Nothing has happened in the last two years to modify the advice 
which officials gave two years ago that membership of the Community 
represented the only satisfactory political framework for the U.K. in the 
long run. The political framework includes economic organisation.  
 
(ii) In the short run, membership of the Community will be 
economically disadvantageous for the economy as a whole, though 
some sectors will benefit very quickly. It may be possible in negotiation 
to limit this cost but nothing will prevent it from being very substantial. 
 
(iii) Over time membership of the Community should bring some 
economic advantage, though it demands an act of faith to be sure that 
membership will bring economic advantages commensurate with the 
political advantages which are expected.31 
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The Treasury’s stance on the cost of membership reflected its 
consciousness of the sacrifices which had been necessary to remedy the 
weakness of 1967-68. The problem was made more difficult by the fact 
Britain had significant short and medium term debt obligations. In these 
circumstances, Figgures was to warn subsequently, there could be no 
additional burden on the balance of payments until the end of 1975.32 Given 
that the principle of entering into negotiations had already been agreed, 
official Treasury advice focussed upon the question of timing, and the need 
for a long transitional period during which the balance of payments burden 
would increase gradually. The later negotiations began, the stronger, it was 
hoped, the economy should be and the more international debt Britain should 
have repaid.33 
 
On 14 July 1969, a high level Treasury meeting took place at Jenkins’s 
request to discuss the possibility of renewed accession negotiations and the 
economic challenges British entry would present.34 Alongside the chancellor, 
there was a strong ministerial presence: the Chief Secretary, John Diamond, 
the Financial Secretary, Harold Lever, and Minister of State Dick Taverne. 
There was an equal complement of senior officials: Permanent Secretary 
Douglas Allen and Figgures were joined by the Chief Economic Adivser, 
Donald MacDougall as well as members of the Overseas Finance Division 
(the section of the Treasury directly responsible for relations with the 
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Community). The minutes do not specify the names of contributors, but at 
the start of the meeting a litany of arguments were deployed against 
embarking on negotiations in the near future.35 These focussed above all 
upon the interrelated problem of cost and indebtedness. It was also pointed 
out that in 1967 the Six had wanted to discuss the international role of 
sterling within the context of accession negotiations. Britain had negotiated 
the Basle agreements (to guarantee the sterling balances) in 1968, and 
would want to renew them in 1971. It was therefore considered undesirable 
‘to be obliged to discuss these matters [with the Community] early next year’. 
Towards the end of the meeting, the arguments took an altogether different 
direction. The pure economic analysis was supplanted by broader 
considerations. It was suggested that: ‘The balance of payments 
assessment, which was essentially short-term, could not be regarded as the 
decisive factor; entry to the Community represented the only sensible 
political and economic course for the United Kingdom.’ The change of 
emphasis continued:  
 
viewed objectively, our interests would seem to lie in doing nothing to 
accelerate the process of negotiation; indeed, the most sensible course 
in present circumstances might be to continue with our existing policies 
for a year or two, until our economic position was thoroughly secured, 
meanwhile keeping closely in touch with the Community. However 
sensible, this course would not ... be practicable, given the state of 
public opinion in the country, and the determination of our friends 
among the five to maintain constant pressure on the French. It would 
be essential to maintain the momentum of opinion; it would be very 
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damaging and dangerous to appear to be moving away from the door 
at the very moment when it gave signs of opening. It would be difficult 
enough to sustain enthusiasm for entry when the assessment of cost 
was known and the short-term burdens were recognised; any apparent 
hesitancy about our purpose could put paid to the prospects of entry for 
a very long time. There would, moreover, be a net political advantage in 
completing negotiations for entry before the election.36 
 
While the invocation of electoral considerations inevitably suggests that this 
was a ministerial contribution, the critical point is that the arguments for delay 
had not been allowed to pass unchallenged. Having pressed the application 
for two years, and in so doing acquired a strong position in relation to the 
Five, it seemed inconceivable that the government might now suspend the 
application in the hope of more favourable financial conditions arising later. 
This had an important consequence for future Whitehall debate: with the 
neutralisation of internal Treasury disquiet, the FCO was left free to pursue 
an early renewal of accession negotiations.  
 
Similar dynamics to those seen in the Treasury were also visible in Cabinet. 
Ministerial opinion can be broken down into three main groups: those in 
favour; those who were sceptical but prepared, as Barbara Castle put it, to 
‘keep’ their ‘mouth shut’ for the time being; and, finally, those willing to 
question the application in present circumstances.37 Only two ministers 
appear to have fallen into the last category in the summer of 1971, namely, 
Peter Shore and Fred Peart. In the year ahead, however, Wilson would 
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encounter increasing difficulty with the middle group – the silent doubters – 
including such senior ministers as Castle and Richard Crossman. At a 
private meeting on 9 July, Wilson agreed that Stewart should seek a 
‘renewed remit’ from Cabinet on Europe.38 With the fresh possibility of 
negotiations, it was felt that ministers needed to restate their basic 
commitment to membership given acceptable terms.39 And with the public 
opponents of entry likely to become increasingly energetic in the months 
ahead, there would be a need for ministers to show a united front.40  
 
The date selected for the Cabinet discussion was 22 July, and the debate it 
triggered provided an early warning of the difficulties Wilson would face if 
and when Britain actually entered into negotiations. Stewart opened by 
describing the improved prospects for this and underlined that ‘the 
government’s settled policy [was] to seek membership’.41 He was followed by 
a volley of critical analysis, in which Shore and Peart appear to have been 
the principal protagonists.42 It was argued that ‘the situation had changed 
considerably, particularly in the economic and agricultural fields, since the 
original decision had been taken in 1967’, and there should be a reappraisal 
of the ‘full implications’ of joining. Given that a central aim of the second 
application had been to join in time to participate in the working out of a 
definitive financial regulation, the possibility that the Six might reach 
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agreement without Britain enabled those hostile to entry to argue that a new 
barrier to joining might soon be raised: 
 
Should the French insist on the satisfaction of their agricultural 
demands in full as a price for agreeing to negotiations for British entry, 
we should be in a difficult position. The price we should have to pay 
might be too high, and we should not seek membership of the EEC at 
any cost.  
 
But the idea of a reappraisal was firmly resisted: should the fact that this was 
being done become public knowledge, it would ‘create doubts about the 
seriousness of our intentions’. The government’s line should be ‘firm but 
cautious’, with the final decision dependent, as always, upon the terms which 
emerged from negotiations. In summing up, Wilson underscored this 
approach, and by once again stressing the critical importance of the terms he 
maintained an awkward compromise: for those ministers favourable to entry, 
there would be continued progress towards negotiations; for those less 
convinced, an assurance that membership might still be declined should the 
outcome be unacceptable. Yet in order to leave himself maximum room for 
manoeuvre in future, Wilson deliberately left the unclear the question of what 
acceptable terms might be. He concluded by saying that Cabinet would ‘take 
note’ of Stewart‘s statement and insisted that ministers’ public 
pronouncements should reflect the government’s agreed position.43 
Cabinet’s approval of this summing up meant that the immediate objective 
had been achieved: Stewart had received a renewed remit. In the longer-
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term, however, the meeting held dangerous portents. The prosecution of 
effective negotiations would depend significantly upon ministers’ readiness to 
make important and potentially painful concessions at critical moments. 
Should divisions over what constituted acceptable terms prevent this, 
Britain’s membership bid could be severely handicapped. 
 
Over the summer, important personnel changes would take place within 
Whitehall. George Thomson returned to the FCO (where he had been a 
minister between 1964 and 1967) as the minister responsible for Europe, 
and was given a seat in Cabinet as Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster. He 
would lead the British team in Brussels if and when negotiations were 
opened. The head of the team at official level would be Con O’Neill, who also 
returned to the Foreign Office in September. A leading marketeer during the 
mid to late 1960s, O’Neill had resigned in February 1968 after being 
overlooked for the vacant ambassadorship in Bonn.44 At the Cabinet Office, 
William Nield became Permanent Secretary and replaced McIntosh as chair 
of the EURO committee. Having worked together on Europe in 1966-67, 
Nield quickly established himself as Wilson’s principal adviser on this subject 
(effectively filling the void left by Palliser’s transfer to the Paris embassy – 
Youde having little specialist knowledge). Within the Whitehall machine, 
Nield and O’Neill also formed a powerful axis in support of the application. 
Once again, the Wilson government was poised to push Britain along the 
path to Europe. Once again, it awaited an opening from France. 
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Waiting on the Six, July to October 1969 
 
On 10 July, Pompidou launched his proposal for a summit of the Six at a 
press conference in the Élysée. This shifted the parameters of European 
diplomacy for the coming months. Instead of the pressure focusing on 
France at each Council of Ministers until an opening to negotiations was 
accepted, the Community began a period of careful preparation, to 
culminate, it was hoped, in a major deal at The Hague at the end of the 
year.45 The summit was to become synonymous with Pompidou’s celebrated 
triptych: ‘completion’ of the common market (by which was meant, first and 
foremost, a definitive agreement on agricultural finance); ‘deepening’, 
denoting the future development of the Community; and ‘enlargement’.46 On 
the application for membership, Pompidou’s press conference remarks were 
open to differing interpretations. He made it clear that the Community’s first 
priority must be the completion of the common market. This should be 
followed by a period in which the Six considered the consequences of 
enlargement, and then, finally, negotiations might begin.47 Pessimists could 
thus point to the large body of internal Community work he had put before 
negotiations, while for optimists the fact that there had been no objection of 
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principle to British accession was potentially significant.48 Wilson did what he 
could to advance the British cause from the sidelines: speaking at a Guildhall 
European dinner on 29 July, he made use of the renewed remit agreed at 
Cabinet to express the government’s desire to see integration extended into 
new areas.49 After emphasising the theme of technological cooperation, 
which had marked his approach to the Community 1966-67, Wilson spoke of 
the ‘aspirations which so many of us have for a greater and more effective 
political unity’, as well as underlining British willingness to discuss progress 
in currency matters, ‘not excluding as an ultimate aim a common European 
currency’.50  
 
Following the summer recess, French actions remained difficult to interpret. 
At the Franco-German summit on 8-9 September, the French warned of a 
“crise mortelle” should a definitive finance regulation not be agreed by the 
end of the year.51 Then, at the Council of Foreign Ministers on 15 
September, Schumann repeatedly evaded attempts by the Six to draw a 
commitment on enlargement.52 Outside the Community bubble, however, 
French rhetoric appeared more positive. During a speech to the UN General 
Assembly in September, Schumann said of the membership applications that 
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it was ‘not only conceivable but eminently desirable that they may 
succeed’.53  
 
It was at the UN on 20 September that Stewart and Schumann had their first 
exchange as foreign ministers.54 Stewart found Schumann ‘friendly and 
forthcoming’, an improvement in itself from the latter part of de Gaulle’s 
presidency. And it was the tone rather than the substance of the meeting 
which he found most encouraging. Whilst insisting that no date for 
negotiations could be set at the forthcoming summit in The Hague (the Six 
would first have to examine ‘whether enlargement was compatible with the 
existence and development of the Community’), Schumann maintained that 
‘the French government approached this question from a positive, not at all a 
negative, point of view’.55 Believing Schumann to be more favourable to 
British entry than the Quai d’Orsay diplomats who flanked him in formal 
discussions, British officials advised Stewart to seek an opportunity to speak 
to the French foreign minister in private. Once alone, it was hoped he might 
be more frank about French intentions.56 This reflected a broader Foreign 
Office anxiety that while the political leadership in Paris might have changed, 
the high ranking officials remained those of the de Gaulle era. Having worked 
tirelessly to prevent British entry for so long, it seemed unrealistic to expect 
them to abandon those positions with any speed.57 Stewart accepted this 
advice and in private conversation asked Schumann whether France (a) still 
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opposed British entry, (b) would reluctantly accept it, or (c) ‘would welcome 
it’. Schumann ‘replied without hesitation that it was (c)’, but completion would 
have to come first.58 The foreign secretary reported to Wilson that he was 
‘well satisfied’ with their exchange.59 
 
The new Anglo-French contacts continued when on 10 October Soames had 
his first meeting with Pompidou. The conversation was dominated by 
Pompidou’s reflections on the European scene, insisting that he had ‘neither 
the desire nor the intention of using any veto’. He was ‘convinced’ that 
accession negotiations should be started and, moreover, he hoped that they 
would be successful. That said, Pompidou did raise some points of concern: 
one was the uncertainty surrounding the date of the next general election – 
the Six would prefer not to be presented with a change of administration mid-
way through the enlargement negotiations (a comment which carried the 
implication that negotiations might have to await a new government). He had 
also noticed that a significant section of British public opinion was opposed to 
membership, and that the resolution on Europe tabled at the Labour Party 
conference had qualified the party’s commitment to membership. (On 2 
October, the Labour Party conference passed a resolution on the EC calling 
on the government to ensure, among other things, protection for the balance 
of payments, the cost of living, and Britain’s freedom of action in economic 
planning and foreign policy).60 Soames did what he could to counter these 
points, emphasising that British entry was supported by the two main parties. 
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In these circumstances, neither a change of government nor the domestic 
opposition to entry should be a source of hesitancy. He urged Pompidou to 
focus not upon the resolution, which was designed to ensure maximum 
support, and instead to look at the speeches made by the party leadership. 
These, Soames argued, demonstrated the government’s firm determination 
to join.61  
 
As these early positive Anglo-French encounters opened up new 
possibilities, the FCO remained anxious about the Six reaching a definitive 
agreement on agricultural finance prior to negotiations between the UK and 
the Community. The ambassadors’ conference in June had stipulated that 
British interests would best be served by a short, temporary agreement, 
containing a provision for an open review. Stewart had agreed that once the 
interdepartmental studies on the cost of membership were complete, Britain 
should look to defend its interests by discreet contacts with the Six.62 In 
September, the attitudes of the Five appeared to suggest that this was 
unnecessary. Brandt referred to a two to three year ‘provisional’ agreement, 
with the Italians also expressing a determination to stand up to France over 
its agricultural demands.63 Even the Dutch foreign minister, Joseph Luns, in 
spite of the benefits the Netherlands accrued from Community agricultural 
policies, indicated support for Brandt’s view on a provisional agreement.64 
The devaluation of the Franc on 8 August, which had destabilising effects on 
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the CAP, also seemed to make a permanent deal less likely.65 In late 
September, however, Soames became concerned by increasing French 
confidence. Paris appeared to believe that if it accepted a provisional 
regulation, the Five would agree to the crucial review clause stipulating that 
subsequent alterations could only be made by unanimous agreement. This 
would give France an effective veto on future changes. Soames wrote to the 
FCO to urge that Britain should encourage the Five to resist what would be 
‘in effect if not in form’ a definitive agreement.66 All was not lost if the Five 
could be brought to realise there was more give in the French position than 
their rhetoric might suggest: 
 
When de Gaulle was around, the Five were obliged to give way to 
French blackmail because their first priority remained the preservation 
of the Community and they had a real fear that, in the last resort, old 
Samson de Gaulle would be prepared to pull down the temple. … 
When Pompidou talks of a “crise mortelle” within the Community he is, 
in the last analysis, bluffing. We here are convinced of this, but we 
wonder whether the Five have yet hoisted in this vital change and 
drawn the right conclusions therefrom.67 
 
Soames wanted the French bluff to be called. The Five should hold firm for 
an agreement ‘that would be acceptable to us and yet would be difficult for 
the French to refuse’.68  
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The ambassador’s recommendation was awaiting further consideration 
when, in the first week of October, embassies elsewhere in the Community 
delivered supporting recommendations. In particular, Jackling reported 
divisions within the German administration over how to handle the finance 
issue. Especially worrying was the fact that the Auswärtiges Amt (the 
German foreign ministry) appeared to be advocating a definitive settlement. 
Jackling urged that Britain should try to ‘stiffen the Five by insisting on 
general reform of the CAP’ as the price for any agreement on finance.69 
Central to reform would be the reduction of agricultural surpluses, which 
could significantly reduce the overall cost of the CAP, and thus alleviate the 
eventual charge on Britain. Soames, Patrick Hancock (now ambassador to 
Italy) and John Beith (ambassador to Belgium) all disliked this tactic: if 
discussions on agriculture were prolonged, the opening of enlargement 
negotiations might also be delayed. Moreover, London should aim to be part 
of any negotiations on CAP reform, and so ensure that the outcome was 
favourable to British interests. Better, it was argued, for Britain to encourage 
the Five to pursue an agreement that would both satisfy France whilst 
allowing Britain’s ‘essential requirements’ to be safeguarded during 
accession negotiations.70  Robinson agreed with this analysis, but was 
uncertain about how such a compromise could be achieved in practice. He 
wrote to O’Neill: 
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If, by the turn of the year, we are going to be faced with an agricultural 
finance settlement from which we are going to have to dissent publicly, 
then we have little to lose by doing all we can in the interval to see that 
the finance settlement is one we can accept. The difficulty is to see 
what could be acceptable at this stage both to us and to the French. 
We should have to have either a ceiling on Community expenditure or 
no unanimity in the review at the end of three years. I do not see the 
French accepting either of these points without the most bitter struggle 
which is bound to bring us into open conflict with them if we take - as 
we would have to take - strong action with the Five.71 
 
At a meeting with FCO officials and Soames on 6 October, Stewart 
requested that draft instructions for Community posts be submitted to him the 
following week. Robinson produced a first version by 8 October and a 
process of consultation began with other Whitehall departments. From 
Downing Street, Youde advised that Wilson would need to approve the 
instructions before despatch.72  
 
A key component of Soames’s advice had been the need to make any action 
acceptable to France. To do this, Britain would have to state its commitment 
to the three principles which underpinned the CAP and to which Paris 
attached primary importance: the single agricultural market, Community 
Preference (meaning the imposition of levies on non-EEC agricultural 
imports), and the collective responsibility of member states for financing 
agricultural support policies.73 But given the massive increase in the cost of 
the CAP in just a few years, O’Neill and Robinson felt that Britain could not 
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make the unlimited financial commitment implied by the third principle, 
collective responsibility for finance.74 Robinson’s draft instructions thus 
omitted any reference to the principles and stressed only the difficulties for 
Britain inherent in a permanent agreement.75 Upon reading the draft, 
Soames was deeply concerned, and wrote to London urging reconsideration: 
 
I am bound to say that, unless we can give more substance to our 
professed willingness to come to terms with the C.A.P., the risks 
inherent in this operation become in my view extremely high. It was 
clear to me that whatever we said to the Six on this sensitive issue 
would inevitably irritate the French and that they would profess to 
regard it as interference. But I felt this would have been a justifiable risk 
if our approach could have been based on the principles. But if this 
really is not possible, then I fear that action on the lines proposed would 
carry with it a real danger of arousing fresh resentment among the 
French ministers at a time when, as you will have seen from my recent 
talks with Pompidou, Schumann and Duhamel they are showing at last 
the first signs of a genuine change of outlook. (I need hardly say that 
the hard line senior officials could be counted upon to encourage such 
a hostile reaction by their political masters if we gave them the 
ammunition they want).76 
 
O’Neill took the point. His recommendation to Stewart two days later was 
that no action should be taken at this stage: 
 
The drafting of instructions proved extremely difficult. The Secretary of 
State agreed that, if we said anything, we should say the same thing to 
all the Six. This is essential. But it is clear that if we state our position to 
the Six at the present moment in the form that we wish them to avoid a 
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permanent agreement (however that permanency is defined) but 
cannot add (and we do not think we should) a reassurance that we are 
prepared to accept the principles of the Common Agricultural Policy, 
the effect of our representations might well be to cause difficulties over 
the consideration of our application for membership of the Communities 
at the summit of the Six next month. It might also cause the French to 
question whether our application should be accepted at all. Yet to say 
formally at this moment that we accept the principles of the Common 
Agricultural Policy (particularly the principle of Community financial 
responsibility) might be to strengthen rather than weaken the hand of 
the French in negotiations with their Five partners, and might prejudice 
our own negotiating position.  
 
The overriding priority had to be to secure an agreement to open accession 
negotiations, with the result that Soames’s advice had been accepted. But 
O’Neill went on to make clear that the current recommendation may change. 
The FCO would carefully monitor how attitudes were developing within the 
Five, particularly within the new German government, and in a fortnight’s 
time the matter would be reconsidered.77 
 
Britain and The Hague summit, October to December 1969 
 
On 21 October, Brandt became the new German Chancellor. There could be 
little regret in London at the disappearance of Kiesinger, whose mediatory 
approach to enlargement had been a source of great frustration.78 The 
ideological affiliation between Labour and the SDP also promised much for a 
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renewal of Anglo-German relations, but added to this was Brandt’s reputation 
for being more ready to stand up to France.79 His promotion to chancellor 
meant that Walter Scheel, the leader of the Free Democrats, the second 
party in the new ‘small coalition’ in Germany, became foreign minister. The 
new administration’s statement of policy to the Bundestag certainly gave 
cause for optimism, containing as it did a forthright passage on the 
importance of British Community membership.80 With new political leadership 
in Bonn, and time running short before the summit, a more intensive phase 
of European diplomacy began, leading up to the crucial meeting at The 
Hague on 1-2 December.81  
 
The promise of a more determined attitude in Bonn was particularly welcome 
at a time when the ambiguity surrounding French policy was giving cause for 
concern. In a letter to Palliser on 22 October, Robinson revealed his growing 
concerns: where in June there had seemed good reason to be optimistic 
about the gradual emergence of a more flexible French attitude, he now 
feared that this might not be materialising. He asked Palliser to provide an 
assessment of the new government’s attitude to British entry.82 Palliser’s 
reply on 29 October was categorical; the joint conclusion of Soames and 
himself was that ‘there has been a fundamental and favourable shift in the 
French attitude since the departure of de Gaulle’. To substantiate the point, 
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Palliser observed that Paris no longer insisted that enlargement would 
necessarily weaken the Community – witness Schumann’s UN speech and 
its reference to the success of accession negotiations as ‘eminently 
desirable’. ‘No French Minister could have uttered any such thought under de 
Gaulle’. Then there was Soames’s audience with Pompidou, in which the 
president had insisted that he would not use a veto. Tackling head on 
France’s hard line approach to The Hague summit, Palliser wrote:  
 
You may also ask why, if they really mean business, the French refuse 
(as they almost certainly will at the Summit) to fix a date for the opening 
of negotiations. … [W]e regard it as a tactical attitude. Is it realistic to 
expect the French to agree now to a date for the opening of 
negotiations? If they do, they lose most of their hold on their partners in 
the preparation of common negotiating positions to which they attach 
such importance. But we do not believe that reluctance on the question 
of a date conceals a continued objection of principle to negotiate. On 
the contrary, it remains our view that the most fundamental change 
which has occurred in the past four months is precisely that - as 
Pompidou says - the veto of principle on the opening of negotiations 
has now been lifted. 
  
Even if the summit did not set a specific date, the embassy believed that 
France could be brought to accept a timeframe within which negotiations 
should be started. For all this, he did not believe that France genuinely 
wanted Britain in the Community. Whilst they were concerned about 
increasing German power, which British entry should help to counteract, 
Paris saw greater danger in an Anglo-German combination directed against 
France. There would also be tougher industrial competition and the dilution 
of French influence in European institutions, bringing with it the potential for 
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English to supplant French as the dominant Community language. 
Nonetheless, France was ‘resigned to British entry … They know they will 
not get what they want out of the Community unless they allow negotiations 
to open’.83  
 
For Robinson, this dual conclusion – that there was no longer any veto on 
negotiations, but that France did not see British entry as being in its own 
interest – raised clearly the danger that Paris might try to adopt so rigid a 
posture during negotiations that a successful outcome would be made 
impossible. This again brought agricultural finance into the foreground, for it 
was here, above all, that Paris could insist upon terms that the British 
government would be unable to accept. On 6 November, Robinson set out 
his thoughts to O’Neill: 
 
If the French position is that they are resigned to negotiations, but 
intend to make them long and tough and have suspended judgement 
on whether they need ever be concluded, then the real problems for us 
arise in negotiations rather than in getting negotiations to start. I would 
conclude from this (to take agricultural finance as the main obstacle to 
our membership) that we risk less as a result of a serious crisis over the 
question of permanency for finance agreements agreed before 
negotiations start, than we do by allowing permanent agreement on 
finance to be reached and then trying to overturn it in negotiations. In 
any case, this is the central issue in our European policy for the coming 
three months.84  
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Three weeks previously, the FCO had decided against making 
representations on agricultural finance for fear of antagonising Paris.85 Now, 
however, with the possibility that France might seek to use a permanent 
regulation to frustrate a successful denouement to negotiations, the greater 
danger appeared to lie in not acting. Better, Robinson felt, to have a 
confrontation at this stage, while the financial arrangements were still 
undecided, than seek to alter them in negotiation, when Paris could insist 
that the onus was on Britain to accept an agreed Community policy. 
 
In fact, the FCO had already begun to retreat from the decision taken on 
agricultural finance in mid-October. Starting in Rome at the end of the month, 
and then with the Belgians, Dutch and the Commission in early November, 
British representatives began to stress the problems that a permanent 
settlement would pose. These were threefold: it would make accession 
negotiations more difficult, as Britain would need substantive safeguards 
against an inequitable contribution; definitive arrangements might take so 
long to agree that the opening of enlargement negotiations might be delayed; 
and British public opinion would be confounded by such a deal being struck 
immediately prior to the opening of negotiations.86 On 7 November, Thomson 
emphasised this last point in conversation with the French ambassador to 
London, Geoffroy de Courcel, and was met with a warning that, ‘Britain 
should be careful not to attempt to divide France from her partners on the 
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question of agriculture’.87 But the FCO could no longer be deterred. 
Instructions were sent to embassies in the Five to continue stressing the 
problems a definitive agreement would create.88 Soames felt that London 
was going too far, but this time his concerns went unheeded.89 Yet the signs 
from the Five were far from encouraging. Italy appeared to be the only state 
willing to oppose a definitive settlement, but it was clear that it could not hold 
out alone.90 The pivotal player would be Germany. Stewart had a visit to 
Bonn scheduled for 14 November and he would exert high level pressure to 
resist French demands.91 
 
That agricultural finance became Britain’s major preoccupation in November 
was, in large measure, a reflection of increasing confidence that a decision of 
principle to open negotiations would be taken, if not at the summit, then 
shortly after.92 This greater optimism was in part due to the Palliser letter, but 
it also followed the more robust line now being taken by Germany and Italy.93 
In Cabinet Stewart remained cautious, asserting that the summit was unlikely 
to set a date, but in a meeting with Wilson on 12 November he revealed his 
belief that negotiations would start by the middle of 1970.94 On agricultural 
finance, the picture was less encouraging: Stewart thought it ‘just 
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conceivable’ that there would be only a temporary settlement, allowing for 
alterations at the end of its life, but ‘the danger was that there could be an 
agreement … [which] could only be changed by unanimity’, thus giving 
France a veto.95 In mid-November, therefore, the British were realistic about 
the chances of avoiding a permanent regulation. Contemplating the worst, 
O’Neill wrote to closely concerned officials that a definitive regulation need 
not present London with an insurmountable obstacle: ‘We would simply have 
to undermine it and find a way round it by insisting that, whatever the nature 
and character of the agreement the Six might have made, the burdens of the 
Common Agricultural Policy must, through one device or another, be 
equitably distributed and not all heaped on us’.96 This did not mean that 
Whitehall had already given up on a temporary regulation. On the contrary, it 
was this issue which took centre stage, as Stewart travelled to Bonn.  
 
The meeting between Stewart and the new German Foreign Minister, Walter 
Scheel, was crucial in conditioning British expectations ahead of the summit 
at The Hague. Stewart began by indicating his belief that French policy had 
changed: ‘it seemed that France now accepted enlargement in principle’. 
Scheel, who had held talks with Schumann only five days earlier, concurred; 
the crucial point for Paris was that there should first be agreement on 
agricultural finance. Provided this was granted, and that it preserved the 
principles of the CAP, France would be ready to move to negotiations, ‘even 
an early date would be acceptable’. Scheel then elucidated the German 
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approach: while Paris insisted that completion must precede development 
and enlargement, Bonn wanted parallel movement on all three. Thus, 
Germany was ‘ready to reach agreement on agricultural finance if this really 
guaranteed progress towards the other two goals’. For the British, the 
implications of this statement were plain: Bonn would concede a permanent 
regulation in return for French agreement to open accession negotiations. 
Stewart impressed upon Scheel the difficulties that such a deal would create 
for London: ‘It was clearly possible that this might be of a kind that would in 
fact make it impossible for the United Kingdom to enter the Community’. He 
stressed the need to make any arrangement alterable in the context of 
enlargement. O’Neill redoubled the foreign secretary’s points: a definitive 
settlement could ‘prejudice negotiations from the outset’, and Britain ‘would 
much prefer that no final agreement was reached now’. Scheel, however, 
argued that Stewart and O’Neill were missing the point; the British problem 
stemmed not so much from the finance regulation itself, but from the 
excessive cost of the CAP as a whole. London’s aim should be to use CAP 
reform to limit total expenditure, in the pursuit of which Germany would be an 
ally. To British minds, this was not an adequate solution: their concern was 
not simply the overall cost, which in any case would remain large, but the 
fact that the methods of finance resulted in Britain facing a disproportionate 
contribution. Again, however, Scheel took a different view, Britain would have 
to mitigate the imbalance by replacing its traditional non-EEC food imports 
with Community ones. In the short term, the problem could also be dealt with 
through transitional arrangements. It was clear that the German position was 
fixed, and thus, while the tone of the meeting remained friendly – Stewart 
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expressed warm appreciation for the support the new government had given 
to enlargement – the British left the meeting confronting a new political 
reality: their efforts to prevent a definitive agreement on finance had 
collapsed. By the same token, it was apparent that Germany would insist 
upon a countervailing commitment from France to the opening of 
enlargement negotiations.97 As the British looked to The Hague, therefore, 
the fundamentals of an agreement between the Six could be discerned.98 
Two questions now remained. First, when would negotiations begin? And 
second, would the agricultural finance regulation allow for contributions to be 
adjusted in the event that British contributions proved manifestly 
disproportionate? 
 
On 1 December, the Six met at The Hague for their long awaited summit. 
The day after, the French veto on negotiations was finally lifted. To 
understand this outcome it is necessary to look beyond the conference 
communiqué; for while it referred to enlargement in positive terms, there was 
no specific commitment regarding negotiations.99 Rather, the communiqué 
needs to be viewed in conjunction with the post-summit press conferences. 
France conceded that the Five should be allowed to state that ‘the difficult 
problems … which should be solved before the start of negotiations, could be 
decided in the first half of 1970, and probably earlier, and that negotiations 
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could start immediately thereafter’.100 Whether or not this represented a 
precise obligation was unclear. Germany appeared to interpret it that way: Dr 
Paul Frank, a senior Auswärtiges Amt official who Brandt sent as his 
personal emissary to report the outcome of the summit to Wilson, stressed 
that 30 June was a deadline and that negotiations should begin in July.101  
 
In London, particular praise was given to Brandt for his support for the British 
candidacy. In Cabinet Thomson explained that the new chancellor’s 
‘firmness and consistency’ contrasted ‘very favourably with the performance 
of previous German governments’.102 Schumann, however, lost no time in 
emphasising that France had been true to its word all along: at a NATO 
dinner in Brussels on 3 December, he reminded Stewart of their private 
conversation at the UN in September, commenting, ‘Now you can see I have 
kept my promise’.103 In return, and as was expected after Stewart’s Bonn 
visit, agreement was reached on the need to settle the outlines of a definitive 
financial regulation by the end of the year, with the summit communiqué 
stipulating that subsequent changes to the regulation could only be made on 
the basis of unanimity (thus giving France a veto), and on condition that the 
principles of the CAP were not infringed.104  
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In his analysis of intra-Community diplomacy before and during The Hague 
summit, Ludlow argues that: ‘France had extracted a high price for its volte-
face on enlargement. But Pompidou was now committed to permitting a 
widening of the EEC in a way which made any thought of future vetoes all 
but inconceivable’.105 By insisting upon settlement of the finance regulation in 
definitive form as a quid pro quo for French agreement to the opening of 
negotiations, this interpretation suggests that Pompidou could not seek to 
wield another veto without precipitating a further, and perhaps more 
dangerous, Community crisis than that of 1968-69.106 It therefore has 
potentially important implications for the explanation of French behaviour 
during the accession negotiations, and consequently will be returned to in 
later chapters. At the time, there could be no such confidence in France’s 
future cooperation. The possibility remained, as Robinson had suggested in 
early November, that France might still seek to thwart the British bid in the 
course of accession negotiations.107 London’s reaction to the summit 
outcome was thus marked by caution. In a long minute on the summit, Nield 
wrote that: ‘whilst we have seen the first breach for ten years in the French 
dyke, there is a very long way to go before the dyke is down’. On agricultural 
finance, his frank assessment was that: ‘the price of membership may well 
be too high unless we can see either the cost of the CAP reduced in the Six’s 
discussions, or get our probable share of the cost reduced in the 
negotiations’.108 Indeed, the British position had been made yet more difficult 
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by the agreement that the final regulation should be based upon the 
European Commission’s proposals, which prescribed that member states 
should transfer not only all agricultural levies, but also all customs duties to 
the Community.109 Britain’s worldwide trading patterns made certain that it 
would record large customs receipts, exacerbating the perceived inequity 
which had existed on the basis of levies alone.110  
 
With the crucial Council meeting on agricultural finance set to begin on 19 
December, the British determined to make new representations about the 
difficulties which would be created if the Community settled on the basis of 
the Commission’s proposals. On 11 December, Nield and O’Neill consulted 
with deputy secretaries from the Treasury, Ministry of Agriculture and Board 
of Trade, and the following day submissions were made to Wilson and 
Stewart advocating action.111 O’Neill’s minute went into great detail about the 
scale of the potential problem. The approximate figure for Britain’s levy 
contributions was put at $500 million (£208 million), representing almost half 
of total Community levy receipts. Customs duties, meanwhile, would be in 
the region of $600 million (£250 million), perhaps 25% of member-state 
collections from that source. A remainder would still need to be covered by 
fixed key contributions (or, in the preference of the Commission, a 
Community tax), but this amount would be comparatively small and would 
have only a marginal effect on the overall distribution of costs. Britain would 
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therefore be certain to face a contribution far in excess of its 20% share of 
GDP in a Community of ten (the Six plus the Four applicants). Moreover, the 
position became more inequitable when consideration was given to how little 
money Britain would receive back through Community agricultural 
expenditure. O’Neill calculated that Britain and Germany would be the only 
sizeable net contributors, with the British figure perhaps three and half times 
as great as Germany’s. The aim, therefore, would be to persuade the Six to 
make provision for possible abatements, or for ‘flexibility’ in the transfer of 
levies and duties. He warned Stewart that ‘unless something along these 
lines is allowed for, the task we shall face next year in negotiating equitable 
arrangements for ourselves in the budgetary field will be much more difficult’. 
O’Neill fully acknowledged that the chances of such safeguards materialising 
were remote, but the arguments in favour of action remained overwhelming: 
 
We cannot have high hopes that our representations will radically alter 
the outcome of the Six’s current negotiations. But we must put our 
views on record. We must do what we can to make the Five aware of 
the changes that would be necessary if they persist in adopting 
arrangements on the lines now under consideration. And we must be 
able to say afterwards that we told them plainly and in good faith that 
arrangements of this kind would involve unacceptable burdens on 
Britain.112 
 
Wilson and Stewart quickly approved the instructions, which due to their 
technical character were to be carried out at senior official, rather than 
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ministerial, level.113 By 15 December, representations had taken place in the 
six capitals and with the European Commission.114 
 
O’Neill’s pessimism proved to be well founded, as British representations 
brought little reward. The Germans and French both indicated that it would 
be difficult to take account of British interests at this stage.115 Then, on 20 
December, Schumann was reported in the Financial Times as saying that, “if 
before joining somebody wants to have an influence on Community 
decisions, the whole system established at The Hague will crumble”.116 Yet 
Paris had little to be acrimonious about, the Council agreement struck on 22 
December locked in place the finance system France so prized. The type of 
safeguards Britain sought were completely absent. A crucial aspect of the 
agreement was the decision that future financial contributions should cover 
all aspects of Community expenditure, not just agriculture.117 In theory, this 
offered hope for alleviating Britain’s financial burden over time; if new 
Community policies could be developed, from which Britain would be a net 
beneficiary, the basic inequity might be reduced. But this was hypothetical 
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and London had to confront the existing pattern of expenditure, dominated as 
it was by agriculture. The settlement of the finance regulation in the form 
proposed by the Commission made certain that the critical issue in accession 
negotiations would be the UK’s contribution to the Community budget. It 
would pit France against Britain – the country which would be most opposed 
to substantive alterations to the regulation, against the country which would 
fair worst under its operations. 
 
Conclusion 
 
The Hague summit should be remembered as one of the most important 
events in the history of Britain’s relations with the Community prior to entry. 
By lifting the veto on enlargement negotiations, Pompidou had initiated a 
process which would culminate in British accession to the Community in 
January 1973. At the same time, his actions must be viewed in the context of 
the Community crisis which resulted from French opposition to enlargement 
over the previous two years.118 December 1969 can thus be seen to 
vindicate the British strategy of 1968 in seeking to isolate France through 
cooperation with the Five in areas outside the Treaty of Rome.119 At the 
same time, the Community’s agreement upon a definitive finance regulation 
would have long-term consequences for Britain’s relations with the 
Community, acting as a recurring point of friction in its first decade as a 
                                                            
118
 See Ludlow, European, pp.146-198. 
119
 See Chapter 1. 
121 
 
member.120 More immediately, it presented a much greater obstacle to 
British accession than had existed in 1967, contradicting Pine’s conclusion 
that British diplomacy in the veto period prevented the Community 
developing in ways that would make its subsequent accession more 
difficult.121 On the contrary, not only did it make the prospect for the 
accession negotiations more challenging, it also provided a ready argument 
for opponents of entry in Britain to deploy against the application in domestic 
debate.122 It was thus a meeting of transformative importance for British 
European policy, the consequences of which will reverberate through the 
remainder of this thesis. 
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Chapter 3 
 
Public Equivocation and Private Determination: 
Wilson’s Domestic Balancing Act 
January to June 1970 
 
 
For some, it has not been beyond the bounds of imagination to suggest that 
if Labour had won the 1970 General Election, it would have been Harold 
Wilson who took Britain into the European Community.1 Edward Heath’s 
supporters naturally doubt this prospect. They argue that but for the strength 
of Heath’s convictions over EC membership, Britain may never have joined.2 
Analysis of the period from January to June 1970 is particularly relevant to 
this question. With The Hague summit having opened the way to 
enlargement negotiations, Britain’s application was once again active. It had 
been relatively easy for Wilson to state his commitment to EC membership in 
the period following the veto, but the revival of the application and the 
prospect of difficult negotiations was bound to present him with domestic 
challenges. The deterioration in public support for membership in the winter 
of 1969-70 created a much more difficult environment in which to advance 
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the application than had been the case in 1967.3 On the surface, there does 
appear reason to question Wilson’s determination to carry the application to 
a successful conclusion. As his authorised biographer Philip Zieger writes:  
 
for students of Wilsonian tactics, there were signs that he was 
preparing to hedge his bets. The White Paper which the government 
published in February 1970 on the likely economic consequences of 
British entry was a cautiously balanced document, and Wilson’s 
speech in the debate that followed was no less cautious and balanced 
in its nature. Indeed, when he berated the Tories for being ready to 
sacrifice cheap food from the Commonwealth without any 
corresponding advantage, he seemed to be distancing himself from 
his more partisan European supporters. 
 
Implicitly looking ahead to Wilson’s 1971 decision to oppose entry on the 
terms negotiated by the Conservatives, Ziegler concludes that Wilson ‘was 
not yet retreating from his support for British entry, but he was placing on 
record that a line of retreat existed’.4 This chapter will interpret Wilson’s 
actions in an altogether different light. There can be little question that the 
white paper presented a potentially grim picture as regards the economic 
consequences of entry, and that his speech in the House of Commons was 
equivocal, but against a background of increasing Cabinet concern about the 
cost of accession, strong public dissatisfaction with the continued pursuit of 
membership, and an imminent general election, Wilson was bound to adopt 
a reserved posture in his public pronouncements. Within government, 
however, and away from the public gaze, the prime minister’s actions reflect 
an altogether more determined attitude.  
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The February 1970 white paper 
 
Wilson had promised to make available an up to date assessment of the 
economic consequences of joining the Community during his speech to the 
Labour Party Conference on 30 September 1969. The background to this 
decision included remarks by Heath to the effect that the British people 
should be given as much information as possible on this score.5 The detailed 
work by a Whitehall team under William Nield’s leadership began in 
November and, with the exception of Wilson, ministers only considered the 
draft in the late stages before its publication. Their impact on the final 
outcome was thus limited to presentational, rather than substantive, 
aspects.6 Wilson was concerned throughout to ensure that the white paper 
avoided antagonising anti-market opinion.7 He thus wanted the paper to be 
‘factual’ rather than ‘argumentative’, and resisted Nield’s desire to include a 
detailed exposition of the political case on the grounds that, ‘this would give 
the opponents of entry the opportunity of saying that we were seeking to 
disguise the economic effects by vague political arguments’.8 He also made 
sure that the conclusion to the white paper was clear about the importance of 
the terms to the final decision on joining.9 Wilson nonetheless opposed 
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Nield’s preference for the document to take the form of a ‘green’, rather than 
a ‘white’, paper (the former is normally used to outline a government 
proposal, the latter an agreed policy); as a member of the prime minister’s 
private staff explained to Nield, ‘To move back to “Green Papers” could give 
the impression that the policy was open for reconsideration’. Wilson’s main 
intervention in officials’ calculation of the economic costs came when he 
asked that further consideration be given to the passage on invisibles (where 
he believed there to be greater potential for a positive impact) and inward 
investment, but this was not such as to prescribe officials’ final conclusions 
on the matter.10  
 
In both Cabinet and parliament, Wilson referred to the white paper as being 
‘objective’. This was undoubtedly a misnomer. The document is better 
understood as the product of interplay between competing Whitehall biases. 
One incident in particular helps to illuminate the point: in the latter stages of 
the white paper’s production, a dispute arose over a passage, drafted by the 
Treasury, for inclusion in the white paper’s ‘overall economic assessment’. 
As was seen in the last chapter, Treasury officials held serious concerns 
about Britain’s ability to manage the balance of payments cost implied by 
EEC membership in the short term, and in this particular section, they 
referred to the possibility of a ‘consequential deterioration in the terms of 
trade’ – a ‘transparent euphemism’, in Nield’s words, for devaluation. The 
matter was finally resolved on the basis of a re-draft by Nield.11  When he 
sent a copy of the original Treasury passage to the prime minister, Wilson 
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expressed ‘amazement’, and decided to speak to Jenkins: ‘The Chancellor, 
of course, was a leading figure in the European movement, and I shall want 
to talk to him. He is also, I think, professionally allergic to consequential 
deteriorations in the terms of trade’.12 But as the relevant passage had now 
been agreed at official level, Wilson’s reaction did not alter the final draft.13 
Overall, the influence of the Treasury may have helped to achieve the 
outcome which Wilson most desired: a white paper which could not be 
branded by anti-marketeers as partial or biased.14    
 
The white paper was divided into five chapters. The first was an Introduction, 
explaining the historical context, important developments since the 
application had been made in the spring of 1967, and the methodological 
approach. It was in this chapter too that a brief reference was made to the 
political case for entry, by quoting from Wilson’s statement to parliament on 2 
May 1967: ‘whatever the economic arguments, this House will realise that ... 
the Government’s purpose derives above all from our recognition that 
Europe is now faced with the opportunity of a great move forward in political 
unity and that we can – and indeed we must – play our full part in it’. The 
remaining chapters dealt successively with the impact of accepting the 
Common Agricultural Policy, ‘Trade and Industry’, ‘Capital Movements and 
Invisible Trade’, and, finally, the overall economic assessment. Capital 
movements and invisibles were judged to be impossible to quantify, and so 
the critical chapters for the calculation of economic costs were those on the 
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CAP and ‘Trade and Industry’, with the latter also discussing the 
countervailing advantages that it was hoped would accrue from the 
dismantling of tariffs between Britain and the Six.15   
 
The chapter on agriculture included what was by far and away the most 
significant component of the balance of payments cost: contributions to the 
Community budget. The gross figure was put at anywhere between £150 
million and £670 million annually, with a claw-back of £50-£100 million. To 
justify the imprecision, it was observed that the Six had agreed their 
contributions to the 1970 budget on the basis of percentage shares, and that 
in subsequent years their payments would be prevented from rising or falling 
by more than a specified amount.16 Britain’s contribution could not be 
predicted as it would depend upon the percentage share negotiated for its 
base year (or ‘key’).17 The lower figure of £150 million represented a British 
contribution in the first year of a transitional period were it to obtain a starting 
contribution representing 15% of the total Community budget. To the 
informed eye, there were two problems with this analysis: first, it was by no 
means clear that Britain would be offered the same transitional terms that the 
Six had agreed for themselves, or that this would even be to Britain’s 
advantage. Secondly, no mention was made of the post-transitional (or 
‘definitive’) period when the financial mechanism would be likely to operate 
untrammelled, with Britain facing a gross contribution near to the upper end 
                                                            
15
 Hansard, HCP, Cmnd.4289, February 1970 
16
 Between 1971 and 1974 member state contributions could not rise (as a proportion of the 
total) by more than 1% or fall by more than 1.5%. Between 1975 and 1977 the figure was 
2% in either direction. TNA/PREM13/3198, paper attached to Barrington to Youde, 2 
January 1970. 
17
 Hansard, HCP, Cmnd.4289, February 1970, pp.20-21. 
128 
 
of the range. Internally officials envisaged that once correctives were 
removed, Britain would be paying in the region of £500 million annually (£430 
million net).18 
 
The second cost associated with the CAP was that of increased food prices. 
This was due to the comparatively high agricultural prices set by the 
Community and the requirement to impose levies on agricultural produce 
imported from non-EEC countries. The white paper estimated that there 
would be an 18% to 26% rise in retail food prices by the end of a transitional 
period, resulting in a four to five per cent increase in the cost of living.19 
While the immediate effect of the rise would be felt by British consumers, a 
significant proportion was likely to be passed on to employers through larger 
wage demands, with negative, but not necessarily significant, consequences 
for industrial competitiveness.20 The other probable effect of more expensive 
food imports was a worsening of the balance of agricultural trade. The 
precise scale of the impact was difficult to predict, as it would depend upon 
the response of consumers and producers to higher prices. Nonetheless, the 
white paper suggested that the effect might range between an improvement 
of £85 million and a deterioration of £255 million.21 
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The chapter on trade and industry dealt with two opposing impacts: on the 
one hand, a short-term deterioration in the balance of visible trade resulting 
from tariff changes between Britain and the EC and Britain and the 
Commonwealth; and on the other, what was termed the ‘dynamic’ (and by 
implication, cumulative) advantages of free trade within the Community. In 
reality, the two points could not be separated, as the beneficial effects would 
themselves alter the visible trade balance. Whitehall, however, had found the 
‘dynamic’ benefits to be impossible to quantify, with the result that this aspect 
was discussed in qualitative terms only. The essence of the white paper’s 
argument was that the EC should provide Britain with access to a larger and 
faster growing market. Tougher European competition would force British 
industry to become more efficient, and the larger population base would 
facilitate increased economies of scale (thought to be particularly important if 
British firms were to compete with giant American corporations). Alongside 
greater inward investment, which it was believed would follow entry to the 
EC, the effect, it was posited, should be increased exports and higher GDP 
growth.22 
 
While the dynamic benefits proved impossible to measure, the experience of 
devaluation did offer a basis upon which to estimate the likely effects of tariff 
removal under a ‘static’ model – that is to say, one in which no account was 
taken of gains in scale and efficiency. On such a basis, and allowing for a 
loss of competitiveness due to higher food prices, the consequence of joining 
the EC customs union was thought to be a decline in the visible trade 
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balance (excluding agriculture) of between £125 million and £275 million 
annually at the end of a transitional period.23 In internal minutes, Nield 
worked on the assumption of a £200 million cost – the mid-point of the 
range.24 In itself this represented a relatively insignificant sum; if the choice 
had simply been whether or not to join a customs union of the Six, a balance 
of payments cost of £200 million would have provided no argument against 
the perceived long-term benefits of tariff removal. The major difficulty, 
however, resulted from the aggregate balance of payments cost, that being, 
the combination of ongoing contributions to the Community budget and a 
deterioration in the balance of visible trade (both agricultural and industrial). 
 
When the higher and lower estimates in the white paper were added 
together, the outcome was a potential balance of payments cost, at the end 
of a transitional period, of between £100 million and £1100 million annually. 
While the extreme ends of the range were all but discounted (it was 
‘inconceivable’, the white paper argued, ‘that all elements in the calculation 
will work in the same direction, whether favourable or unfavourable’) even 
the middle point of £600 million would represent a very significant burden.25 
Briefing Wilson in March 1970, Nield suggested the full balance of payments 
cost would be between £700 and £900 million annually.26 There were two 
problems associated with this: first, it would constitute a large drain on British 
economic resources, as money which could otherwise be used domestically, 
either for consumption and investment, would be spent outside Britain. As 
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the white paper explained, ‘a reduction in investment would sooner or later 
involve a reduction in the growth of g.n.p’. Secondly, if the foreign exchange 
requirement could not be met, year-on-year, the government would have to 
employ deflationary policies (and possibly devaluation) in an attempt to 
strengthen Britain’s trade balance. The effect would again be to depress 
economic growth. Both scenarios threatened the very economic rationale for 
joining: to improve Britain’s economic performance.27 
 
Faced with the large balance of payments cost, there was an ever present 
temptation for the advocates of entry to overstate the economic advantages. 
The significance of tariff discrimination, for instance, could easily be 
exaggerated when considered in general terms only. But with the Kennedy 
Round set to reduce the Common External Tariff to approximately 6% ad 
valorem by 1972, there was a need for caution as well as greater 
contextualisation on this score.28 This was part of a broader tendency to 
overstate the extra growth potential offered by EEC membership. While the 
government did not give an official estimate for this, at various times 
hypothetical growth increases were discussed to demonstrate the resource 
benefits (in terms of additions to national income) that they would give rise 
to. The white paper mentioned a 1% increase and, in his speech during the 
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House of Commons debate that followed, Jenkins referred to a 0.5% 
increase.29 Even the lower number would have been a considerable gain 
owing to the removal of quite limited tariffs. In addition, by stressing the 
higher rates of growth achieved by the Six, the impression could be created 
that such levels were realistic for Britain. But this, too, was to ignore 
important contrary evidence. First, it was not only the Community countries 
that were enjoying such favourable economic performance. Between 1958 
and 1967 the majority of EFTA countries recorded growth rates close to, or 
better than, the EEC average.30 Secondly, during the period 1950-73, Britain 
recorded the lowest rate of GNP per capita growth of any west European 
country. Indeed it was the only nation to average less than 3% per annum.31 
This suggested that there was more to the inferior performance of the UK 
economy, relative to its major European competitors, than tariff 
discrimination alone. The white paper partially acknowledged this when it 
pointed to other possible explanations for the better economic performance 
witnessed on the continent: ‘more workers now leaving agriculture for 
industry; the advantages of post-war rebuilding of major industries with new 
machinery and the latest technologies; and generally a significantly lower 
proportion of g.n.p. expended on defence’.32 Even with this proviso, however, 
the paper went on to argue that ‘if British industry responded vigorously’, the 
dynamic effects ‘would be considerable and highly advantageous’.33 
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Had the costs deriving from agriculture been removed from the equation, the 
economic case could easily have rested on the argument that EC 
membership represented the most advantageous trading framework 
available to Britain, and that this would help to optimise British economic 
performance over the long term. Even a very small increase in the rate of 
growth would accumulate over time to make a meaningful difference to total 
national income. Faced with the balance of payments and food price 
consequences of the CAP, however, the prospect for the 1970s threatened 
to be detrimental. Given that public opinion could be expected to be less 
impressed with arguments about political benefits, the economic case 
needed to seem defensible in its own right. The consequence was that the 
proponents of EC membership were prone to placing more weight upon the 
‘dynamic’ advantages than was empirically justified.34 
 
The politics of equivocation: Wilson and the House of Commons 
debate 
 
On 24 February, the House of Commons convened for a two-day debate on 
a motion to take note of the white paper. The focus of speeches spanned 
much wider than just the economics of entry, and engaged with issues of 
national sovereignty, European political unity, and the democratic control of 
Community institutions. The diversity of opinion was symbolised by the 
personalities themselves, from committed marketeers such as Jenkins and 
Heath, to fierce opponents like Enoch Powell and Douglas Jay. For the 
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government, the debate was opened by Stewart, with Wilson assuming 
responsibility for the close.35 After two days of often impassioned argument, 
the prime minister’s low-key and at times technocratic treatment of the 
subject was highly anti-climactic. Following a cursory consideration of the 
political case, the greater part of the speech was devoted to a dry analysis of 
the findings contained in the white paper, during which only a passing 
reference was made to the hoped for dynamic benefits. The muted tone was 
only interrupted towards the end when Wilson diverted into what seemed a 
gratuitous flurry of party polemics, accusing the Conservatives of wanting to 
pay the price of entry (by increasing the price of food), whether or not Britain 
actually joined, through its proposal to introduce an agricultural levy 
system.36 In Ziegler’s judgement, this performance saw Wilson ‘distancing 
himself from his more partisan European supporters’, but it is possible to 
read the prime minister’s comments differently.37 His deliberately equivocal 
stance was in fact motivated by short-term tactical considerations: to mollify 
anti-market opinion both within and outside government, with a view to 
safeguarding Labour’s electoral position and protecting the application from 
an early and precipitate increase in domestic controversy. Three factors are 
vital to understanding this approach: the reaction of Cabinet to the figures 
contained in the white paper, the shift in public opinion against EEC 
membership, and the imminence of a general election. 
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The meeting of Cabinet on 3 February to discuss the draft white paper is 
illustrative of the internal constraints Wilson faced in his approach to the 
parliamentary debate. Despite emphasising that a final decision on 
membership could only be taken in the light of negotiations, the figures 
contained in the white paper naturally gave impetus to ministers sceptical 
about British entry. For the estimates in the white paper put a very different 
complexion on the notion of acceptable terms; it was now plausible to argue 
that entry would not be feasible on any terms that seemed likely. Castle 
recorded in her diary the ‘shocked reactions of some of the most devoted 
adherents of going in’. She was particularly struck by Roy Mason, President 
of the Board of Trade: ‘I am a pro-European, he said in effect, yet this 
document would cause me to pause’.38 In 1967 the balance of payments cost 
had been put at £500 million a year at the end of a transitional period. Wilson 
now suggested that the figure might be £700 million. This, he argued, was 
‘similar’ to the 1967 estimate.39 It was nonetheless a significant burden and 
ministers could not ignore the possibility that the figure might be even higher. 
Moreover, in 1967 it had been the declared intention of the government to 
enter the Community in time to participate in the negotiations on a definitive 
mechanism for financing the CAP. This held out the possibility that Britain 
could still limit its contributions under the permanent regulation. As a result of 
The Hague summit, the fundamentals of the finance regulation had been 
fixed, making it much more difficult to envisage a satisfactory outcome to this 
problem. Even the paper’s use of comparative growth rates, which had been 
intended to support the arguments about the dynamic advantages of joining, 
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gave sustenance to the doubters. A table on page 30 of the draft placed 
EFTA growth rates alongside those of the Community and used the average 
of each to show that the EEC grew faster than EFTA between 1958 and 
1967.40 The EFTA average, however, was strongly dragged down by the 
poor performance of the UK economy. Otherwise, the majority of EFTA had 
experienced growth rates similar to, or better than, the Community. This was 
seized upon in Cabinet:  
 
The key to the cost of membership would be the outcome of the 
negotiations on agriculture and whether or not we could afford this cost 
depended upon the effect of membership on the United Kingdom 
growth rate. In this connection the table on page 30 of the draft was 
rather discouraging: the United Kingdom growth rate had been low for 
many years not only in relation to existing member States of the EEC 
but also other countries in Western Europe which were not members. It 
could well be the case that we should not be able to afford the cost 
which was demanded.41 
 
Privately, Wilson had shown himself to be less disturbed by the estimates 
than were his ministerial colleagues. The prime minister’s reaction is 
captured in the record of a meeting with Thomson on 13 January, during 
which the draft white paper was discussed:  
 
The figures were less alarming than the Prime Minister had expected 
partly because the figures were for 1977 not 1972. By 1977 Britain’s 
G.N.P. would be £60 billion. It would be much easier to get 1% of 
national income into exports over seven years. At least we now had 
seven years to accomplish what the Communities would have 
accomplished in twenty.42 
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A point of qualification is necessary when comparing Wilson’s £60 billion 
figure with the estimates in the white paper; the prime minister would have 
been referring to current prices (prices adjusted for inflation), whereas the 
figures contained in the white paper were in constant prices. In constant 
prices, and assuming a growth rate of 3% per annum, British GDP in 1977 
would have been in the region of £48 billion.43 Relative to the white paper, 
therefore, Wilson’s preparedness to accept a cost amounting to 1% of 
national income would have meant a balance of payments cost of close to 
£500 million annually. The main significance of the document, however, is 
not the precise monetary sum that Wilson was prepared to countenance, but 
the fact that his commitment to entry had not been shaken in the face of the 
estimates produced by officials. 
 
Cabinet concerns about the economic effects nonetheless circumscribed his 
room for manoeuvre when dealing with the issue in public. In particular, it 
was now much less feasible to argue, as had been the case in 1967, that the 
political case was ‘decisive’ in relation to the economic.44 Ministers decided 
that a line be removed from the conclusion of the draft stating that: ‘nothing 
has happened since 1967 to invalidate the judgment then taken that the 
balance of political advantage transcends the short and long-run economic 
considerations’.45 Even more significant was the argument that, in the light of 
the potential economic cost, ‘It was important ... not to over-emphasise the 
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political and other advantages of membership. The position which the 
Government took in the Debate in the House on the White Paper needed 
careful consideration.’46 Wilson was already conscious of the need to avoid 
appearing to disregard the economic consequences by giving too much 
attention to the geo-political arguments, hence his decision not to include a 
detailed recapitulation of these in the white paper.47 But the formal 
articulation of this point in Cabinet, can only have made him more conscious 
of the need to tread carefully in the parliamentary debate. 
 
The second consideration bearing upon Wilson was the stark shift in public 
opinion against joining the EC. Public attitudes towards entry were often 
difficult to interpret, and much could depend upon the precise question 
asked. Nonetheless, a series of survey results, published in February 1970, 
were highly discomforting for pro-marketeers. Public support for the 
application had peaked in July 1966 at 71%, and thereafter there had been a 
steady decline. In April 1967 the numbers approving of the application had 
still been greater than those disapproving, but during 1968 and 1969 this 
position reversed.48 The February 1970 results were even more alarming, 
with a further significant decline in support (perhaps due in part to the 
prospect of increased food prices and a general rise in the cost of living).49 
Gallup asked, ‘Do you approve or disapprove of the Government applying for 
membership of the Common Market?’, and found that just 22% of those 
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surveyed approved, 57% disapproved, and 21% said they didn’t know. A 
Harris poll revealed similar levels of opposition; the question was simply, ‘Are 
you for or against Britain joining the European Common Market?’ 19% were 
for, 63% against, and 18% didn’t know. The most dramatic result, however, 
was that produced by ORC. To the question, ‘How much are you in favour or 
against Britain joining the European Common Market?’, 72% responded 
‘against’, with 18% in favour and 10% don’t knows.50 During the 
parliamentary debate, both Wilson and Stewart acknowledged the poll data. 
The foreign secretary referred to the ORC figures showing 72% against 
entry, but noted that in the same survey 67% of respondents had also said 
the government should enter negotiations, ‘to see what terms we can get’, 
while 49%, a majority of those holding an opinion, said that they would be ‘in 
favour of joining’ were it to become ‘clear that we would be better off in the 
Common Market’.51 Similarly, Wilson accepted that the data showed ‘a 
strong majority against entry’, but argued that there was also ‘a substantial 
majority in favour of going on with the negotiations’.52 (The implication being 
that there would be greater support for entry if the government could secure 
acceptable terms.) If the ambiguity in the polling evidence gave reason to 
believe that the public could be persuaded to accept EEC membership at a 
later stage, there were obvious electoral risks involved in appearing to 
unequivocally favour EC membership at this stage. This was particularly the 
case given that Wilson was actively considering when to call an election. 
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For the third concern which conditioned Wilson’s speech was that of an 
impending general election. The Castle and Crossman diaries demonstrate 
that from the beginning of the year, the prime minister was thinking carefully 
about the timing of when to go to the country.53 During an ‘inner Cabinet’ 
meeting on 14 January (also referred to as the Management Committee), he 
advised his colleagues ‘to take an autumn election as our assumption’, but to 
be aware that there might be ‘a favourable opportunity earlier’.54 Two months 
later, Wilson appears to have moved in favour of an earlier date. At a further 
inner Cabinet on 8 March, he deployed a number of arguments in favour of 
June. Crossman noted, ‘Harold is anxious for an early election and he 
intends to have one’.55 Given that the parliamentary debate took place on 24 
and 25 February (much closer to the second meeting) it is fair to assume 
that, at the time of the parliamentary debate, Wilson was contemplating 
going to the country in the early summer. As a consequence, his sensitivity 
to the significant shift in public opinion against Britain’s application would 
have been all the more acute. By taking a cautious approach he could 
suppress the EC application as an issue of domestic controversy and so limit 
any potential damage it might cause to Labour’s hopes of re-election. He 
might also have calculated that by presenting himself as more cautious than 
Heath, he might secure some electoral advantage. But if this consideration 
did apply, it was very much secondary to his desire simply to keep the EC 
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out of the election. After all, if Wilson was looking to gain points over Heath 
on this subject, it would have been logical for him to make use of the tactic 
during the election campaign. In the event, he did not.56 
 
If the overriding tone of Wilson’s speech was one of caution, there were also 
remarks which demonstrated a desire to protect the pro-market case. He 
thus countered arguments that the Community was ‘inward looking’ by 
pointing to the comparatively high levels of aid given to developing countries 
and its commitment to trade liberalisation through the Kennedy Round.57 On 
the issue of sovereignty, he criticised attempts to portray the choice before 
Britain in zero sum terms, stating that ‘the whole history of political progress 
is a history of gradual abandonment of national sovereignty’. Quoting from 
his 1961 speech on the Macmillan government’s decision to apply, Wilson 
went on to say: ‘The question is not whether sovereignty remains absolute or 
not, but in what way one is prepared to sacrifice sovereignty, to whom and 
for what purpose ... [and] whether any proposed surrender of sovereignty will 
advance our progress to the kind of world that we want to see’.58 Similarly, 
he expressed a clear view about the need to enter negotiations as soon as 
they were offered. Given the prevailing economic conditions, one plausible 
argument was that Britain would be better to defer the start of negotiations 
until more favourable circumstances arose. Wilson rejected this, insisting 
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that, ‘At the very moment when, after years of dispute, the Six are ready to 
sit down with us, to spurn them now would be to add a very large and 
significant chapter to the historical record of missed opportunities.’59 As 
cautious as Wilson’s speech may have been, the need to protect the 
application was never far from his mind. 
 
Stewart appeared a little less cautious than Wilson. The foreign secretary 
devoted the majority of his speech to economic questions, and only towards 
the end stepped onto his natural terrain, political affairs. Even then, and with 
the exception of the argument that European integration should improve the 
prospects for détente with Eastern Europe, his tone was primarily defensive; 
stressing that a failure to enlarge the Community would not prevent its further 
development, and that the world would in future be dominated by the United 
States, Soviet Union, China and the EC, ‘none of them particularly 
concerned about the part which this country ... might play’.60 Conversely, it 
was the senior economic minister, Jenkins, that made the most coherent 
political argument. Sidestepping the conventional emphasis upon the 
strengthening of British and European influence in the world, the chancellor 
deployed a more personal analysis: ‘Not having the detailed responsibilities 
of a Foreign Office Minister, I should like to approach this standing back a 
little and in the broadest possible way’. This took the form of a critique of 
British foreign policy since the Second World War, in which he argued that 
Britain had taken ‘too long ... to accept a European orientation’: 
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We continued to believe that it was our duty to police large parts of the 
world, to defend our former dependencies, and to maintain a network of 
military commitments barely approached by the super-Powers, let alone 
by our power equals. In this way, not for unworthy motives, we tried to 
cling on to our precarious position as the third of the great Powers. 
Economically we were not in their league. Militarily, we tried to pretend 
that we were. I do not believe that the attempt worked. It produced 20 
years of severe overstrain with grave effects upon our economic 
performance.61 
 
When placed alongside Wilson’s speech, it could be argued that the prime 
minister might have shown greater ingenuity in making a political case for 
entry. Undoubtedly, part of the explanation must be the contrasting 
personalities of the two men (Wilson calculating and tactical, Jenkins always 
more ready to state his views plainly), yet the pressures confronting Wilson 
were also much greater than those with which Jenkins had to grapple.62 
From the perspective of public opinion, and with an election in view, the 
opinion that mattered was that of the prime minister. Moreover, Wilson was 
responsible for ensuring Cabinet discipline on the European issue; he could 
not at this stage afford to find himself out-of-step with those more sceptical 
ministers, and thereby risk fermenting dissent. The time to make a strong 
case would be at the conclusion of negotiations, when a definite decision 
was required.  
 
The final aspect of the debate which needs to be explained is Wilson’s 
deviation into party polemics, accusing the Conservatives of wanting to pay 
the price of entry – by introducing a levy system for agriculture – whether or 
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not Britain joined the EEC.63 The genesis of this lies in a speech that Wilson 
made to a Labour Party meeting on 22 February (the Saturday before the 
parliamentary debate) in which he criticised Conservative economic 
proposals, including their intention to introduce a levy system in agriculture. 
Where Labour would only introduce a levy in return for the wider benefits of 
EC membership, Wilson charged, the Conservatives would do so 
regardless.64 But the prime minister quickly regretted having deployed the 
argument in the way that he did, and the next day sought to correct 
interpretations that he was shifting from his position on Europe. Wilson called 
a BBC reporter to Chequers and underlined Labour’s commitment to EEC 
membership on acceptable terms. Yet he could not resist reiterating his 
attack on the Tories: ‘What I am concerned with is the strange behaviour of 
those who want to pay the price when there is no certainty of getting in’. The 
Times predicted that these ‘events ... have made sure the [white paper] 
debate will have some rancorous passages’, and so it proved.65 While 
Stewart and Maudling both made reference to the controversy, the dispute 
was escalated most of all by Heath. In the final stages of his speech, the 
Conservative leader made an extended rebuttal of Labour accusations, 
before unleashing a personal attack on Wilson’s negotiating resolve through 
reference to his abandonment of the industrial relations Bill, In Place of 
Strife. Heath rallied, ‘If the Prime Minister wants to fight the coming election 
on who should negotiate for Britain, let him come out now and fight it’.66 
Given the length and ferocity of Heath’s attack, it was unsurprising that 
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Wilson rejoined the argument in his own speech. His reference to Tory 
proposals on agricultural levies should not, therefore, be interpreted as an 
attempt to strike a more ambivalent stance on Europe; it was motivated by 
entirely separate impulses relating to electoral politics. This is underlined by 
the fact that he went well beyond subjects even remotely related to the EC 
application, invoking the mistakes of ‘Selsdon Park’ – a leitmotif of Labour’s 
1970 election campaign – including Conservative policies on welfare 
services and housing.67 
 
The determined marketeer: Wilson, the opening of negotiations, and 
the management of Cabinet dissent 
 
Wilson’s reservations in parliament were such that it is possible to imagine 
that he was becoming more circumspect about pressing for EC entry as a 
result of the increased cost of membership and shifts in public opinion. 
However, when the prime minister’s management of EC-inspired Cabinet 
tensions is taken into account, it is clear that his personal determination to 
advance Britain towards Community membership remained firm. 
 
A first insight into Wilson’s attitude can be gained by returning to the Cabinet 
meeting of 3 February, focussing upon the specific ways in which he sought 
to defend the application against the figures presented. Thus, in outlining the 
contents of the white paper, Wilson used a number of arguments to soften 
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the impact upon ministers. He asserted that ‘the estimates inevitably 
presented a distorted picture since the size of the adverse effects only had 
been found capable of estimation’.68 He also said that he ‘believed that 
membership would lead to an inflow of capital’, despite the fact that Whitehall 
investigations had led to the opposite conclusion.69 Without offering any 
figures, the draft white paper argued that observing Community directives on 
capital movements ‘must be expected in a typical year to involve a sizeable 
cost to the United Kingdom balance of payments’.70 He also told ministers 
that Britain could ‘expect ... [to] obtain a longer transitional period than could 
reasonably have been expected in 1967’, as the Six had extended their own 
transitional period for implementing the CAP finance mechanism from 1970 
to 1977.71 This was an argument officials were planning on deploying during 
the accession negotiations (the initial negotiating brief for this item targeted a 
transition period of as much as fourteen years).72 This would mean that it 
would be longer before Britain would have to assume the full financial burden 
of EEC membership. Yet it remained far from clear that the Community 
would be receptive to such an argument, and to imply that London could 
expect a significantly longer period of adjustment was by no means 
justified.73  
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The most striking example of Wilson’s benevolent analysis of the evidence is 
to be found in his argument that the dynamic advantages of membership 
might prove significant enough, within the space of a transitional period, to 
outweigh the balance of payments costs of entry. He thus argued that: 
 
He thought it reasonable to assume that this eventual cost might at the 
end of a transitional period be of the order of £700 million a year. ... It 
was only necessary to assume a very small increase in the annual rate 
of growth of gross domestic product (gdp) as a result of entry into an 
enlarged Community in order to provide the additional resources 
required to meet the cost of membership over a long transitional 
period.74 
 
This approach was based upon calculations submitted to Wilson by Nield 
which projected Britain’s total GDP over 1972-81 on the basis of two different 
growth paths. The first – supposed to represent the position should Britain 
remain outside the Communities – was a constant rate of 3% per annum. 
The second, suggesting what might transpire if Britain were to join the 
Communities, saw the growth rate accelerate by 0.1% a year over the 
decade, reaching 4.0% by 1981. On this basis, the addition to national 
income resulting from Community membership would, by 1977, amount to 
£982 million – sufficient to offset the £700 million balance of payments cost.75 
The latter scenario was, however, highly dubious. The magnitude of the 
suggested rise in GDP growth was extremely optimistic. If just the fifth year 
in the range was looked at, the assumption was a 0.5% rise. Such an 
increase could hardly be described as ‘very small’; it was, on the contrary, a 
substantial effect ascribed to the removal of relatively limited tariffs. In 
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addition, the tariffs themselves would only be reduced gradually during the 
transitional period, meaning that Britain would not enjoy free access to the 
Community market for several years after its accession. Finally, even if 
Wilson’s postulation did materialise, it did not address the major concern: 
that of whether Britain would be able finance the foreign exchange burden 
inherent in the balance of payments cost. An increase in the growth rate did 
not necessarily correspond to an improvement in the balance of payments, 
and the crucial question was whether Britain would be able to secure 
sufficient credits on current account, year on year, to offset the claims that 
would result from Community membership. Wilson would himself make this 
point in the debate on the principle of joining the Community in October 
1971.76 That was a different time and a different context, however, and as 
prime minister in early 1970 it was to his advantage to overlook the point. 
 
There is also evidence that Wilson was already thinking about how best to 
ensure that internal divisions over Europe did not weaken his ability to 
successfully manage the forthcoming negotiations. While it was not until 15 
May that the Community openly stated its preference for a start to be made 
on 30 June, from the beginning of 1970 Whitehall proceeded on the 
assumption that negotiations would begin around the middle of the year.77 In 
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February EURO began updating the negotiating briefs left dormant since 
1967, and on 16 April Wilson set up a ministerial sub-committee ‘to supervise 
the preparation for the forthcoming negotiations’ and to report to EURM.78 
This would be chaired by Labour’s negotiator designate, George Thomson, 
and be composed of the President of the Board of Trade, Roy Mason, the 
Minister for Agriculture, Cledwyn Hughes, the Chief Secretary to the 
Treasury, John Diamond, and the Paymaster General, Harold Lever. As a 
group, it had a clear pro-market bias, liable to facilitate the speedy and 
effective prosecution of negotiations.79 Wilson’s thinking on this matter is 
further illuminated by his response to Nield’s suggestion that negotiating 
briefs should only be presented to Cabinet ‘within a very short space of time’ 
before they needed to be tabled in Brussels. Such a procedure would, in 
Nield’s eyes, guard against leaks and ensure that ministers did not have to 
reconsider papers that had to be altered because of new circumstances.80 
Wilson fully agreed, but offered a further justification of his own: ‘I can think 
of Ministers who faced with a changed situation ... will play one brief off 
against another – e.g. sticking on a harder line in the first brief compared with 
the second – w[hile] strongly quoting inconsistencies’.81 And as will now be 
seen, Wilson’s sensitivity to potential Cabinet obstacles was by no means 
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unwarranted given his experiences in the final months prior to the 1970 
general election. 
 
In late March, Peter Shore, Minister without Portfolio, made a public speech 
(in conjunction with a press release) on Europe emphasising the cost of entry 
and casting doubt upon the sincerity of the government’s application. In the 
light of an improving economy, Shore argued, ‘whether or not we join the 
European Economic Community becomes an option which we can take up if 
it suits us, or leave alone if it does not’.82 Given that Shore was a close 
associate of Wilson, there was inevitable speculation that the speech might 
have been sanctioned by the prime minister.83 When, in Cabinet, it became 
clear that he had made no attempt to clear the speech with either the prime 
minister, the foreign secretary or FCO officials, he received, in Castle’s 
words, a ‘trouncing’.84 Crossman thought it ‘an act of total recklessness ... I 
had absolutely assumed that such a thing could not have occurred’.85 Where 
the Cabinet minutes conceal the finer details of the discussion, these are 
vividly depicted in ministerial diaries. Castle described Wilson as ‘coldly 
furious. I should think that if there were not an Election coming, Peter’s days 
would be numbered’.86 Crossman paraphrased Wilson’s argument that ‘the 
speech hadn’t given the whole balanced policy, only one aspect of it, and we 
had all told each other all the time we must be careful to get the balance 
right, and in particular that we were making a real and serious bid for entry. It 
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was that point which hadn’t come out clearly’.87 Stewart and Jenkins also 
made known their irritation, and even Healey seemed annoyed: the defence 
secretary observed that others ‘who were not too keen on the idea of entry 
had usually been careful not to rock the boat’. When Peart tried to defend 
Shore, by asserting that it was ‘A very popular speech’, Healey snapped 
back, ‘We could all make popular speeches ... It’s the easiest thing in the 
world’.88 The incident is illuminating for two reasons. First, it highlights the 
implicit compromise which accommodated different ministerial viewpoints; 
the commitment to membership would not be challenged on the 
understanding that a final decision upon entry rested upon the terms. 
Second, it highlights Wilson’s concern that the membership bid be 
recognised as genuine. He was no doubt aware of his own reputation for 
calculation, and wished to avoid any impression of backsliding, but in 
addition to this, the prime minister had to be conscious of the damage which 
might be inflicted upon the government’s relations with the Six (so close to 
negotiations) if it now appeared that he was wavering over entry. He 
therefore suggested that the Foreign Office re-issue the statement he had 
made on day the White Paper was published, in which he stressed the 
sincerity of Britain’s application.89 Shore was also pressed to make a 
corrective statement and, in the House of Commons, Wilson once again 
underlined that the government was ‘negotiating to get in with 
determination’.90 
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A more serious threat to the internal compromise came at a meeting of the 
inner Cabinet on 20 April. On this occasion, Crossman was the minister 
responsible, urging Wilson to take advantage of public concern about the 
cost of joining the Community to reinforce Labour’s election campaign. 
Crossman had been inspired to take action on these lines after a 
conversation with the anti-Market economist, Nicholas Kaldor, who had 
recently published a forthright article on the subject in the New Statesman. 
Crossman addressed Wilson by saying: ‘Look, let us discuss the 
programming of our Common Market attitudes. Would the P.M. tell me 
something about this? Are we planning to open negotiations or not?’ 
Crossman’s diary account explains what followed: 
 
It emerged that in July we are to have what Harold described as ‘a 
Victorian family portrait’. He said, ‘That is what Willy Brandt has called 
it, a family portrait, with all the members of the E.E.C. and all the 
applicants coming to record their official positions.’ I said, ‘Marvellous. It 
would suit us very well to have that in July. But, in that case, Prime 
Minister, you must appreciate that we are hoping you will be able to use 
it for electoral purposes because, after all, the only thing wrong with 
Peter Shore’s speech was that Peter Shore said it. If you said it, from 
your central position, it would have been O.K. What I am expecting of 
you is that in July you will be able to make a speech about food prices 
and the cost of entry and of the C.A.P., and you could suggest that 
Britain isn’t going to join. With that you could win the election. As we 
have given up the idea of an election-winning budget, we are left with 
the E.E.C., where Heath is suspect. We are depending upon you to do 
it.’ 
 We discussed this for thirty-five minutes and, although Harold 
continued to say we couldn’t discuss the Common Market without 
Michael Stewart (the Foreign Secretary is in Turkey at the moment), we 
were obviously doing so. There was not even a denial by Roy [Jenkins], 
who might have said that appearing to manoeuvre in this way would be 
dangerous, and that we shouldn’t exploit the Common Market in the 
election. Denis [Healey] and Fred Peart also sat silent, merely smiling. 
Barbara [Castle] and I made it clear that in the summer we would 
expect the P.M. to make our negotiating posture an election-winning 
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issue. We reached a general agreement that Michael Stewart had been 
wrong to urge members of the Cabinet to do their share of speaking on 
the Common Market and that only the inner three [Wilson, Stewart and 
Jenkins] should do so. The minority would express their view by 
remaining silent and any speaking I were to do would be 
misunderstood.91  
 
The description of a ‘general agreement’ was a tacit acknowledgement that 
Wilson had withstood the attempt to make electoral capital out of the EEC. 
Crossman reflected upon this in his diary: ‘Harold and Michael are ardent 
Common Marketeers now, more I would say than Roy who, as Chancellor, 
sees the real difficulties and is certainly prepared to postpone if demanding 
higher terms would win us the election’. The other ardent Marketeers, 
Crossman believed, were Crosland and, somewhat surprisingly, Healey ‘who 
certainly wasn’t before but now, I think, feels that he has to be in favour of 
entry if he is ever going to become Foreign Secretary’. Crossman and Castle 
were ‘willing to try but not on terms that are too high’.92 Given the limitations 
of diary evidence, it is important to be guarded when drawing conclusions 
from Crossman’s account. In particular, his reading of individual ministers’ 
attitudes should not be accepted uncritically. His impressions were those of a 
minister with little involvement in the detail of European policy. But this 
should not obscure the important fact: Wilson’s lone (and successful) 
defence against Crossman and Castle. While there can surely be no greater 
prize for any prime minister than retention of office, Wilson resisted both the 
temptation and the pressure to better his party’s electoral prospects by 
playing on public concerns about the EEC. On this point alone, Crossman’s 
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account offers a vivid counterpoise to the idea that Wilson’s personal attitude 
to EC entry was anything other than committed. 
 
Conclusion 
 
The first half of 1970 bore witness to a domestic situation completely 
different from that which had prevailed when the second application was 
launched in May 1967. The increased balance of payments cost gave 
renewed vigour to sceptics inside and outside of government, as public 
opinion, for its own reasons, shifted decisively towards opposition.93 Against 
this background, Wilson had to proceed carefully; his speech to parliament 
reflected the need to withdraw the venom from the domestic debate in a way 
that benefited both Labour’s election prospects and the prosecution of the 
forthcoming accession negotiations. While it was already possible to discern 
some of the pressures which resulted in his 1971 decision to oppose entry 
on Tory terms, Wilson’s actions within government, by attempting to soften 
the adverse impression of the white paper upon Cabinet, by loading the new 
EURM committee on negotiations with pro-market ministers, and by resisting 
internal pressure to strike a more sceptical posture for domestic advantage, 
demonstrated his continuing determination to bring about the success of the 
application.94 All his careful manoeuvring was to be in vain, however, as at 
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the General Election of 18 June, Labour was unexpectedly defeated.95 
Rather than to Wilson, the task of negotiating British entry would fall to the 
man with perhaps the strongest pro-market credentials of all. With Edward 
Heath the fate of the application would now rest, and the opportunity to etch 
a place in history as the prime minister that led Britain into the Community.
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Chapter 4 
 
The Arrival of Heath:  
the Conservative Government and the Second 
Application 
June to December 1970 
 
 
‘We were returned to office to change the course of history of this nation – 
nothing less’.1 Such was the conviction of Edward Heath in his first address 
to the Conservative party conference following its election victory in June 
1970. That result had come as a surprise to many; the opinion polls leading 
up to the election had strongly indicated a Labour victory.2 On 19 June, 
however, it was Heath that was asked to form the new government of the 
United Kingdom with the slender but workable majority of 30 MPs. At the 
centre of the platform upon which the Conservatives were elected was the 
same theme of economic modernisation which had been the leitmotif of 
Wilson’s 1964 campaign. But where the Wilsonian vision of a technologically 
advanced ‘white heat’ Britain promoted economic planning and an 
interventionist approach to industrial management, for Heath, the 
touchstones of prosperity were smaller government and incentives for 
individual enterprise.3 Into this logic, the benefits of a ‘wider’ EC market fitted 
easily, but against a background of strong public scepticism, the European 
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issue received only brief attention in the Tory election manifesto.4 On the 
question of whether Britain would actually join, the Conservative platform 
was assiduously cautious: like Labour, the final decision would depend upon 
the terms: ‘Our sole commitment is to negotiate: no more, no less. ... A 
Conservative Government would not be prepared to recommend to 
Parliament, nor would Members of Parliament approve, a settlement which 
was unequal or unfair’.5 While such caution was inevitable given public 
concern about the consequences of entry, it was at odds with the 
temperament of the new prime minister.6 Whether the electorate in general 
was conscious of it is unclear, but in Edward Heath, the British people had 
chosen a man for whom British membership of the Community was a vital 
concern.7 
 
This chapter will examine the impact of the incoming Conservative 
government upon Britain’s pursuit of EC membership between June and 
December 1970. It will begin by focussing on Heath, before broadening the 
analysis to the dynamics within the Conservative Cabinet as a whole. The 
second section will move on to examine the opening phase of the accession 
negotiations, which commenced just twelve days after the General Election, 
delineating the issues which would determine their success or failure, and 
exploring internal thinking on how a positive outcome was to be attained. In 
the final section, the chapter will explore how prospective contributions to the 
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EC budget, brought to the fore once more by Britain’s opening bid on 
Community finance, again called into question the economic rationale for 
British entry, producing tensions at the heart of the Conservative Cabinet. 
 
Heath, the Conservatives and Europe, 1967-1970 
 
As was seen in the Introduction, Heath’s commitment to the objective of 
‘Britain in Europe’ is best explained as a product of his experiences as chief 
negotiator during the first accession negotiations. It was from the mid-1960s, 
and particularly after his appointment as leader of the Conservative party in 
July 1965, that the European issue became central to Heath’s political 
identity. The Conservative election manifesto for 1966 (at which point public 
support for British entry was nearing its zenith) confidently declared that a 
Tory government would ‘Work energetically for entry into the European 
Common Market at the first favourable opportunity’, and in the meantime 
would ‘Prepare for entry by relating the development of our own policies to 
those of the Common Market’.8 When, during the campaign, Heath was 
lampooned by Chancellor of the Exchequer, James Callaghan, for an 
approach which would discard British ‘bargaining cards’ before even getting 
to the negotiating table, Heath hit back: ‘I know more about negotiating than 
any member of the present Labour government and I know more about 
Europe than any of them’. Taking aim at the prime minister, who was due to 
speak about policy towards the Community that evening, Heath rattled: ‘It 
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has always been known that Mr Wilson has been anti-European’.9 In March 
1967, Heath enhanced his own European credentials with three lectures at 
Harvard University, focussing upon the history of the Communities up to that 
point (including Britain’s relationship with them), their future development in 
economic and institutional fields, and concluding with an examination of the 
role that an enlarged Community might play in the world.10 
 
If the first application provided the catalyst for Heath’s involvement in 
European politics, his determination to see Britain join the Community rested 
upon two distinct but co-existing impulses: first, the need to strengthen 
British influence in the world; and second, a more sentimental identification 
with the idea of European unity. When, in 1969, Heath decided to publish the 
Harvard lectures under the title Old World, New Horizons, he argued that the 
latter constituted ‘not a vague concept, but the habit of working together to 
reach accepted goals’, and in his speech to the House of Commons during 
its debate on the February 1970 white paper, he attributed his support for 
British entry to a belief ‘in closer international co-operation,’ adding that he 
favoured EC membership ‘because I am an internationalist’.11 Robert 
Armstrong (Heath’s Principal Private Secretary between 1970 and 1974) and 
Ziegler further argue that Heath was motivated by a desire to see Europe 
organised in a way that would prevent further wars (an objective rooted in his 
visits to Germany and Spain during the 1930s, as well as serving with the 
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British army in north-west Europe during 1944-45).12 The most prominent 
feature of his public discourse on Europe prior to June 1970 was his 
aspiration for the Community to become a unified actor in international 
affairs, by means of co-ordinating member state foreign policies.13 It would 
also be one of the most distinctive features of his European policy in 1972-73 
(after the accession negotiations had been successfully concluded), albeit 
one that falls outside the scope of this study.14  
 
In reacting to Labour’s decision to apply for EEC membership in 1967, the 
tactic of the Conservative leadership was to show support for the principle of 
entry, but to distance themselves from the government’s diplomatic 
methods.15 Crowson explains that the underlying logic was to avoid being 
‘tarred with any blame’ should the application fail, and to ‘deflect domestic 
electoral attention away’ from the European issue.16 This approach continued 
during 1968-69: speaking at the 20th anniversary of The Hague Congress in 
November 1968, Heath was critical of what he saw as the post-veto tactic of 
seeking to isolate de Gaulle, arguing that, ‘A Europe without France in the 
long run makes as little sense as a Europe without Britain’.17 And again, in 
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the introduction to Old World, New Horizons, Heath argued that Labour’s 
diplomacy in 1967 had been predicated upon, ‘a misunderstanding of the 
nature of the EEC and in particular of the relationship between France and 
Germany’.18  
 
These criticisms have acquired historiographical significance due to Heath’s 
role in the eventual success of the application. A prominent strand within 
British historiography of EC entry, including Heath’s memoirs, suggests that 
his part in the positive outcome of the negotiations was decisive. According 
to this view, Heath rejected the tactics of the Wilson government, based 
upon co-ordination with the Five in order to pressure France, and focussed 
instead upon overcoming the opposition to enlargement at its source. In his 
memoirs, Heath also implies that it was he personally that was responsible 
for this shift in tactics, with Rippon and others in the Foreign Office less 
convinced.19 The May 1971 Heath-Pompidou summit is thus held up as the 
moment that Heath persuaded Pompidou to accept British membership – a 
great personal achievement, which distinguished him from the failure of 
those that had gone before.20 It is of course correct that between 1968 and 
early 1969 (above all during the Soames affair) important officials in the FCO 
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were wedded to a policy of isolating France, and that Wilson might have 
done more to temper this. However, while it is clear that Heath’s role was 
central to Britain’s accession, to suggest that it was singly critical is to 
overstate the prime minister’s impact. A more measured account thus 
follows. 
 
The Conservative Cabinet of 1970 contained a number of firmly pro-
membership ministers, with little obvious prospect of dissent. At the same 
time, Heath’s personal zeal was not replicated among other senior portfolios. 
The former Prime Minister, Alec Douglas-Home, returned as foreign 
secretary (the same position he had held at the time of the first application). 
Home’s support for entry was born of a pragmatic recognition that it was the 
only means of preserving British influence among the major western 
powers.21 Heath’s first Chancellor, Iain Macleod, was ‘the heaviest 
heavyweight’ after the prime minister, and a figurehead for the ‘One Nation’ 
Conservatives.22 There is little evidence regarding his views on Europe – a 
possible indication of agnosticism – although as party chairman at the time of 
the first application, he had looked to style the Conservatives as ‘the party of 
Europe’.23 He was to die of a heart attack in July 1970, marking a 
considerable and early psychological setback for the government as a 
whole.24 Macleod’s successor was the man originally charged with leading 
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the British negotiating team in Brussels, Anthony Barber.  Both appointments 
appear primarily explicable by his good relationship with Heath.25 Barber’s 
views on Europe before 1970 are also unclear. At the Treasury, however, he 
would be counselled in the economic dangers of early entry, and his attitude 
quickly became cautious.26 Reginald Maudling, Heath’s principal rival in the 
1965 leadership contest, was made Home Secretary. Having led the abortive 
free trade area negotiations in 1957-58, Maudling was by 1970 a clear, if 
unenthusiastic, supporter of EC membership. He was also critical of a 
perceived tendency, on both sides of the debate, to dramatise the potential 
consequences of membership.27 Barber’s promotion meant that Geoffrey 
Rippon became the new Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster with 
responsibility for the EC negotiations. Like Barber, Rippon had little 
association with European policy prior to 1970, but he was to prove both 
determined and effective in his prosecution of the accession negotiations. 
The sensitive post of Minister for Agriculture was given to another of Heath’s 
allies, James Prior.28  
 
In their memoirs, both Barber and Prior are fulsome in their praise for 
Heath’s handling of the EC application. Barber argues that, ‘I do not believe 
we would have joined without Ted’s determination and resolve’, recalling that 
‘as the Government’s popularity slumped, some were tempted to take the 
populist line that the terms were not good enough and that we should 
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withdraw from the negotiations’. The clear implication was that only Heath 
had the requisite conviction to overcome this barrier.29 Prior, too, recalls that, 
‘In Cabinet, Minister after Minister would set out all the difficulties and 
recount the insoluble problems’, and again insists that: ‘No one other than 
Ted would have taken Britain into Europe’.30 As far as Cabinet discussions 
are concerned, the official records do not sustain the picture presented in 
these accounts. The substance of British negotiating objectives, as opposed 
to negotiating tactics, was discussed on relatively few occasions. There is 
just one instance during the negotiations when British entry was called into 
question during Cabinet discussion: in December 1970, in the context of 
Britain’s opening bid on Community finance. The only ministerial memoirs to 
refer specifically to the this debate are those of Margaret Thatcher, Secretary 
of State for Education between 1970 and 1974, and later prime minister, in 
which she also criticises Heath for his handling of the Community finance 
issue.31 After this meeting, however, there was little significant controversy. 
The crucial months were those of May and June 1971, as the negotiations 
reached their climax, and it was then that Britain had to make the most 
important concessions. Yet there is no evidence of dissenting voices. Given 
this, and until the release of the Cabinet Secretary’s notebook, it seems 
safest to conclude Barber was referring to doubts among MPs, rather than 
senior ministers, and that Prior too was recalling not Cabinet, but the 
ministerial committee on the Approach to Europe (now under the simplified 
acronym ‘AE’), of which he was also a member, and the purpose of which 
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was to coordinate the British negotiating position and to find solutions where 
internal disagreements emerged.32  
  
The Heath years are sometimes depicted as a period of rare, even 
unprecedented, emphasis upon Britain’s relations with Europe.33 Hill and 
Lord have drawn a distinction, however, between ‘early and later Heath’. Up 
until 1972, they argue, Heath’s approach was a traditional one, centring upon 
the need to reinforce British influence, but that from 1972 onwards it became 
more radical: ‘With a more pessimistic view of the constraints on a purely 
national diplomacy, Heath became increasingly interested in the practicalities 
of forging a collective diplomacy within the EC’.34 But, as has been seen, 
Heath’s support for political unity was a consistent feature of his thinking in 
the 1960s. The chronological distinction Hill and Lord make seems better 
explained not by attitudinal changes, but more basic structural ones. The 
crucial change in 1972 being the fact that Britain began to be treated as a de 
facto member of the Community, participating, for instance, in the Paris 
summit of the Nine (the Six plus Britain, Denmark and Ireland; Norway 
having rejected EC membership earlier in the year) that October. Britain was 
also able to accede to the nascent European Political Cooperation (EPC), 
established by the Davignon Report of October 1970, which resulted in 
attempts to formulate joint postures on European security and the Middle 
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East.35 In 1970-71, however, British foreign policy was necessarily confined 
to past strictures; the question of whether or not it would actually join the 
Community being predominant. At a strategic level, the principal 
characteristic of the Heath government’s first year is continuity with Labour. 
This is captured in memorandum which Home submitted to the Overseas 
Policy and Defence Committee in July 1970, the purpose of which was ‘to set 
out the main objectives of our external policy and to indicate the order of 
importance to be attached to them’. Europe, as a geographical area, was 
identified as lying ‘at the centre of our policies’, with Britain’s main objectives 
listed as being: ‘To maintain the strength and cohesion of NATO’; ‘To obtain 
membership of the European Communities on acceptable terms and to move 
on from there towards the creation of a more cohesive Western Europe in 
the political, defence and economic fields’; ‘To seek better East-West 
relations’; and ‘To seek improved relations with France with the object of 
enjoying the same level of relations as we now have with Germany’. There 
was nothing here to separate Home from the ideas expressed by Brown, 
Stewart and the Foreign Office between 1968 and 1970.36 
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Even Heath’s ideas on European political unity were less distinct, by British 
standards, than is often assumed. From early 1968, the Foreign Office 
became increasingly wedded to this concept as a means to give Britain a 
stronger voice in world affairs.37 Thus, in response to the establishment of 
new procedures for political cooperation in the WEU under the Harmel Plan, 
a departmental circular by Permanent Under-Secretary Denis Greenhill, 
explained that: ‘Gradually ... we hope to see the [WEU] Council feeling its 
way forward from mutual and implicit acceptance of a given line of policy to 
[a] more explicit practical commitment on the part of member governments’. 
Greenhill even went so far as to recommend that Britain ‘make this 
consultation in WEU one of the main features of our foreign policy’38 While 
the Davignon Report meant that the focus of European political cooperation 
shifted from the WEU to EPC, successive FCO papers underlined the 
continuing priority accorded to the concept by officials.39 
 
The principal point of discontinuity between the Wilson and Heath 
governments with regard to European policy is in the revival of ideas about 
an Anglo-French nuclear deal.40 Here, Heath’s personal views were 
paramount. Fresh inter-departmental studies were requested, and, despite 
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the ongoing reservations of FCO and Ministry of Defence officials, Heath 
took the initiative by securing Nixon’s blessing to make progress in this area 
during an Anglo-American summit in December 1970.41 At this meeting, 
Heath suggested that an Anglo-French deal could be used as a means to 
bring France into closer alignment with NATO.42 This, however, should be 
interpreted as a means of ‘selling’ it to Washington, rather than as a genuine 
reflection of Heath’s motivations. His objectives at this stage were 
established clearly at a meeting with Home and Peter Carrington, the 
Defence Secretary, the previous month: ‘to establish whether there was any 
advantage to be gained in introducing the subject’ into the accession 
negotiations (at ‘heads of government’ level), with a view ‘to the striking of a 
final bargain on the terms of entry’.43 For the period June 1970 to June 1971, 
it was the goal of negotiating British membership of the EC which would 
dominate Heath’s European policy and no Anglo-French nuclear deal 
entered the frame. It is upon the negotiations that the remainder of this thesis 
will focus. 
 
The negotiations commence, June to November 1970 
 
On 30 June, taking up the invitation which had been issued to the Labour 
government earlier in the month, Home and Barber represented Britain at an 
opening session of the enlargement negotiations in Luxembourg, alongside 
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the three other applicant states, Denmark, Ireland and Norway.44 In 
accordance with the views expressed by Cabinet, Barber’s statement 
adopted a ‘businesslike’ like approach, moving swiftly through the history of 
Britain’s earlier attempts to join the Community and the reasons which 
underpinned the present government’s continuing support for that objective, 
before referring back to George Brown’s speech at the WEU, two years 
earlier, to highlight the main issues upon which Britain needed to negotiate.45 
The only subject which Barber discussed in any depth was Community 
finance; once again reminding the Six of Brown’s July 1967 statement, 
Barber explained that Britain had then made known its desire to participate in 
the Community’s negotiations on a definitive regulation: 
 
Had we done so, the resulting agreement would no doubt have made 
fair provision for us as it has for each of the existing members of the 
Communities. But we were not party to your agreement. ... And so we 
have to work together to find a solution to this basic problem which will 
be fair and sound for the enlarged Community and for all its members. 
If I appear to labour this point, it is only because, unless such a solution 
is found, the burden on the United Kingdom could not be sustained and 
no British government could contemplate joining. 
 
Reflecting the British desire that only the major problems needed to be 
dealt with before entry (leaving smaller issues to be settled once Britain 
was a member), Barber expressed his hope that ‘the negotiations can be 
kept short and confined to essentials’ – an objective which proved 
impossible to realise. In a final passage, Barber invoked Britain’s most 
famous champion of European unity, Winston Churchill, before rallying to 
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his conclusion: ‘Inspired by goodwill and united by so many aims and 
hopes and interests, this time we can succeed’.46    
 
 
Given the terms on which Community finance was eventually settled, 
Barber’s opening statement might appear as tough rhetoric designed for 
negotiation, but overstating Britain’s true position. Such a conclusion would, 
however, be misplaced. At this stage, Barber’s remarks were consistent with 
Whitehall thinking. At the first meeting of the AE committee on 3 July, he 
conceded to ministers that acceptance of the definitive financial mechanism 
‘without modification’, ‘would clearly impose an intolerable burden’.47 Officials 
had estimated that Britain’s full contribution at the end of a five year 
transitional period would approximate £510 million per annum. With receipts 
likely to be in the region of £80 million, London could be confronted with net 
payments of £430 million.48 Whitehall’s preferred solution would have been a 
permanent cap to its contribution or, better still, a renegotiation of the finance 
system itself, but it was clear that the Six would reject both and insist upon 
ameliorating the problem within existing rules.49 Officials therefore advocated 
seeking a long transitional period, of as much as fourteen years, during 
which payments would increase gradually, enabling London to press for 
changes to Community policies in a way that would alleviate the eventual 
burden. They also recommended negotiating a review provision that could be 
activated if British contributions at any time became too onerous. In such 
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circumstances, the official negotiating brief argued, ‘we would simply have to 
insist as a firmly established member, that some modification [to the 
budgetary rules] be made’.50 Ministers made no attempt to define specific 
British negotiating objectives at this stage; better, it was thought, to await the 
outcome of exploratory discussions with the Community.51 The matter would 
be returned to in November-December 1970 in the context of Britain’s 
opening bid. 
 
After Community finance, the two other major subjects were New Zealand 
dairy products and Commonwealth sugar. By comparison, the solutions to 
these issues appeared more straightforward.52 In both cases, the problem 
derived from the economic importance of the respective commodity to the 
producing countries, and Britain’s predominant place as an export market.53 
In the case of New Zealand, dairy products accounted for approximately 20 
per cent of export earnings, with 90 per cent of its butter and close to 80 per 
cent of its cheese sold in the UK market.54 For developing sugar producers, 
above all in the Caribbean, the situation was even more acute: sugar 
production was not only pivotal to national income, but also provided large 
sections of the population with employment.55 And in both cases, there was 
not only a perceived moral imperative, but a political danger too. With 
significant public and parliamentary sympathy for such smaller (and in the 
case of sugar producers, poorer) Commonwealth countries, a failure to 
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secure satisfactory arrangements would create difficulties in the pursuit of 
domestic ratification for British entry.56 Britain’s opening bids for both 
subjects (eventually tabled on 6 November) would be conditioned by these 
pressures. For New Zealand, it was suggested that Britain might continue to 
import dairy produce at present quantities and present prices for the full 
length of the agricultural transitional period (expected to last between 5 and 6 
years), with a review provision that would enable the continuation of special 
access arrangements for some time thereafter. For sugar, it was proposed 
that, from the start of 1975 (when existing Commonwealth arrangements 
came to an end), imports from developing producers should continue at 
present quantities and reasonable prices, with a similar provision for ‘regular’ 
reviews.57 From the outset, Whitehall recognised these bids to be not only 
unrealistic, but ‘extravagant’. Their highly ambitious nature was intended to 
deflect charges that London had not done enough (or could have done more) 
to safeguard the interests of small Commonwealth producers.58  
 
For the remainder of this thesis the phrase ‘the three main issues’ will be 
used to denote Community finance, New Zealand and sugar. This is a true 
reflection of the priority accorded to these subjects by London.59 It was thus 
that when the terms were settled upon all of them (following the agreements 
reached on the major French concerns of sterling and agricultural 
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preference) in June 1971, that it became clear that the negotiations were 
going to succeed.60 From the outset, however, it is important to be aware that 
in the background, a fourth issue, fisheries, was gradually growing in 
significance.61 Formally, the problem only came into being on 30 June, the 
same day that the enlargement negotiations were opened. That evening, the 
Council of Ministers agreed the outlines a new Common Fisheries Policy 
(CFP).62 The problem for Britain derived primarily from the provision for 
common access to the coastal waters of all member states. (Given that the 
four applicant states had extensive coastlines, the issue was certain to 
become one of the major themes of the enlargement negotiations as a 
whole.) Yet it was at first unclear how much of an issue it would prove to be 
for Britain; fishing was a miniscule economic concern, constituting just 0.1% 
of total GDP.63 The domestic controversy generated by the issue, with an 
alleged threat to the livelihoods of Britain’s inshore fishermen, proved much 
greater. As O’Neill explained in his report: ‘No small stretch of coastline is 
without a few fishing boats; and like the Home Guard in 1940 every 
fisherman pictured the combined fleets of the Six sailing up to his coast and 
sweeping all the fish away’.64 London’s initial tactic was to leave the subject 
until the end of the negotiations, when, with the end in sight, the atmosphere 
could be expected to be more helpful to the search for a settlement (on this 
issue, it seemed likely that London would need to abrogate its general 
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principle of not requesting changes to existing Community regulations).65 By 
1971, however, local dissatisfaction was being translated into national 
political pressure, with the result that in May Cabinet urged Britain’s 
negotiators to seek an agreement before parliament was asked to vote on 
the principle of accession. 66 The British proposal of June 1971 proved 
unsuccessful, and in the event the main negotiations over fisheries did have 
to wait until the end of the negotiations, finally being resolved, in tandem with 
the other applicants, during December 1971 and January 1972. 67 
 
The course of the negotiations as a whole was broadly consistent with British 
thinking at the outset. At the core London’s strategy was the objective of 
‘breaking the back of the negotiations’ – in other words, reaching agreement 
on the main problems – by the summer holiday of 1971. The aim would then 
be to produce and sign an accession treaty by the end of the year, leaving all 
of 1972 for the necessary domestic legislation to be navigated through 
parliament, with the aim of British accession in January 1973. And, from the 
start, there was no doubt in British minds that success or failure would be 
primarily contingent upon the attitude of France.68 For London, the 
predominant fear was that Paris would adopt such a rigid posture over the 
major problems that a successful outcome would be made impossible.69 
Different tactics were envisaged in order to deal with this danger. In a minute 
to O’Neill on 17 July, John Robinson, now promoted to assistant under-
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secretary in the FCO, envisaged a multilateral summit in the spring of 1971. 
This would confront Pompidou with the collective pressure of Britain and the 
Five in order to induce the necessary concessions (Robinson was less 
accurate in predicting that the main obstacle to agreement would be 
Community finance – as will be seen, in May-June 1971, New Zealand was 
an equal, if not greater, concern).70 In October, a review of negotiating 
strategy by Nield suggested using bilateral summits with Brandt and 
Pompidou in the spring of 1971 to create the political conditions that would 
facilitate agreement at ministerial level in May or June 1971.71 The similarity 
between this and the way in which events subsequently developed should 
not, however, be taken to suggest that Britain was in any sense able to 
control the process. On the contrary, the development of the negotiations in 
the crucial six months of January to June 1971 was determined above all by 
Paris, with the Britain playing a primarily reactive role. 
 
The first ministerial meeting between Britain and the Community took place 
in Brussels on 21 July. It focussed mainly upon procedural matters, agreeing 
that there should be two ministerial meetings per quarter, as well as bi-
monthly meetings of deputies (for Britain, this was O’Neill, and for the Six, 
the permanent representatives to the Community). It also began what was 
known as the ‘fact-finding’ stage of the negotiations (information sharing and 
analysis of the various problems).72 Iain Macleod’s death on 20 July led soon 
after to Barber’s appointment as Chancellor, with Rippon taking over 
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responsibility for the accession negotiations.73 Rippon spent much of the 
autumn touring Europe and the Commonwealth, with visits to Germany on 7 
September, Hong Kong, Australia and New Zealand in the middle the month, 
followed by talks with the Belgian government and the Commission on 13-14 
October, the second ministerial meeting between Britain and the Community 
at the end of the month, and culminating with meetings in Paris on 9 
November.74 The 27 October meeting formally brought the ‘fact finding’ stage 
to an end, but negotiations on the major issues was still some way off.75 
Britain was now into the process of tabling its opening bids. Those on New 
Zealand and sugar were presented simultaneously on 6 November, but, for 
reasons which will be explained shortly, that for Community finance had to 
wait until mid-December.76 Before this, the third ministerial meeting between 
Britain and the Community took place on 8 December, principally notable for 
the British proposal that there should be a general five year transitional 
period for both industry and agriculture.77  
 
During his exchanges with the Six and the Commission, Rippon started to 
make known the British desire to see the back of the negotiations broken by 
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the summer of 1971.78 In general, this appeared an uncontroversial 
proposition, but the target proved an early point of friction between London 
and Paris, evidencing above all the ongoing mistrust in Anglo-French 
relations. The objective was particularly relevant to Paris, as France was due 
to assume the presidency of the Council of Ministers in the first six months of 
1971, and would therefore act as chair of the enlargement negotiations. In 
conversation with Schumann on the morning of 9 November, Rippon said 
that he was ‘much looking forward’ to the foreign minister’s chairmanship, 
and hoped that ‘the essentials of the negotiations could be decided by the 
end of this period’. Schumann’s response was assiduously equivocal: ‘The 
French willed the end, but the means of achieving it were far from easy. ... 
[I]n preparing the negotiations the Six had to choose between a bargaining 
position and a realistic position. They had chosen the realistic position but 
this left them with little room for manoeuvre’.79 At the end of their afternoon 
meeting, Rippon delivered a thinly veiled warning about what would happen 
if the negotiations were to fail: ‘there would certainly be a period of very sour 
relations between Britain and members of the Community’, but the question 
would not simply disappear, Britain ‘would have to take things up again’.80 
The suspicion inherent in Rippon’s remark appeared to work both ways; 
when Pompidou talked to Soames two weeks later, he made clear that 
France would not be bullied into reaching agreement by a specific date. 
When Soames raised the matter, Pompidou ‘leant forward on to his desk and 
spoke with great vigour. He said we realised of course that M. Schumann 
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was going to be in the chair for the next six months and one thing he was 
determined should not happen was for the negotiations to become a battle 
between Britain and France. He said he thought it would be a great mistake 
to allow the end of June to grow into a fixed target date: maybe the 
negotiations would be concluded at the end of May or at the end of July.’ In a 
clear reference to the continuing absence of an opening bid on Community 
finance, Pompidou put the onus squarely upon London: ‘If we [the British] 
were anxious to get on with them – and he understood this and wanted to 
assure me that the last thing France wanted was to drag her feet – we 
should tackle some of the major topics before the end of December and 
therefore before France was in the Chair’.81 
 
There were also two meetings between Heath and Pompidou during 1970. 
Both were relatively brief, but both were notable for Pompidou’s Delphic 
intimations regarding the Anglo-American ‘special relationship’ – an 
inevitably sensitive topic given de Gaulle’s opposition to British membership 
for this very reason. The first meeting took place in May 1970, while Heath 
was still leader of the opposition. After expressing some general reservations 
about Britain’s ‘tendency to remain too closely attached to United States 
policies’, Pompidou warned that the policies of an enlarged Community could 
provoke ‘hostile reactions’ from other major powers (not just the United 
States: the USSR, Japan and Latin America as well): 
 
The important thing he wanted to satisfy himself about was what 
Britain’s position would be within Europe when faced with these 
difficulties from outside. This he hoped to find out during the course of 
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the next two years. It was not enough just to have European 
sentiments: we would have to be prepared to defend to the hilt 
European interests in the face of likely economic and political 
onslaughts from outside.82  
 
The second Heath-Pompidou meeting took place in November 1970, on the 
occasion of de Gaulle’s funeral. For this reason, the discussion was relatively 
brief, and a significant part of the discussion was focussed upon Heath’s 
domestic policies. Towards the end, however, Pompidou produced from his 
desk a copy of that day’s Le Monde, and opened it to show Heath an 
advertisement by the state-owned British airline BOAC. The caption read: 
‘America begins in London on board a VC 10 of BOAC’. Heath did not 
respond directly, and as he prepared to leave remarked simply that he 
looked forward to a further meeting when Pompidou considered the time to 
be ‘appropriate’.83 Overall, Heath’s impression of the meeting was a 
favourable one: he reported to London that ‘there was none of the 
scepti[ci]sm I had noticed when we ... met in the spring’ and that at one point 
Pompidou ‘acknowledged the European orientation of our policies’. It may be 
that Heath overlooked the connection between the BOAC advert and 
Pompidou’s remarks about Anglo-American relations the previous May, but it 
was certain that FCO officials would be sensitive to it. In briefing Heath for 
his visit to Paris the following spring, the Foreign Office recalled the two 
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incidents, and furnished him with detailed counter-arguments in case 
Pompidou should raise the Anglo-American theme again.84 
 
Cabinet qualms over Community finance, November to December 1970 
 
The delay, to which Pompidou had referred, in the tabling of an opening bid 
on Community finance was a result of the need to take account of both 
attitudes within the Community whilst also giving sufficient time for ministerial 
consideration. The eventual bid, tabled by the British delegation on 16 
December, was to represent a significant retreat from the ideas of a 13 or 14 
year transitional period contained in the June negotiating brief.85 The 
reactions of the Community, and the European Commission in particular, to 
the statistical material submitted by London during the fact-finding stage 
made clear that any such terms would be impossible to negotiate. London 
had initially tabled a paper suggesting that Britain’s net contribution at the 
end of a transitional period might be close to £470 million.86 The Commission 
then responded with a report challenging the British figures and the 
assumptions upon which they were based.87 It argued that by the end of the 
transitional period, agriculture would form a significantly smaller proportion of 
the overall budget than it did in 1970, and that larger sums would then be 
devoted to areas such as regional and industrial policy, both of which should 
operate to Britain’s advantage. It also asserted that the stimulus to British 
economic growth resulting from entry to the EEC should reduce the size of 
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the contribution as a proportion of GNP. The only positive aspect of the 
Commission’s report from the British point of view was its statement that, ‘if 
in the present Community or an enlarged Community unacceptable 
situations were to appear, the very life of the Community would require that 
the Institutions find equitable solutions to them’.88 Later, when the 
negotiations on this issue had been concluded, London would present this to 
parliament as a de facto assurance that the Community was bound to re-
open the finance question if future British budgetary payments presented 
serious difficulties.89 For the present, however, the Commission’s scepticism 
towards British claims of inequity was further manifested in its vue 
d’ensemble of 16 November. This advanced two possible transitional 
arrangements for finance: the first involved a contribution of 21.5% in 1973, 
followed by four years of correctives that would prevent British payments 
rising above 22.4% of the overall budget; the second envisaged that, upon 
entry, Britain should automatically become liable for 90% of levy receipts as 
well as an increasing proportion of customs duties. Given that it was a 
principal British objective to secure a low contribution in the initial years of 
membership, both suggestions led to consternation within Whitehall. Nield 
dismissed the first as ‘clearly worthless’, but the second was little better; 
even under that arrangement officials estimated that Britain’s net contribution 
in the first year would be close to £220 million.90  
 
Yet confronted with these views, as well as the need to make progress in the 
negotiations and so stay on course to meet their own timetable, British 
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officials were forced to contemplate terms much less favourable than those 
envisaged just a few months earlier. By December, officials had come to 
accept that Britain would be unable to obtain better than a five year 
transitional period, with an additional two to three corrective years.91 Within 
such a framework, the precise figures for Britain’s contributions assumed 
even greater importance, and officials now concluded that Britain would be 
unable to secure better than a 17-18% contribution (of the overall budget) at 
the end of five years. When added to the other balance of payments costs 
deriving from higher food prices and a short-term deterioration in the balance 
of trade, the total foreign exchange burden by the late 1970s seemed likely 
to be in the region of £500 million a year.92 As was seen in Chapter 3, the 
argument that Labour pro-marketeers had used to defend this cost (and 
even, perhaps, a greater one) was that it would require only a small increase 
in the rate of British economic growth, indeed as little as 0.25% per annum, 
to offset it. This, however, was a controversial proposition given that it was 
far from clear that such a dynamic effect would materialise. In December, the 
annual report of the National Institute of Economic and Social Research 
(NIESR) strongly warned against banking upon a noticeable stimulus to 
growth, arguing that ‘to accept a heavy burden of ‘impact effects’ as the price 
of entry, in the belief that the dynamic effects are likely to be even bigger, 
would ... represent a triumph of hope over experience’.93 The Treasury 
assiduously avoided a dogmatic posture on whether EC entry would result in 
any short-term boost to the rate of growth. Its principal concern was the more 
certain, and measurable, problem of whether Britain would be in a position to 
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meet the year on year burden in terms of foreign exchange.94 Its starting 
position was that EC entry would inevitably involve devaluation. Connected 
to this was the danger that currency markets would anticipate such a move 
and speculate against sterling. In a minute to the chancellor’s office in 
November 1970, Frank Figgures warned that devaluation might therefore 
need to be carried out pre-emptively, perhaps as early as September 1972.95 
As in 1967/68, devaluation would compel the government to adopt restrictive 
economic policies so as to ensure financial stability – policies that would 
have a negative effect upon the rate of economic growth (and 
employment).96 Such an analysis was not intended to lead ineluctably to the 
conclusion that Britain should not join; rather, Treasury officials were anxious 
that the economic implications of entry in present circumstances should be 
more fully understood by ministers before negotiations advanced too far.97 
The opportunity to make clear these economic consequences was to arrive 
in December 1970 as part of the ministerial consideration of the opening bid 
on Community finance, and detailed briefing material was sent to Barber for 
this purpose.98  
 
The first stage in the ministerial consideration of the opening bid took place 
at the AE committee on 7 December.99 The meeting was chaired by Home, 
with Barber, Whitelaw (Lord President of the Council), Jellicoe (Lord Privy 
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Seal), Prior, Davies (Secretary of State for Trade and Industry) and Rippon 
all present. Rippon opened the meeting by summarising the contents of an 
official memorandum on Community finance, which set out the best terms 
that officials believed it would be possible to negotiate: a gradual build up 
(over 5 years) to a ‘key’ contribution of 17 per cent; three further years of 
correctives, and a review provision ‘which we could invoke at any time if the 
burden of our net contributions to the budget threatened to become 
intolerable’.100. Rippon acknowledged that acceptance of a 17 per cent key 
would ‘mean that by 1978 our net contributions to the budget would have 
become substantial; and that the other impact effects of our entry into the 
Community were also likely to have adverse consequences for the balance 
of payments’, but followed this by insisting that ‘the dynamic benefits of entry 
should enable us to sustain a significantly higher economic growth rate as 
members than if we remained outside’.101 In this context, the memorandum 
included a table (similar to that shown to Labour ministers in February 1970), 
demonstrating the gains to national income which would accrue should the 
growth rate accelerate from 3% to 3.25% over a five year period. The figures 
indicated that, if such a ‘dynamic’ was realised, the addition to national 
income by the end of the transitional period would outweigh the balance of 
payments cost.102 During the discussion, it was pointed out (the minutes do 
not specify by whom, but potentially by Barber) that ‘the generation of 
additional domestic resources would not in itself solve the balance of 
payments deficit likely to result from entry and that difficult problems of 
economic management had to be faced’. It was not spelt out what these 
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‘difficult problems’ would be, but the implication could only be that deflation 
and/or devaluation would be necessary. This was followed, however, by an 
insistence that ‘the assessment by officials certainly did not suggest that the 
Government should now conclude that entry would not be in our long-term 
economic interests, particularly when account was taken of the undoubted 
difficulties we would face if we remained outside the Community’. Now, the 
contrary suggestion seemed to be that Community membership would 
provide an opportunity for economic expansion that could not be realised 
independently. On the surface, it might be judged that such an argument was 
advanced either disingenuously – to defend a policy which was primarily 
motivated by political considerations – or that it reflected blind faith in the 
potential for Community membership to reinvigorate the British economy. For 
those who were strongly committed to Community membership on political 
grounds, there was undoubtedly a tendency to overlook the weaknesses in 
the economic arguments. Yet it was also argued that, once inside the 
Community, Britain could insist that a reduction to its contribution be made. 
At this stage, the primary concern should therefore be to secure terms that 
were saleable domestically and which would keep British contributions in the 
early years of membership to a minimum. The longer-term situation could be 
addressed as a member. The committee finally approved the official 
memorandum, and agreed that it should be submitted to Cabinet with a view 
to a decision on the tactics of the opening bid.103 
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In advance of the Cabinet discussion, Nield furnished Heath with a detailed 
brief on the finance problem. Conscious of Treasury concerns about the 
balance of payments cost, Nield warned that:  
 
The Chancellor of the Exchequer may argue that our prospects of 
maintaining a £500 million annual surplus are not good, even if we do 
not have to shoulder the additional cost burden of entry to the EEC: that 
it follows that no significant economic extra burdens ought to be 
assumed: and therefore that no terms of entry we can foreseeably 
negotiate could be borne without consequential devaluation and/or 
deflation.104  
 
For Nield, such an analysis provoked three additional questions: 
 
a.  if our economy is in fact in such a state that we cannot afford to 
enter, can we with such a weak economy afford to stay out and 
endure increasing American, European, Japanese and other 
competition? 
 
b.  given the need to restore stability and growth in the United 
Kingdom economy, does membership of the EEC, or alternatively 
non-membership, provide the better context for achieving these 
essential economic objectives, i.e. can our known economic 
problems be solved more easily inside than outside the EEC. If the 
answer is “stay out”, then: 
 
c.  how do we extricate ourselves from the negotiations (which are on 
the way to success if we follow the line in CP(70)115 ... without 
charges of bad faith in starting the negotiations and suspicions of 
economic weakness in stopping them?105 
 
He went on to argue that, in fact, the present meetings were not the occasion 
for deciding whether or not the cost was an acceptable one; rather, their 
purpose should be to determine whether the opening bid was ‘realistic and 
sensible’. Perhaps recollecting the tactics which had been used so effectively 
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by Wilson on same issue, Nield advised that judgments about whether the 
cost of entry was tolerable should be deferred until it was clear what the final 
terms would be.106 
 
At Cabinet on 10 December, a clear difference of view emerged over the 
potential economic consequences of accepting the terms which officials 
considered to be the best that Britain could negotiate. Rippon began by 
outlining what the terms were (as per the AE meeting three days earlier), and 
made known his proposed tactical opening bid for a 13 to 15 per cent 
contribution at the end of five years, which was designed to secure the 17 
per cent key which officials thought to be the lowest that Britain could hope 
for. After explaining what the percentage contributions would mean in 
financial terms (a total balance of payments of cost in the fifth year of 
membership of approximately £460 million), Rippon again stressed that the 
costs needed to be viewed against a possible increase in the rate of 
economic growth. He initially referred to the scenario envisaged by Jenkins 
in the February 1970 debate on the white paper, ‘that if the United Kingdom 
growth rate increased as a result of entry by ½ per cent a year we should 
have an extra £1,100 million a year of real income at the end of five years 
and an extra £2,700 million a year at the end of 10 years from which the 
balance of payments costs could be met’, but went on to explain that ‘even if 
they [the dynamic effects] were only half as much as Mr. Roy Jenkins had 
suggested’, that is to say, even if there was only a quarter per cent increase 
in the rate of growth, this ‘would still provide sufficient real resources to meet 
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the estimated costs’. This, again, was a less than complete answer to the 
problem: with or without an increase in the rate of economic growth, Rippon 
did not tackle the question of whether the exchequer would be able to 
sustain the annual foreign exchange burden. Instead, his answer to the 
problem of excessive budgetary payments focussed upon the negotiation of 
a review provision, through which Britain could secure changes to the 
financial mechanism from inside the Community. Indeed he went further, 
arguing that, ‘whether there was a formal review clause or not we should no 
doubt follow the Community precedent and demand special reimbursements 
or, in the last resort, refuse to pay’.107  
 
In response to this, however, the contrary case was, for the first time, put 
before Cabinet. The minutes do not reveal who made the intervention, but 
there is good reason to conclude that it was Barber. During a meeting of the 
Economic Strategy committee the previous day, Barber had addressed the 
issue of budgetary contributions by explaining that:  
 
He had been advised that if gross domestic product ... were to grow at 
the faster rate indicated [in the memorandum by officials] ... as a result 
of our entry, it was not possible to say whether this increase in gdp in 
the circumstances would of itself – and without special measures by the 
Government – lead to an improvement in the balance of payments 
which could be offset against the costs of entry or whether it would 
actually worsen the balance of payments. In any event he was not clear 
why it was necessary to make our opening bid on Community finance 
by the end of this year.108   
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This convoluted form of expression perhaps reflected his nervousness in 
making such a challenge, not only to Rippon, but in effect to the prime 
minister as well. Now, in Cabinet, it was argued that: 
 
Even if substantially faster economic growth were achieved ... the 
Government would probably still find it necessary to take severe 
measures in order to bring about the switch of resources required to 
meet the balance of payments cost. Indeed, if the balance of payments 
costs built up too rapidly in the early years of our membership, the 
measures of economic restraint that would have to be taken might 
largely offset the stimulus to faster growth created by our entry.109 
   
While these analyses are by no means identical, the first shows that the 
chancellor was ready to contradict the flawed economic analysis being 
offered by Rippon. The riposte, however, was not long in coming: it centred 
once more upon the review provision: ‘if we found that a difficult balance of 
payments situation was developing as a result of the burden of our net 
contributions to the Community budget, it would be open to us at any time to 
request a review of the Community’s financial arrangements’.110  
 
As noted earlier in the chapter, this is also the Cabinet meeting which 
Margaret Thatcher discusses in some detail in her memoirs. Her account 
(which accords so closely with the official records that it is inconceivable that 
it was not based upon access to the relevant files) was evidently written with 
a view to explaining her subsequent travails with the Community over the 
British contribution to the Community budget.111 She is critical of Heath and 
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Rippon’s handling of the matter, arguing that the latter ‘seemed to attach little 
significance’ to the review provision on the assumption ‘that we could reopen 
the question’ even without one. She goes on to say that ‘this whole question 
should have been considered more carefully. It came to dominate Britain’s 
relations with the EEC for more than a decade, and it did not prove so easy 
to reopen’.112 While it may be true that officials underestimated the difficulty 
Britain would encounter in securing what it believed to be a fair contribution, 
Thatcher’s analysis simplifies the situation confronting the government at the 
time. It was far from clear that Britain would be able to negotiate a review 
provision, for the reason that the Community members would themselves 
recognise that this portended a British intention to alter the budgetary 
mechanism at a later date. Thatcher’s analysis would therefore imply that a 
review provision should have been made a ‘make or break’ issue, or, in other 
words, one upon which the government should have been prepared to see 
the negotiations fail. From the perspective of December 1970, and whatever 
the future difficulties it might create, this could hardly have appeared a better 
strategy than Rippon’s logic of seeking to negotiate changes from inside the 
Community.    
 
To return to the 10 December Cabinet meeting itself, it now fell to Heath to 
sum-up the discussion and to propose a way of dealing with the difference of 
view.  Adopting a similar line to that recommended by Nield, Heath deferred 
further consideration of the matter until an unidentified point in the future:  
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it was not necessary for the Cabinet to reach a final decision at this 
stage on the question of whether we should be prepared in the last 
resort to accept the terms which the official assessment suggested 
were the most favourable we were likely to obtain from the Six in any 
settlement of the Community finance issue. A more detailed 
examination of all the relevant factors would be required before it could 
be decided whether the balance of payments burden implied by such 
terms would or would not be a tolerable one. It was not, however, 
suggested that the burden would so clearly be intolerable that no useful 
purpose would be served by continuing the negotiations.113 
 
By ending the discussion in this way, Heath implicitly acknowledged that 
there were grounds for doubt about whether the economic cost of 
Community membership was tolerable, and offered an assurance of further 
examination at a later stage. It is a pledge that acquires greater significance 
in the light of the way in which Cabinet finally endorsed the terms on 
Community finance the following summer. For the present, however, 
ministers accepted Heath’s modus vivendi and agreed to the tactical bid 
recommended by Rippon. The last of Britain’s three main opening proposals 
was finally tabled in Brussels on 16 December.114 
 
Conclusion 
 
The Conservative election victory of June 1970 brought to power a man with 
unique credentials to lead the British application for membership of the 
European Community. His experience as Britain’s negotiator in 1961-63 
gave him an affinity with issues that his peers could not match, and his 
championing of European unity in the 1960s meant that the Community itself 
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could be in little doubt about the sincerity of the British desire to join.115 But 
Heath also inherited an application that had considerable momentum behind 
it, and a Whitehall team already prepared for the process of negotiation.  The 
twin challenges which confronted the application also remained unchanged: 
the uncertainty surrounding France’s attitude to British membership, and the 
need to secure acceptable terms for Community finance had dominated 
Whitehall thinking for the past year. The less divided nature of the 
Conservative Cabinet promised to be an asset in the latter regard, but the 
debate of 10 December showed that the scale of prospective British 
budgetary contributions could still bring into question the case for British 
entry.116 With the tabling of Britain’s opening bids, the test of French 
intentions would now come to the fore. In a minute to Heath shortly after the 
October ministerial meeting, Rippon explained that:  
 
For the next stages we should have no illusions about the difficulties. 
The French may sometimes misjudge their interests, and play the 
diplomatic game for its own sake. ... But they will fight hard and 
effectively for what they judge their interests to be and none of the Five 
or the Commission seem able to stand up to them in the end. 
 The vital question for us is what political price they attach to the 
consequences of success or failure. Either could be costly for them as it 
could be for us.117 
 
The early months of 1971 would pose this question even more pointedly.
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Chapter 5 
 
Enlargement Enigma:  
Britain, the Élysée and the Accession Negotiations 
January to May 1971 
 
 
The period from January to May 1971 saw questions about France’s attitude 
towards British EC membership crystallise, and then receive a definitive 
answer. The first three months of the year witnessed rising tension, as the 
French adopted an uncompromising stance over the terms on which Britain 
could join the Community.1 As the Community could only operate on the 
basis of unanimity, the impasse between France, taking a hard line, and the 
Five, adopting more moderate positions, left the Community unable to 
respond to Britain’s opening offers on the major issues. Successive 
ministerial meetings in February and March passed without significant 
progress, and were accompanied by France’s decision to propel sterling to 
the forefront of negotiations – the same subject upon which de Gaulle had 
predicated his 1967 veto. This development led to questions about French 
intentions. Did these actions reflect a desire to frustrate enlargement by 
insisting upon terms that Paris knew the British government could not 
accept? Or was it rather a case of testing British nerves with a view to 
securing the greatest possible concessions for French interests? These 
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questions filled the Community atmosphere in spring 1971.2 Yet unbeknown 
to all but a handful of individuals in the Élysée and Whitehall, conversations 
had already started between Christopher Soames and the Secretary General 
at the Élysée, Michel Jobert, which were to culminate in a summit meeting 
between Heath and Pompidou in the latter part of May.3 Just three days 
before foreign ministers were due to reconvene in Brussels for the May 
ministerial meeting, Heath’s forthcoming visit to Paris was announced.4 The 
ministerial meeting then produced the first breakthroughs on major subjects, 
including sugar and Community finance.5 But significant uncertainties 
remained, especially on sterling and New Zealand. The eyes of Europe now 
turned to the Élysée, where on 20 and 21 May, Heath and Pompidou spent 
more than ten hours in private, tête-à-tête talks. On the evening of 21 May, 
they emerged to face a European press corps gathered in the regal Salle des 
Fêtes, the room in which de Gaulle had twice before declared vetoes of 
British applications. It was to be a moment of no less drama: with Heath 
sitting alongside him, Pompidou explained what their talks had been about, 
and where agreement had been found. To the captivated audience, he then 
revealed it to be their shared conviction that the remaining problems of the 
accession negotiations could be solved by the end of June.6 During two 
ministerial meetings in Luxembourg the following month, sugar, sterling, New 
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Zealand and Community finance were all settled. In the early hours of 23 
June, at the conclusion of the second meeting, emotions ran high: nearly a 
decade on from Britain’s first application to join, the diplomatic path to 
Community membership was reaching its conclusion.7 
 
The question of why the negotiations took this course, and how they were 
finally resolved, has elicited contrasting interpretations from those that have 
written about them. The debate centres upon the elusive and enigmatic 
figure of Georges Pompidou. In his classic study of Britain’s entry to the 
European Community, Kitzinger delineates two ‘rival theories’, which, he 
argues, constitute the parameters within which an explanation of French 
behaviour is to be found. The ‘hard’ theory posits that, up until the spring of 
1971, Pompidou continued to hope that British entry could be frustrated, but 
that under pressure from the German Chancellor, Willy Brandt, and the 
Italian Prime Minister, Emilio Colombo, he was brought to realise the 
damage which would be inflicted upon French interests should the 
negotiations fail, and be seen to fail because of French intransigence.8 The 
‘soft’ theory, by contrast, begins with the premise that Pompidou was 
reconciled to the prospect of British accession from the moment of his 
election in June 1969, but that he chose to strike an ambiguous posture for 
some time thereafter in order that the reversal of de Gaulle’s veto policy 
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should not seem too sudden.9 There is, however, a different variant of the 
hard theory, which has attracted considerable support in British 
historiography. According to this, Pompidou was persuaded to permit 
enlargement only after the summit meeting with Heath had convinced him 
that Britain would not undermine the Community from within. One of the 
earliest exponents of this interpretation was Heath’s political secretary, 
Douglas Hurd, himself a participant in the preparations for the summit, as 
well as being present in Paris when the crucial meeting took place.10 With 
minor nuances by different authors, including Heath’s memoirs, this narrative 
of the accession negotiations has appeared time and again in the secondary 
literature.11 Conversely, strong support for the ‘soft’ theory, or variants 
thereof, has been provided by the retrospective account of Pompidou’s 
principal foreign affairs adviser, Jean-René Bernard.12 It has also found 
favour in Ludlow’s recent analysis of the French president’s contribution to 
The Hague Summit of December 1969; as a result of The Hague deal, 
Ludlow argues, ‘Pompidou was ... committed to permitting the widening of 
the EEC in a way which made any thought of future vetoes all but 
inconceivable’.13 This view leaves open the question of the relationship 
between the Heath-Pompidou summit and the success of the accession 
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negotiations.14 Rücker emphasises the role of sterling, arguing that French 
demands on this issue represented a ‘test of confidence’ in Anglo-French 
relations in the context of British entry to the Community.15 
 
Over the next two chapters, the events of January to June 1971 will be re-
examined, primarily from a British perspective, but also with French 
presidential sources used to explain the Élysée’s actions and motivations at 
key stages. This chapter will take the story to mid-May, immediately prior to 
Heath’s meeting with Pompidou. It argues that the hard-line positions 
adopted by French negotiators in early 1971 formed part of an Élysée 
strategy which had its core two objectives: the first, to strengthen France’s 
bargaining hand in pursuit of its own negotiating priorities; and, second, to 
demonstrate the need for an Anglo-French summit as a precursor to the 
resolution of the major issues at Brussels. It will go on to show how the 
summit meeting was arranged and prepared, with particular emphasis upon 
the Soames-Jobert talks that continued throughout the spring. Finally, the 
chapter will examine the May ministerial meeting, at which the first significant 
advances of the negotiations were made, explaining the implications of the 
meeting for the forthcoming talks between Heath and Pompidou. The 
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question of what occurred at the summit, and how it paved the way for the 
climax of the negotiations in June, will be the subject of the next chapter. 
 
L’impasse préméditée: Pompidou takes command, January-April 1971 
 
Following Britain’s opening bids at the end of 1970, the first quarter of 1971 
saw tension progressively increase as the negotiations struggled to advance. 
The main reason for this was the decision by France to adopt a series of 
hard-line postures on the major negotiating subjects. The year began with 
Pompidou’s much publicised remarks at a press conference on 21 January. 
In what appeared to be a thinly veiled reference to Britain’s opening bid on 
Community finance, Pompidou explained that ‘We have often had occasion 
to say that France wanted, and believed in, Britain’s entry to the Common 
Market. That is still my position, but of course it depends in the first place on 
the British. One must admit that the British have three qualities amongst 
others: humour, tenacity and realism. I have the feeling that we are still 
slightly in the humorous stage’.16 At the ministerial meeting in Brussels on 2 
February, the Six were unable to respond to any of Britain’s three main 
proposals (sugar, New Zealand and Community finance), but agreements on 
lesser issues (policy towards Asian Commonwealth countries, and the 
procedure for industrial tariff changes during the transitional period), enabled 
a veneer of momentum to be maintained.17 On 18 February, there followed a 
desultory meeting of the Six’s permanent representatives, during which 
                                                            
16
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France’s Jean-Marc Boegner reacted sharply to the thinking of his partners 
on Britain’s budgetary contribution during the transitional period. The dispute 
centred upon a Belgian proposal, approved by all except France, which 
envisaged a British starting contribution of between 7.5% and 9% per cent, 
increasing over five years to between 17.5% and 19.5%, with three further 
years of correctives that would limit London’s payments to 22%, 24% and 
26% respectively. While it was no great surprise that France wanted the 
Community to begin with a tougher proposal (and so prevent London using 
whatever negotiating time remained to whittle down the percentages), it was 
the nature and tone of Boegner’s reaction which gave cause for concern. He 
explained that he had received instructions from Paris ‘not to continue the 
attempt to define a Community position until the UK had changed its 
proposals’. In France’s view, the British bid was neither ‘appropriate nor 
decent’, and the ‘Belgian proposals represented neither a basis for 
discussion nor reflection’.18 It was in March that France emerged clearly as 
the main obstacle to Britain obtaining satisfactory terms. At a fractious 
meeting of the Council of Ministers on 15 March, there was an unbridgeable 
gap between the French Foreign Minister, Robert Schumann, and the Five 
on each of the major subjects.19 A further restricted session was held that 
evening with a view to finding a measure of agreement (particularly on sugar, 
where France appeared to have few interests to defend) but this again 
proved desultory.20 As a result, the March ministerial meeting, which began 
the following day, was unable to record any advance.21 It was another two 
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months until the next such meeting in May, and speculation about French 
motives inevitably followed.22  
 
The situation was compounded on 18 March, when France brought sterling 
to the foreground of the negotiations.23 Hitherto, the British had proceeded 
on the line, never formally agreed to by the Six, that sterling was a matter for 
discussion and investigation, but not negotiation.24 However, in a statement 
to his fellow permanent representatives, which leaked immediately, Boegner 
declared that France wanted the Council meeting on 30 March to be used to 
co-ordinate a Community position on sterling.25 Such a procedure, while not 
necessarily malicious, at least appeared to suggest a more determined 
French approach to the matter. Boegner insisted that there was an 
incompatibility between the reserve role of sterling and the movement 
towards economic and monetary union within the Community. It was the 
desire of his government to see an orderly run-down of the sterling balances 
(sterling reserves belonging to other governments, but held in London) in 
parallel with British entry.26 
 
French actions in March 1971 have elicited differing interpretations from 
historians. Some accept French positions at face value, presenting the 
impasse as a genuine stand-off over the terms of entry.27 Others, however, 
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argue that the subsequent French retreat from these demands show them to 
be essentially tactical, with Pompidou permitting a softening of the French 
stance only in the context of a bilateral meeting between himself and Heath. 
Both Kitzinger and O’Neill conclude thus, with the former arguing that: ‘It was 
not until the deadlock had crystallized at the multilateral level, not in other 
words until France had made clear that it was in her power to insist on 
conditions which no British government was likely to be willing to accept, that 
Georges Pompidou could reckon to obtain the maximum advantage from a 
direct approach by Edward Heath. A great deal of the bargaining 
manoeuvres in the early part of 1971 could thus in a sense be construed as 
signals to come up and see me some time’.28 The argument in the first part 
of this chapter accords closely with Kitzinger’s interpretation. The impasse 
was directed by Pompidou in order to exert pressure upon Britain and the 
Five, the purpose being to strengthen France’s bargaining position, but also 
to demonstrate publicly the need for a summit meeting between himself and 
Heath.29  
 
The thinking behind French tactics is illuminated by the record of a meeting 
between Pompidou and senior French ministers on 16 February. In addition 
to Schumann, the Prime Minister, Jacques Chaban-Delmas, Finance 
Minister, Valery Giscard d’Estaing, and Defence Minister, Michel Debré, 
were all present. On the principle of British entry, Pompidou’s attitude 
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remained ambiguous: he agreed with Giscard’s proposition that France 
should favour British membership as a way to prevent the Community 
developing in a federal direction, but conditioned this with some remarks 
about Anglo-American relations. This, he felt, was the basic difficulty relating 
to Britain’s general policies. Pompidou’s impression, while perhaps only an 
impression, was that the Heath government had recently been moving closer 
to Washington. He pointed, in particular, to its stance on Laos and the Middle 
East.30 Regarding the conduct of the negotiations, however, Pompidou was 
more straightforward. He made clear that, for the moment, he did not want to 
engage in a discussion of figures for Community finance (hence Boegner’s 
hard-line stance at the meeting of permanent representatives just two days 
later). Pompidou was conscious that Britain’s bargaining position was 
stronger than that of France, and stressed that the Six must be unanimous in 
their approach to the vital issues. These he specified as being: British 
acceptance of the definitive finance regulation in full; the method by which 
London would move towards implementation of the regulation over a 
transitional period; and the application by Britain of Community preference 
(preference in agricultural trade) from the moment of accession. The linked 
problems of Britain’s balance of payments difficulties and the sterling 
balances were also discussed in a general way, but without any clear 
conclusion. Most important of all from the perspective of this chapter, is the 
president’s summary of the discussion, in which he made clear his desire 
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that France should adopt an uncompromising negotiating stance in the 
coming weeks: ‘In relation to Great Britain, it is necessary, for the moment, 
for the Minister of Foreign Affairs to be very firm and even malicious’.31 
 
Even before the March ministerial meeting, however, bilateral conversations 
had been initiated between Christopher Soames and Michel Jobert, which 
were to culminate three months later in Heath’s visit to Paris for talks with 
Pompidou. The possibility of a summit was initially referred to during a 
conversation between Soames and Jobert in mid-February.32 Shortly 
afterwards, on 25 February, Soames also saw Pompidou to discuss the 
negotiations. Nothing was said about the possibility of a meeting with Heath, 
but the conversation provided a useful clarification of the president’s priorities 
in Brussels. On Community finance, Pompidou explained that he wanted 
London’s contributions at the end of a five year transitional period to be 
approaching the figure which it would be required to pay when the finance 
mechanism operated without restriction. On agriculture, he wanted Britain to 
apply Community preference from the moment of accession. His attitude to 
Britain’s starting contribution for finance was more relaxed. Striking a very 
different tone to that used by Boegner at the meeting of permanent 
representatives just a week earlier, Pompidou said that the Commission’s 
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suggestion of more than 21% in the first year ‘was too much’ but, equally, 
Britain’s opening proposal of 3% ‘was too little’.33 Soames returned to 
London at the beginning of March, and at a meeting with Heath, expanded 
further on the impression he had formed of Pompidou’s thinking. In 
response, Heath asked Soames whether he thought the best means of 
resolving the major issues would be a multilateral summit of the Ten ‘which 
had been carefully prepared in advance’, or whether ‘the right course was for 
him to have bilateral talks with M. Pompidou, and leave the negotiations to 
be concluded thereafter at Ministerial level at Brussels’. Soames was in no 
doubt that the latter was the right course of action: ‘He thought that M. 
Pompidou would want to settle these matters himself with the Prime 
Minister’. In line with the ambassador’s advice, Heath authorised Soames to 
tell Jobert that he felt ‘an understanding between himself and M. Pompidou 
would be an important element in the negotiations’, and that that the timing of 
any meeting between them was important in view of the need to avoid the 
Brussels negotiations turning sour’.34 
 
In his memoirs, Heath implies that this decision distinguished him from the 
FCO (‘there were still some officials in the Foreign Office who wanted to 
isolate the French by working with the Five against them’), and that Rippon 
felt qualms about the procedure.35 While the tactic of encouraging the Five to 
apply pressure to France in pursuit of better terms of entry was an important 
part of FCO strategy, it does not follow that this also made it averse to a 
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bilateral meeting with Pompidou.36 On the contrary, immediately after 
Soames’s visit to London, the Foreign Office began to advocate an Anglo-
French summit.37 In a paper sent to the Cabinet Office on 3 March, and 
subsequently transmitted to Downing Street under Nield’s name, the FCO 
recommended that such a meeting should take place in the second half of 
April, the purpose being to ‘lay the foundations’ for a decisive ministerial 
meeting in Brussels the following month.38 Alongside a meeting with 
Pompidou, Heath had also expressed an interest in a multilateral summit of 
the Ten as a way to bring the negotiations to a successful climax. The FCO, 
however, was sceptical; the only circumstances in which it could see an 
argument for this was if the negotiations reached deadlock during May or 
June. But a summit of this nature ‘would ... be a meeting of last resort’ rather 
than ‘part of a deliberate plan’. Alternatively, one could be used symbolically, 
‘to crown the success of the negotiations ... once this was assured’.39 The 
prime minister, however, continued to hesitate over a decision: it would not 
be until after his talks with Brandt on 5 and 6 April that he finally settled his 
mind in favour of a bilateral summit and made a formal approach to 
Pompidou.40  
 
Meanwhile, on 6 March, Soames met Jobert again. He conveyed the prime 
minister’s interest in a visit to Paris, and enquired about its potential timing. 
When viewed alongside Pompidou’s remarks at the meeting with senior 
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French ministers on 16 February, Jobert’s comments to Soames now provide 
a further insight into the Élysée’s negotiating tactics and the reasons for its 
uncompromising stance in March. Jobert explained that a summit: 
 
would clearly have to be either before the Ministerial negotiating 
meeting in May or before the Ministerial meeting in June. A point for 
consideration was how much of a crisis atmosphere was desirable for 
the holding of the Prime Minister/President meeting. Jobert tended to 
think that the best situation would be one that was short of a crisis, but 
where there was a sufficient degree of impasse for people to appreciate 
the need for a meeting. 
 
Jobert suggested that he and Soames meet again after the March ministerial 
to review the situation. He also stressed the importance of keeping their talks 
secret: for France, he was to ‘pilot’ any summit preparations, and if the Quai 
d’Orsay learnt of the plans, ‘it would create many difficulties’.41 While a 
diplomatic exchange of this sort would not normally provide a strong 
foundation upon which to interpret French motivations, the fact that Jobert 
acted as Pompidou’s principal conduit in communicating with London before 
and after the summit, makes this an invaluable means of gauging the 
Élysée’s intentions and objectives. The particular importance here being 
Jobert’s stress upon the desirability of a negotiating impasse, which accords 
with Pompidou’s remarks to French ministers, but adds a further motivation: 
to demonstrate the importance of a summit meeting with Heath as a 
precursor to a successful denouement of the negotiations in Brussels.42  
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In London, these early conversations between Soames and Jobert had an 
important impact upon Foreign Office attitudes towards French negotiating 
tactics: where Schumann’s actions at the March ministerial meeting 
inevitably fostered suspicions among outside observers, Jobert’s remarks to 
Soames meant that senior figures within the FCO remained relatively 
unmoved.43 At the ministerial meeting itself, Rippon responded firmly to the 
absence of progress, but in his report to parliament on 18 March he recited a 
banal statement of his recent activities, revealing no hint of concern about 
events in Brussels.44 This prompted the following question from the shadow 
foreign secretary, Denis Healey: 
 
Is the right hon. and learned Gentleman aware that many of us 
understand that his inability to give the House any news results in large 
part from the refusal of the French Government to allow the Six to 
adopt a negotiating position on the major issues, and that the behaviour 
of the French Government in paralysing these negotiations is leading 
many objective observers to the conclusion that they wish to prevent 
our application from succeeding for the third time?45 
 
In his reply, Rippon refused to lay blame at the door of the French, but made 
clear his view that ‘we are entitled now to expect the Community to put 
forward reasonable proposals on the main issues which have now been 
before it for some time’.46 This was an exercise in public relations. In a 
personal minute to Heath, Rippon expounded his thinking more candidly: 
 
People are, of course, asking themselves why the French isolated 
themselves so unreasonably. Some of the French delegation were not 
happy with their position on sugar. But, even if Schumann handled his 
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position insensitively, it is obviously part of a deliberate strategy. I 
believe that the French are now constructing the best negotiating 
position for themselves in preparation for the crunch here, and also no 
doubt for any bilateral meeting with us. ... The French fear that if they 
make concessions to their partners here before the crunch, they will 
have to pay a second time when the crunch comes with us. And they 
are right. They also want to demonstrate to us the ineffectiveness of the 
Five in order to strengthen their position in talking to us.47 
 
 
The March ministerial meeting was followed shortly afterwards by Boegner’s 
statement to EEC permanent representatives on sterling, leading to further 
speculation about malicious French intent.48 Qualms about the reserve role 
of sterling had been a consistent feature of the French attitude towards 
British EC entry since the first enlargement negotiations, and had been 
accorded particular importance in de Gaulle’s November 1967 press 
conference, which presaged the formal French veto of the second application 
the following month.49 As has been seen, the critical element in the France’s 
1971 demands was for a commitment to run down the sterling balances after 
accession.50 In Whitehall, the principle of doing this was uncontroversial; the 
difficulty was how to do so without precipitating potentially damaging financial 
instability. The accession negotiations, it was maintained, offered insufficient 
time to find a solution to such an intractable problem.51 
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London also had difficulty in discerning precisely what it was about sterling’s 
role that worried the French – a consequence of the inconsistent way in 
which France defined and conceptualised the problem during the 
negotiations.52 The ambiguity in French pronouncements at the time has 
carried through into the subsequent historiography. Confessing to his own 
bemusement at French reasons for pressing the issue, O’Neill speculated 
about a number of possible motivations, the most notable being that it was 
kept in-hand as a possible justification for a veto should Pompidou ‘in the last 
resort’ decide that this was necessary.53 Bernard argues that it was ‘natural’ 
that France should want to discuss the problem, which had the potential to 
destabilise the economic and monetary policy of an enlarged Community.54 
Rücker, by contrast, contends that it amounted to a ‘test of confidence’ in 
Britain, which Heath was required to, and ultimately did, pass at the May 
1971 summit.55 Schenk offers yet another interpretation by suggesting that 
Pompidou wanted to ensure that following British entry sterling did not 
become a de facto European reserve currency, leading to increased tension 
between the enlarged Community and the United States.56 The argument of 
this thesis accords most closely with that of Bernard. The French emphasis 
upon sterling should be understood as reflecting a general concern that the 
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structural weakness of the British balance of payments (a product of the 
sterling balances), could be a source of instability for the enlarged 
Community – particularly one moving towards closer economic and monetary 
coordination. If Britain were to experience balance of payments difficulties 
inside the Community (a prospect which could not be discounted given the 
budgetary costs) other member states might be called upon to provide 
financial assistance under Articles 108 and 109 of the Treaty of Rome.57 In 
these circumstances, the Community would effectively be helping to 
underwrite the sterling balances. This conception of the problem is well 
captured in a conversation between Bernard and the Minister for European 
Economic Affairs in the Paris Embassy, John Galsworthy, in April 1971. 
Bernard explained that French ideas ‘were anything but cut and dried’; they 
‘had no wish whatever to make sterling a stumbling block and no desire to 
cause us embarrassment. At the same time they were simply not prepared ... 
to take over our balances’.58 Given that Pompidou was himself a former 
banker, with a clear grasp of monetary matters, it is understandable that he 
should have wanted to examine ways of discarding this long-standing French 
concern in parallel with British accession.59 
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The Foreign Office and Treasury were again less disturbed by Boegner’s 18 
March statement than outside observers.60 In a minute to O’Neill, the head of 
the European Integration Department, Norman Statham, observed that the 
alarmist nature of some press reactions had been ‘off beam’.61 Officials had 
known for some time that France had concerns in this area, and the 
statement could even be seen as a useful clarification.62 Heath was less 
sure. His concern stemmed less from the substance of Boegner’s action, 
than from its form. An added sense of intrigue resulted from the fact that 
Raymond Barre, Vice President of the European Commission, and the 
commissioner responsible for financial and monetary questions, had on the 
same day tabled a paper reviewing Britain’s responses to a Community 
questionnaire on economic and financial matters, which concluded that 
further exchanges with the candidates were necessary.63 As a member of the 
Commission, Barre was of course formally independent of the French 
government, but the fact of his French nationality, alongside the coincidence 
of timing between with Boegner’s statement, inevitably gave rise to 
speculation that he had acted under influence of the Élysée.64 At a meeting 
between Heath, Home and Rippon on 23 March, ‘the latest French move on 
sterling’ was discussed. Heath felt ‘it was difficult not to see this as a 
deliberately unhelpful step’.65 The following day, Barber wrote to Heath to 
give his view that neither Boegner nor Barre’s statements seemed 
‘unreasonable’ or ‘particularly hostile’. Heath, however, was unconvinced, 
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commenting that ‘it is the way the French have done this and the forum in 
which they chose to raise the question which almost makes it a hostile act’.66 
Following up on Barber’s letter, Rippon also wrote to Heath to endorse the 
Treasury view. Again, the influence of Jobert’s comments to Soames was 
apparent:  
 
We can only guess at the French motives but, at this stage, it would 
seem right to keep an open mind. It may be that President Pompidou’s 
decision to raise the question of sterling in this way is consistent with 
the view that he has realised that the negotiations are reaching their 
crucial phase, and that the French have to make their position on 
sterling clear now if they are to do it all.67 
 
Heath agreed to Rippon’s recommendation that London should stick to its 
position that sterling was not subject to formal negotiation and should be 
‘discussed separately and discreetly’, but as if to make clear that keeping an 
open mind also meant entertaining the possibility of malicious intent, he 
further commented: ‘But we cannot be certain about French motives’.68 
 
Against this background, a further meeting between Soames and Jobert took 
place at the end of the month. Soames began by commenting upon the lack 
of progress at the March ministerial meeting, only to be met by Jobert’s 
phlegmatic response: “Well, we did not expect it to, did we?”. ‘The vital 
meeting would be the talk between the President and the Prime Minister’. On 
timing, Pompidou’s preference would be for a date in late May, but Jobert 
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emphasised that this must remain a secret. He went on to say that, in 
Pompidou’s view, ‘all the main subjects were now pretty well ripe for 
discussion ... and it was important not to remove too many leaves of the 
artichoke before their talk took place’. The implication was that the Élysée 
wanted to preserve the impasse until the summit was held. Soames enquired 
about the possibility of an April meeting, hitherto the preference of the 
Foreign Office, but Jobert was reluctant to envisage timing of this sort: ‘If the 
prime minister and the president met as early as April, there would be two 
months left during which officials would try to re-open matters which had 
been decided in Paris and this was a danger which should not be run’. ‘The 
best solution was to have a meeting as late as possible’, and Jobert ‘took it 
as read’ that once Heath and Pompidou met ‘they were “condemned to 
succeed”’.69 
 
At the start of April, Heath visited Bonn for talks with Brandt. While he had 
been moving towards such a decision for the past month, it was to be the 
German chancellor’s remarks which finally convinced Heath to organise a 
bilateral summit with Pompidou.70 The importance of waiting until his Bonn 
visit, however, was that Brandt’s attitude might yet be pivotal; if the 
negotiations were to reach deadlock, or if a summit meeting with Pompidou 
were to fail, pressure from the Five, and in particular Germany, would be 
Britain’s best hope of averting yet another failed entry bid. The negotiations 
were discussed early on the first day of the talks. Brandt began by explaining 
that he did not favour ‘using pressure’, but Germany had made plain to 
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France that if the negotiations were to fail, it would ‘poison’ the Community, 
just as de Gaulle’s veto had done in 1968 and 1969. He remained optimistic: 
‘Nothing has changed my view and even my conviction that President 
Pompidou wants the negotiations to succeed’. Heath agreed that it was 
wrong to try and pressure France, but warned that France’s tough 
negotiating tactics ‘may go too far so that the negotiations cannot succeed 
regardless of whether the French want them to or not’. Brandt pointedly 
asked Heath whether he had any plans to visit Pompidou. Given Jobert’s 
insistence upon the need for secrecy, Heath could only respond vaguely: he 
had no ‘specific plans’, but he had let Pompidou know that he would be ‘glad 
to visit’. Brandt then offered his own support for Heath going to Paris. The 
chancellor was also ready to do so himself, should ‘the Brussels talks 
seemed to make this necessary’. He was also contemplating calling for a 
summit of the Six, ‘if the situation in June turns critical’. Brandt had 
mentioned the idea to Pompidou, as well as the possibility of a further 
summit of the Seven at some point during the summer.71 With Brandt’s clear 
support for a Heath-Pompidou meeting, and his readiness to intervene 
personally if the negotiations ran into crisis, the case for an Agnlo-French 
summit now appeared compelling. Even if the meeting were to fail, there 
would still be hope of German intervention rescuing the situation. The Easter 
recess would provide Heath with time to think through his tactics, but shortly 
thereafter, the approach to Pompidou would be made. 
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The path to Paris: the Soames-Jobert talks and the organisation of a 
summit 
 
The last week in April and the first in May gave rise to an intensive period of 
activity, culminating, on 8 May, with the announcement of Heath’s visit to 
Paris. On 23 April, 4 and 5 May meetings were held in Downing Street to co-
ordinate the British stance on a summit meeting.72 In the intervening period, 
Soames and Jobert met twice to relay the views of their respective 
governments. While Heath, Rippon and senior FCO officials all supported a 
summit meeting, there remained considerable uncertainty about Pompidou’s 
intentions. In advance of the first Downing Street meeting, this question was 
addressed in a paper by the Paris embassy. In October 1969, prior to The 
Hague summit, Michael Palliser, the most senior embassy figure after 
Soames, had written to John Robinson to assuage FCO concerns about 
Pompidou’s intentions, recording his and Soames’s view that France fully 
intended to lift the veto on enlargement negotiations.73 Now, it was the Paris 
embassy again which was most confident that Pompidou intended the 
Brussels talks to succeed. Substantiating this view, the paper explained that: 
 
The president continues to state categorically in private conversations – 
and not only with British visitors – that he genuinely wants the 
negotiations to succeed. The French Government says the same thing 
in its public ministerial speeches. In both cases the statements are 
invariably qualified by the reservation that Britain must accept all the 
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rules and regulations and not expect any special treatment extending 
beyond a strictly defined transitional period. These professions of good 
will may, of course, be no more than dust thrown in the eyes of the 
outside world. But their effect on public and political opinion in France 
(where 64% of those canvassed in the most recent public opinion poll 
expressed themselves in favour of British accession) has been such 
that the French Government would be discredited if it now placed itself 
in the position of opposing Britain’s entry other than in clear defence of 
some vital national interest. Public opinion is not expecting another 
French veto and the present French Government does not give any 
impression of having any stomach for one.74 
  
The paper was prefaced by a letter from Soames to the FCO PUS, Denis 
Greenhill, in which the ambassador set out his own, more idiosyncratic, 
reasons for reaching the same conclusion: 
 
Pompidou has never been – and is not now – enthusiastic about our 
entry. (Enthusiasm is anyway not part of his make-up.) He probably 
does not believe that the present Community will disintegrate if we do 
not join it. He is not scared of German pressure and believes that 
Italians always have their price. He would no doubt admit that, in the 
event of failure, the Community would stagnate for a time. But so what? 
Pompidou is no European visionary panting for political unification. He 
is a cautious, hard-bargaining, reticent Auvergnat with limited 
imagination and no talent for grandeur. He has got the all-important 
finance agreement under his belt and has reached agreement with 
Brandt on the beginnings of an economic and monetary union ... 
without having had to pay for it in terms of commitment to 
supranationalism. Nevertheless I remain convinced, for the reasons 
given in the enclosed paper, that he accepts that on balance it is right 
and necessary that we should come in: and he foresees a very 
unpleasant time ahead for him and for France if he can be blamed for 
keeping us out.75 
 
 
In addition to the inevitable speculation about Pompidou’s attitude, London’s 
attitude towards a summit was marked by two principal concerns. The first 
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focussed upon the relationship between the ministerial meeting in Brussels, 
due to take place on 11 and 12 May, and the Heath-Pompidou meeting 
which would follow.76 The Foreign Office, in particular, argued strongly that 
there should be some important advances at the ministerial meeting in order 
to prevent the summit taking place in an atmosphere of crisis.77 During his 
conversation with Jobert on 27 April, Soames ‘rubbed in hard’ need for 
‘manifest progress’, which Jobert, in Soames’s words, ‘professed to accept’ 
(hinting in particular at the possibility of an advance on Community finance, 
albeit in terms of ‘principles’ rather than figures).78 The second British 
concern related to the proposed summit agenda. In London, it seemed 
natural to assume that one of the chief purposes of the summit would be to 
discuss the principal problems of the accession negotiations.79 It came as a 
considerable surprise, therefore, that the French draft agenda, handed to 
Soames by Jobert on 4 May following a meeting with Bernard and 
Pompidou, contained no reference to the main British negotiating concerns.80 
The French draft was split into two parts: the first containing the subjects to 
which Pompidou accorded ‘greatest importance’ – the functioning of 
Community institutions, sterling, Community preference, the future use of 
French within the Community, and the safeguarding of the rights of African 
states presently associated with the Community under the Yaoundé 
Convention. The second part was comprised of two ‘lesser’ issues – Britain’s 
views on the consequences of enlargement for the west European countries 
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that had not applied for Community membership (for example, Sweden and 
Switzerland) and Community policies on overseas investment.81 When 
Soames enquired about the absence of Community finance, sugar and New 
Zealand, Jobert explained that, ‘Pompidou’s view was that if he and Mr. 
Heath could reach an understanding on the points in the [French] paper, all 
the rest would follow’. Soames redoubled his point, underlining that Heath 
would expect to talk about the British priorities as well. To this Jobert replied 
that, ‘he was certain the president would be prepared to talk about them if 
Mr. Heath wished: and they would see in the course of their conversation to 
what extent it was advisable to reach final agreement between themselves, 
or how much should be left for the subsequent meeting in Brussels’.82 
 
The draft Élysée agenda, and Jobert’s remarks to Soames provide the first 
insight into Pompidou’s objectives at a summit meeting. As will be argued in 
the next chapter, the president’s purpose would be to obtain a number of 
British concessions on political questions raised by enlargement, but not in 
all cases pertinent to the Brussels negotiations. These concerns were 
highlighted in the French agenda. At the time, however, the Élysée draft 
provoked more confusion than clarity, and was received in London with 
considerable uncertainty. Home in particular expressed strong misgivings: 
 
bilateral discussions restricted to the items which the French President 
had suggested could be dangerous. The Prime Minister would be 
pressed to make concessions on sterling and agricultural community 
preference which the French could make public, and find himself 
unable to secure any precise agreement on matters of concern to the 
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UK which we might be told should be handled à Six at Brussels. It was 
therefore necessary to devise some means of ensuring, so far as we 
could, that at such talks progress was made on issues of concern to us 
such as New Zealand, Community finance and sugar, as well as on the 
issues which M Pompidou had raised.83 
 
A revised agenda was drawn up by the FCO which included all of 
Pompidou’s proposals, but made two British additions. The first was: ‘How do 
the President and Prime Minister see the Role of the Enlarged Community in 
the World’. This was placed at the start of the agenda, with the aim of moving 
the talks beyond ‘restricted French interests’, as well as offering Heath the 
opportunity to underline the benefits of enlargement, and also, perhaps, ‘the 
consequences of failure’.84 The second addition grouped the main British 
negotiating concerns together under the single heading: ‘The Decisions 
necessary to ensure the early success of the negotiations for enlargement of 
the European Communities’.85 Issuing new instructions to Soames, Heath 
said that the revised agenda should now be given to Jobert with the 
message that, ‘it was the Prime Minister’s intention ... to reach clear and 
sufficient understandings to facilitate the resolution of the main outstanding 
problems in the negotiations by June’, and that ‘unless the French President 
considered that it would be possible to achieve this the Prime Minister would 
not consider that his visit should take place’.86 
 
On 6 May, Soames and Jobert met for what would prove to be one of their 
most significant conversations. Soames passed Jobert the revised agenda 
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and delivered Heath’s message about the need to tackle ‘the important 
issues remaining to be negotiated’. Jobert reminded Soames of what he had 
said at their last meeting, ‘that if M. Pompidou and the Prime Minister could 
reach agreement on the points set out in the French agenda, ‘the rest would 
follow’. Soames, however, made clear that Heath expected more than this: 
he would want ‘to seek agreement with the President during his visit on the 
main outstanding issues and not to leave it to chance that agreement might 
emerge at the later meeting in Brussels’. Under pressure, Jobert now 
conceded.87 Britain’s principal negotiating concerns would be formally 
incorporated on the summit agenda. On 8 May, simultaneous press 
announcements were made in London and Paris. There was little detail. It 
was simply stated that: ‘The President of the French Republic and the Prime 
Minister consider that a meeting to discuss matters of common interest 
would now be useful’. Pompidou had therefore invited Heath to Paris on 20-
21, and this had been ‘accepted ... with pleasure’.88 An hour before the 
announcement, Rippon met with diplomatic representatives of the Five to 
inform them of what was afoot. Conscious of the danger that their 
governments might now expect the impasse to be broken bilaterally, and 
desirous that progress should be made at the May ministerial meeting as a 
positive atmospheric precursor to the Heath-Pompidou meeting, Rippon 
underlined that the announcement of the summit ‘in no way diminished the 
importance of the ... meeting in Brussels next week’.89 
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The ‘first breakthrough’: the May ministerial meeting90 
 
The British negotiating stance for the May ministerial meeting was discussed 
in Cabinet on 6 May.91 At an earlier meeting of the AE committee, each of 
the major issues had been examined in detail, and Rippon now informed the 
full Cabinet of what had been agreed.92 With Britain’s contribution to the 
budget still a potentially divisive issue internally, Rippon was reluctant to 
discuss figures until it was absolutely necessary to do so. As such, he 
requested and received only very limited authority to respond to an offer that 
the Community might make. This was that if the Six should ‘put forward 
proposals pointing to a gradual increase in our contributions from less than 
10 per cent of the budget in the first year to a level of up to 20 per cent in the 
fifth year’, he could respond by saying that Britain regarded this as ‘a basis 
for negotiation’.93 At a more fundamental level, it was now four months since 
the 10 December Cabinet meeting had recorded a clear difference of view 
over whether the financial cost represented a worthwhile price for 
membership. Heath had ended that meeting by saying that the question 
would be returned to, but still no attempt had been made to do so.94 When 
the negotiations did start to gather momentum, this was to have important 
consequences; presented with a potentially historic success for the 
government, the atmosphere became much less conducive to expressions of 
unease about budgetary costs. 
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By early May, New Zealand was acquiring a status alongside Community 
finance as one of Britain’s two premier negotiating concerns.95 While it was 
freely recognised in Whitehall that Britain’s opening bid on this subject was 
unrealistic (London had proposed that the present quantity of New Zealand 
dairy exports to Britain should be maintained, at present prices, for the full 
length of the transitional period, with a review provision to extend access 
arrangements thereafter), attitudes within the Community gave considerable 
cause for worry.96 The Five and the Commission had shown a readiness to 
guarantee between 45% and 62% of New Zealand dairy exports by the fifth 
year of a transitional period (implying a readiness to preserve a special 
access regime for some time thereafter), but, without any compensating 
price increase, this seemed likely to fall well short of Auckland’s 
expectations. France had thus far adopted the extreme stance that New 
Zealand dairy exports should come to an end completely at the end of five 
years.97 The New Zealand government had similarly adopted an 
uncompromising stance, and when the Prime Minister, Keith Holyoake, wrote 
to Rippon in April, reviewing once again the difficulties of his country’s 
position, Home, who had taken a particular interest in this issue, revealed his 
mounting apprehension: ‘This is going to be very difficult. I have always felt 
in my bones that Parliament might reject the whole on the N.Z. question and 
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the French know it’.98  Similar, if less acute, problems were created by sugar, 
where Britain needed to satisfy the Commonwealth governments concerned. 
On both issues, the AE committee had declined Rippon his requested 
negotiating authority, insisting that before Britain moved from its opening 
proposals (in the case of New Zealand) or agreed to a potential Community 
proposal (in the case of sugar), further consultations should be held with the 
governments concerned.99 In Cabinet, it was underlined that, ‘Both issues 
were of great political sensitivity’, and that ‘We must make every effort to 
carry the Governments of New Zealand and of the developing 
Commonwealth sugar-producing countries with us in seeking compromise 
solutions’.100  
 
The meeting also saw the first expressions of ministerial concern regarding 
the Common Fisheries Policy. At the start of the negotiations, Whitehall had 
planned to leave this issue until the later stages of the negotiation, when, 
with success in sight, a more positive atmosphere should facilitate a 
satisfactory solution. Yet as domestic pressure grew during the first months 
of 1971, the government was forced into rethinking this strategy.101 No 
attempt would be made to deal with the issue at the May ministerial meeting, 
but in Cabinet it was now argued to be ‘essential that we should obtain 
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satisfaction on the fisheries regulations before Parliament was asked to 
approve any accession agreement’.102  
 
On 11 May, Britain and the Six assembled in Brussels for the first day of 
what would prove to be a dramatic meeting – perceived subsequently as ‘the 
first breakthrough’ of the negotiations.103 The political backdrop to the 
meeting was unlike any other: Heath’s imminent visit to Paris had been 
announced just three days earlier; then, on 10 May, Bonn floated the 
deutschmark (a response to a surge in currency flows into Germany) 
throwing the Community’s plans for economic and monetary union into 
flux.104 No agreement, however, was recorded until the second, and final, 
day of the meeting. The portents at the start were positive, with a self-
proclaimed French advance resulting in a Community proposal on sugar. But 
the positive tone did not last long.105 The Community’s offer was to extend 
the offer of association arrangements to developing Commonwealth 
countries in the Caribbean and Pacific, thus allowing the specific details for 
sugar producers to be settled in 1974, when the present Yaoundé convention 
fell due for renewal.106 In theory, this was an advantageous proposal both for 
Britain and the Caribbean countries most affected, as it would enable London 
to negotiate from a stronger position inside the Community. But the absence 
of any specific reference to sugar in the proposal seemed likely to render it 
unacceptable to the governments concerned. Rippon thus responded in 
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strong terms, insisting upon the need for a clearer assurance on sugar, he 
declared that the present offer ‘would not be regarded as an assurance of 
any kind’. He went on to make wider criticisms about the general lack of 
progress – pointing to Community finance in particular, Rippon declared that 
‘The dialogue of the deaf must end’.107  
 
The confrontational tone of Rippon’s statement created ripples of anxiety in 
both London and Paris. On 12 May, after an ‘urgent’ request for a meeting, 
Jobert implored Soames to represent to London the constructive intent which 
underlay the French offer of association. With an eye upon Heath’s 
forthcoming visit to Paris, Jobert emphasised that he and Soames had: 
 
not without some difficulty, done the preliminary work to set up a 
meeting of the greatest importance to our two countries. This could only 
have been achieved on the basis of total mutual trust between each 
other. We both had a responsibility now to see that nothing was done to 
damage the chances of this vital meeting being successful ... It was his 
earnest hope not only that the French initiative should be accepted by 
us as designed to be helpful but also that it should be seen publicly that 
this was our view.108 
 
From London, news also reached Rippon that Heath was worried by the tone 
of his statement.109 If no further progress could be made, it was vital that the 
ministerial meeting should not end in acrimony; the most important thing was 
to ensure a positive atmosphere leading up to his meeting with Pompidou.110 
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On the second day, events were to take an altogether different course. 
Resuming at 7pm (after talks within the Six), and in a fashion akin to the 
fabled Community ‘marathon’, the negotiations continued into the early hours 
13 May.111 As O’Neill recalled in his report, the meeting ‘acquired a character 
and atmosphere completely different from that of its predecessors’, as 
‘matters were resolved in hours which, on previous form, could have 
occupied months’.112 At just after 1am a form of words was found on sugar 
that satisfied both parties. The offer of association now included a clause 
stipulating that ‘the enlarged Community will have at heart the safeguarding 
of the interests’ of those countries ‘whose economies depend to a 
considerable extent on the exporting of basic products and notably sugar’.113 
Given the limits which had been placed upon his negotiating authority by the 
AE committee, and to Schumann’s evident disappointment, Rippon was 
unable to agree the Community proposal there and then. Rather, he 
welcomed the offer but made clear that he could not make a formal response 
until he had consulted the countries affected.114 Nonetheless, it was a first 
important advance, and it was paralleled by a British agreement to apply 
Community preference in agriculture as soon as it entered the Community. It 
had long been known that this was one of the main French priorities, and it 
was also one of the five subjects to which Pompidou had accorded ‘greatest 
importance’ in the Élysée’s original agenda for the summit meeting with 
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Heath.115 The AE committee had permitted Rippon to make the concession, 
which he did as part of a wider package of transitional arrangements for 
industry and agriculture.116 More was to follow: contributing further to the 
sense of momentum, at nearly 4am the Community tabled a French-inspired 
outline proposal on Community finance.117  
 
The complex nature of the Community’s May finance proposal has meant 
that its full significance has often been either overlooked or not properly 
understood. Despite the absence of figures, it brought Britain and the 
Community much closer to agreement on this fundamental issue, and for that 
reason it is crucial to understanding the political context leading into the 
Heath-Pompidou summit. It established a set of principles under which each 
applicant state would be assigned a base ‘key’, equivalent to its share of total 
Community GNP. During a five year transitional period, the key could rise or 
fall depending upon whether, under the normal operation of Community 
rules, the relevant country’s contribution would been larger or smaller than 
the percentage figure indicated by the key. Year-on-year movements would 
be restricted, however, to 1% between 1973 and 1974, and 2% for the 
remainder of the transitional period. To calculate the applicant countries’ 
precise contribution in each of the five transitional years, they would be 
granted a series of progressively diminishing abatements from the key. The 
abatement figures would therefore be the critical point for negotiation, but the 
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Community did not yet make proposals for this aspect.118 From the British 
perspective, it was significant that the key was related to GNP, as this would 
ensure that its contribution in the fifth year would be capped some way below 
what its contribution would be under the normal operation of budgetary rules. 
With this in mind, the Community had also left open the possibility of 
additional ‘corrective’ years; these would prevent sharp increases in the 
applicant countries’ contributions in the immediate post-transitional years. 
With these two points appearing to point towards a satisfactory solution, the 
critical remaining variable would be Britain’s starting contribution, and it was 
upon this point that Heath and Pompidou would concentrate upon when 
discussing Community finance at the summit.119   
 
Headlines on the morning of 13 May were dedicated to the progress in the 
Brussels negotiations.120 Within Whitehall, however, attention immediately 
shifted to the preparations for Heath’s Paris visit. These are now indelibly 
stamped with Douglas Hurd’s depiction of Heath sitting under a tree in the 
Downing Street garden, ‘dunking biscuits in tea’, while ‘experts on cane 
sugar and New Zealand butter and the sterling balances ... had their session 
under the tree’ and ‘ducks from the park waddled amorously across the 
lawn’.121 On the diplomatic front, a discreet preparatory mission travelled to 
Paris on 15 May for discussions with an Élysée team composed of Jobert, 
Bernard, and another of Pompidou’s technical advisers, Jean-Barnard 
Raimond. The head of the British mission was Robert Armstrong, Principal 
                                                            
118
 Hannay, Britain’s, p.185; TNA/CAB133/422, PMVP(71)8(ii) (Revise), 18 May 1971. 
119
 TNA/CAB134/3357, AE(71)14, 27 May 1971; TNA/PREM15/2241, RoC Heath and 
Pompidou, 20-21 May (4 sessions); AN, 5AG2/108, Séjour à Paris de M. Heath, 20-21 Mai. 
120
 The Times, 13 May, p.1. 
121
 Hurd, End, p.62. For the official briefs see: CAB133/422, PMVP(71), various memoranda. 
229 
 
Private Secretary to the prime minister, and he was flanked by Peter 
Thornton, the Cabinet Office technical expert, Palliser and Hurd. The shape, 
but not the specifics of a deal now started to become clear.122 The French 
emphasised the need for firm undertakings on sterling and the functioning of 
Community institutions. On the former, France had no desire to ‘embarrass’ 
the British, but Jobert stressed that the matter required ‘une certain 
précision’. On Community institutions, Pompidou would again need a clear 
statement from Heath about the British stance on majority voting, with 
particular reference to the French view that if any member state believed its 
‘vital interests’ to be affected, unanimity must apply. On the Yaoundé 
Convention, the president would look for mechanisms to ensure that the 
influx of new Commonwealth associates did not undermine the benefits that 
accrued to existing Yaoundé members. And on the role of French within the 
Community, Pompidou would ‘welcome’ any means that Heath might be able 
to suggest for protecting its role as a working language. For their part, the 
British stressed the ‘critical importance’ for public opinion of satisfactory 
terms for New Zealand. Acceptable figures were also needed for Britain’s 
budgetary contribution during the transitional period, and a solution to the 
fisheries question was also required. Jobert evinced a sympathetic attitude: 
on the issues of concern to public opinion, France could be flexible; they 
were working on proposals with a view to an overall settlement by the end of 
June. The French understood the importance of this timing to Britain.123 
Combined with the progress made at the May ministerial meeting, this 
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apparently constructive French approach during the preparatory talks started 
to put the prospects for a successful outcome in a very different light. 
Reviewing the likely content of the forthcoming summit talks in Cabinet on 18 
May, Heath said that he ‘believed that M. Pompidou genuinely wished the 
negotiations to succeed. He had now interested himself personally in the 
issues involved in a way which suggested that he intended to work for a 
successful outcome’.124 The accuracy of this judgement would soon be 
revealed.  
 
Conclusion 
 
It had always been anticipated that the success or failure of the accession 
negotiations would be primarily contingent upon the attitude adopted by 
France. In the first months of 1971, France heightened the uncertainty 
surrounding its intentions by adopting a rigid position on London’s three main 
negotiating concerns, and placed sterling at the forefront of the Brussels 
talks through Boegner’s statement to the Council of Ministers. In 1973, 
Kitzinger argued that the impasse in the negotiations had been engineered 
by Paris with a view to creating advantageous conditions for a subsequent 
summit meeting with Heath.125 This chapter has reached a similar 
conclusion, but provides a clearer explanation for Pompidou’s premeditated 
impasse: quite simply, to strengthen France’s bargaining position at Brussels 
level, and to demonstrate publicly the need for a summit meeting with 
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Heath.126 Throughout the spring, the talks between Soames and Jobert had 
continued, establishing the agenda which would form the backbone of the 
summit talks.127 Then, at the May ministerial meeting, the negotiations began 
to move. Community preference was settled, and important advances were 
made on sugar and Community finance. But significant problems still 
remained; the question of sterling was still unresolved, and the French 
position on New Zealand remained far from what London seemed likely to 
need to satisfy parliament.128 Insistence upon a high starting contribution 
could also present problems for London should Pompidou wish to do so. Yet 
French actions in May, both at the ministerial meeting and the preparatory 
talks in Paris, augured against too negative an assessment of French 
intentions. On the contrary, and as Heath himself suggested to Cabinet, the 
signs were that the Élysée was now adopting a more helpful line.129 It was 
thus in a mood of cautious confidence that the prime minister departed for 
Paris.
                                                            
126
 Archives Nationales (hereafter AN), 86/AJ/127, Compte-rendu du Conseil restraint sur la 
negociation entre la Communauté Economique Européenne et la Grande Bretagne, 16 
février 1971; TNA/PREM15/369, Soames to Greenhill, 10 March 1971. 
127
 TNA/FCO30/1151, Paris to FCO, tel.521, 6 May 1971; TNA/PREM15/2241, Annotated 
agenda, undated, after RoC Heath and Pompidou, 20 May 1971, 10am. 
128
 TNA/FCO30/914, RoC Rippon and Holyoake, 14 April 1971; TNA/CAB134/3357, 
AE(71)4th meeting, 3 May 1971; Hannay, Britain’s, p.159; TNA/FCO30/915, Home 
handwritten minute, undated, on Holyoake to Rippon, 28 April 1971. 
129
 TNA/CAB128/49, CM(71)26th, 18 May 1971. 
232 
 
Chapter 6 
 
A High Political Package Deal:  
the Heath-Pompidou Summit and the Climax of the 
Negotiations 
May to June 1971 
 
 
A ‘great hope for all Europeans’: this was the sentiment of French Prime 
Minister, Jacques Chaban-Delmas, as he greeted Edward Heath at Orly 
airport in Paris on the afternoon of 19 May 1971. In a short statement, 
Chaban-Delmas went on to welcome Heath as the leader of one of Europe’s 
‘oldest, strongest and most glorious’ states, invoking the unbreakable bonds 
of friendship forged between Britain and France during the past century.1 
Rich in sentiment, Chaban-Delmas’s remarks help to capture the dual 
significance which the Heath-Pompidou meeting appeared to hold: first, a 
successful meeting might all but guarantee a positive outcome to the 
accession negotiations; and second, this was an important moment in Anglo-
French relations, providing an opportunity to dispel the mutual suspicion and 
antagonism of the past decade, and perhaps to begin a new and more 
constructive chapter in their history.   
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In nearly all accounts of Britain’s entry to the European Community, the 
Heath-Pompidou summit is accorded central importance.2 Yet the 
explanations for its function have hitherto been less than clear. For Kitzinger, 
the purpose was to examine ‘political ‘gut issues’’ – issues of particular 
concern to France that were raised by the prospect of British entry to the 
Community – ‘as the vital preliminary to the bread-and-butter quantitative 
topics of the Brussels wrangling’.3 In Kitzinger’s view, it was ‘axiomatic’ that 
‘once Pompidou had agreed to meet Heath, he did not do so to become 
personally involved in a failure’. The president had already experienced a 
major foreign policy reversal as a result of the Algerian government’s 
decision to nationalise French-owned oil companies, and the enlargement of 
the Community now provided an opportunity to ‘score a personal success’.4  
While O’Neill does not discuss the summit in any detail, he argues that ‘It 
was by far the most significant meeting that took place in the whole course of 
the negotiations’, and that ‘it was successful beyond our best expectations’. 
While he summarises its primary ‘achievements’ (‘broad understandings 
about the main outstanding issues of the negotiations in Brussels’, 
agreement on the future functioning of Community institutions, and dealing 
head-on with French concerns about the role of the French language in the 
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Community, should Britain join), O’Neill is unable to place these topics within 
an explanatory framework for the success of the negotiations.5  
 
In many accounts, the summit has been seen as the moment at which Heath 
persuaded Pompidou to accept the principle of British entry to the EC.6 In 
this view, Pompidou continued to feel uncertain about whether Britain was 
fully committed to the Community, and the summit was the moment when 
Heath convinced him that such concerns were unnecessary. A final 
explanation is that the purpose of the summit was to overcome the technical 
impasse in the accession negotiations.7 Yet those who advance this 
argument imply that the impasse was genuine. As has been seen, it was in 
fact deliberately engineered by Pompidou, in part to demonstrate the need 
for a summit meeting. Rücker places sterling at the forefront of her summit 
interpretation, arguing that this constituted a ‘test of confidence’ in Anglo-
French relations in the context of enlargement, which Heath passed at the 
summit.8 But the way in which the matter was eventually settled points 
against this conclusion. 
 
While sharing elements of Kitzinger’s and O’Neill’s analyses, this chapter will 
advance a new interpretation of the Heath-Pompidou summit and its part in 
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the success of the second application. At a public level, the summit was 
designed to demonstrate an Anglo-French reconciliation after the events of 
the 1960s.9 At a substantive level, Pompidou’s purpose was not, as 
proponents of the ‘persuasion’ thesis suggest, to obtain assurances from 
Heath about the strength of British commitment to the Community, rather, it 
was to secure concessions principally on four specific French political 
concerns: the use of majority voting within the Council of Ministers, the 
running down of the sterling balances after entry, protection for the benefits 
accruing to existing Yaoundé associates, and ways of maintaining the role of 
French as a working language in an enlarged Community.10 These, along 
with Community preference (which had been settled at the May ministerial 
meeting), were the issues accorded ‘greatest importance’ in the original 
Élysée agenda, and had been emphasised by the French team during the 
preparatory talks on 15 May.11 In seeking British concessions, Pompidou 
was able to trade upon London’s need for French flexibility on its two 
principal negotiating worries: Community finance and New Zealand. The 
summit thus took the form of a bilateral package deal, with Pompidou 
moderating the French stance on British negotiating concerns in return for 
undertakings by Heath on the four French points.12  
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This chapter will begin by examining a number of presentational and political 
aspects of the summit, as well as the contextual background to the 
respective priorities of Heath and Pompidou. The middle of the chapter will 
then focus upon the summit meeting itself, showing how the talks developed 
over the two days, and how satisfactory understandings were reached on the 
major issues. The final section of the chapter will then analyse the two 
ministerial meetings in Luxembourg in June – which progressively resolved 
sugar, sterling, New Zealand and Community finance – and thus conjointly 
marked the climax of the negotiations. It will also explain how the British 
Cabinet then took the decision to approve these agreements and to 
recommend to parliament British entry to the Community on the terms 
negotiated. 
 
Pieces in a package: presentation and politics 
 
It was in Pompidou’s public presentation of the summit three days before it 
began that the roots of the persuasion thesis are to be found. In an interview 
for the BBC television programme Panorama on 17 May, Pompidou 
presented his view of the summit’s purpose: 
 
Generally speaking ... one should not believe that the problem of 
Britain’s entry into the Common Market consists of solving questions 
such as sugar from the Commonwealth. This kind of thing can always 
be solved, and the proof is that a solution has been found. The crux of 
the matter is that there is a European conception or idea, and the 
question to be ascertained is whether the United Kingdom’s conception 
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is indeed European. That will be the aim of my meeting with Mr. 
Heath.13  
 
Then, for French television on 24 June – the day after the second June 
ministerial meeting, which was seen to mark the success of the negotiations 
– Pompidou delineated four questions which he claimed to have put before 
Heath during the summit talks. The first three related to Community 
preference, the functioning of Community institutions, and the role of sterling. 
The fourth, ‘and probably the most important’, according to Pompidou, was 
whether ‘Britain had really decided to become European. Whether Britain, 
which is an island, had decided to moor itself to the continent and if she was 
therefore ready to come in from the wide seas which had always drawn her’. 
As with the three previous issues, Heath had delivered the desired answer: 
‘[his] views are similar to France’s conception of the future of Europe, and 
are consistent with what he has been saying publicly for the past twenty 
years’.14 As Heath’s answer was indeed so predictable given his affinity with 
the European issue throughout the 1960s, the informed listener might have 
wondered whether it was really as important a question as Pompidou was 
suggesting. More substantively, the fact that Pompidou included Community 
preference as one of his four questions should be cause for caution in using 
Pompidou’s public utterances as a means to interpret his actions at the 
summit. As has been seen, this item had been settled at the May ministerial 
meeting, and, as agreed at the preparatory talks, it remained on the summit 
agenda simply in order for the two men to record their mutual satisfaction at 
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its resolution.15 His reference to the subject should rather be seen as a 
means to present himself domestically as a defender of French agricultural 
interests in the context of enlargement. Crucially, the proposition that he 
explicitly asked Heath to confirm the strength of Britain’s European outlook 
is, as will be seen, not borne out by the summit record. To be sure, 
Pompidou did, on two occasions, intimate that he felt some continuing 
reservations about the depth of Britain’s commitment to the Community, and 
each time Heath responded with reassuring words.16 But when viewed in the 
context of the summit talks as a whole, this provides no basis upon which to 
sustain the view that Pompidou was in need of persuasion about Britain’s 
commitment to Europe. 
 
How, then, is his emphasis upon this point to be explained? As with 
Community preference, Pompidou was primarily appealing to a domestic 
constituency. While public opinion in France appeared broadly in favour of 
British entry, opposition could still be found on the Gaullist right.17 As recently 
as 5 May, the former Minister for Social Affairs, Jean-Marcel Jeanneney, 
published a long article in the French newspaper Le Monde entitled, ‘Three 
reasons to oppose British accession to the EEC’. Jeanneney’s specific 
objections focussed upon the threat enlargement would pose to European 
economic and political independence, and the danger that English would 
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become the dominant language of the Community. The common theme 
which united both concerns was the need to build a European entity that was 
distinct from, and free from undue influence by, the United States.18 One way 
for Pompidou to defend against criticism of this sort, and to appear 
consistent with the thinking of de Gaulle, was to imply that the decision to 
permit British entry had only been taken when the British themselves had 
demonstrated that they were truly European. Pompidou’s desire to appear in 
keeping with Gaullist tradition was a feature of his 24 June interview: he 
recalled that in 1958 the General had expressed concern that the EEC would 
lead to tension between Britain and France, and, in a pointed reference to 
the Soames affair, reminded his audience that the General ‘in the last 
months of his Presidency made an approach towards Britain which failed 
because of the British Government of the time’.19 At a diplomatic level, 
Pompidou’s presentation of the summit in this way was also less likely to 
create friction with the Five than would a frank admission of his real 
objective: to secure undertakings from Heath on issues that could be seen as 
relevant to the whole Community, not simply France. 
 
The first subject upon which Pompidou would seek a commitment from 
Heath was majority voting. During the ‘empty chair crisis’ of 1965-66, France 
had boycotted EEC institutions in a move partially motivated by its objection 
to the planned introduction of majority voting to the Council of Ministers in 
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1966.20 The crisis was eventually brought to an end in January 1966 on the 
basis of the so-called ‘Luxembourg compromise’. One aspect of this was ‘an 
agreement to disagree’ between France and the Five over the application of 
majority voting rules. The French position was that if any member state 
believed a vital national interest to be at stake, the Council must operate on 
the basis of unanimity, thus ensuring a continuing right of veto.21 At an 
Élysée press conference in January 1971, Pompidou had made clear that 
this interpretation of majority voting rules remained, for him, a cardinal 
principle.22 One purpose at the summit was therefore to secure a 
commitment from Heath that the British would accept the French view.23 
 
It was Pompidou’s second objective, an undertaking to run down the sterling 
balances, which promised to be the most challenging issue of the summit 
talks.24 As was seen in the last chapter, sterling’s functions as a reserve 
currency, and the structural weakness in Britain’s balance of payments which 
this created, presented a general concern for France about the problems 
sterling might create within an enlarged Community.25 One aspect which 
particularly worried the French was that if Britain was to experience balance 
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of payments difficulties as a member of the Community, it could request 
financial assistance from the other member-states under articles 108 and 
109 of the Treaty of Rome.26 This might lead to a situation in which the 
Community was helping to underwrite the sterling balances. At the same 
time, the Élysée was conscious that British negotiators inevitably held an 
advantage in exchanges on this subject due to the concentration of technical 
expertise within Whitehall.27 Thus, rather than engage in detailed 
examination of the problems the sterling balances posed, Pompidou would 
seek to treat it as an issue of principle: that sterling’s current position was 
incompatible with membership of the Community.28  
 
The British position had hitherto been that it was willing to accept the 
principle that the sterling balances should be run down, whilst maintaining 
that there was insufficient time during the accession negotiations to find a 
realistic and secure means of doing this.29 At a meeting with Treasury and 
Cabinet Office officials on 4 May, it was suggested to Heath that one 
possible mechanism would be to create an alternative asset into which 
sterling holders could move, such as the IMF system of Special Drawing 
Rights (SDRs).30 This was to be Heath’s first proposition to Pompidou on this 
issue during the summit talks.31 Whatever the nature of the understanding, 
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the critical objective was to ensure that the problem could be disposed of as 
a continuing concern in the Brussels negotiations. 
 
There remained two other issues to which Pompidou would attach particular 
importance in his discussions with Heath.32 The first was his concern that the 
accession of African Commonwealth countries to the Yaoundé Convention 
would dilute the benefits, above all in terms of development aid, derived by 
existing associates, many of which were former French colonies. Pompidou 
was particularly worried about the case of Nigeria, a country which was both 
larger and wealthier than many of Francophone associates, but which, if aid 
was distributed in per capita terms, might significantly reduce the funds 
available for countries with greater need.33 Pompidou had raised the specific 
problem posed by Nigeria during his talks with Brandt in January 1971, 
describing it as ‘une question très sérieuse’.34 The president’s fourth and final 
concern was the role of French within an enlarged Community. French had 
hitherto been the working language of the EC, but the accession of Britain 
and three other northern European states (Denmark, Ireland and Norway), 
for all of whom English would be the preferred language, would challenge 
this. In an enlarged Community, both Germany and the Netherlands might 
also see English as the more natural language in which to conduct business. 
In his report on the negotiations, O’Neill commented upon his own 
impression, derived during his time as head of the British delegation to the 
Community in the mid-1960s. He noted that this question ‘had been, and was 
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becoming increasingly, a major reason for our exclusion’.35 It was also the 
third of Jeanneney’s reasons for opposing British accession in his Le Monde 
article of 5 May, reflecting, perhaps, a wider Gaullist concern on this point. 
During the summit preparatory talks, the French delegation had stated only 
that Pompidou would ‘welcome’ proposals from Heath on this issue; there did 
not appear to be any expectation of specific commitments.36 The Foreign 
Office, however, had a British concession prepared: that in future all British 
officials deployed to Community institutions would be capable of working in 
French.37 It was a political gesture, and one unlikely to have a major effect, 
but it was hoped that it would go some way towards alleviating French 
concern. 
 
London had stipulated just two items for inclusion on the summit agenda. 
The first, ‘How do the President and the Prime Minister see the Role of the 
Enlarged Community in the World’, had been seen as a way for Heath to 
impress upon Pompidou the potential benefits of enlargement, and also, if 
deemed necessary, the consequences of failure.38 Following the preparatory 
talks, this heading had been expanded to read: ‘The need and scope not 
only for enlarging and deepening but also for developing a distinctively 
European personality in world affairs with distinctively European policies 
which recognise and give expression to the common interests of Europe in 
economic and monetary affairs, in political affairs, in defence, and in relation 
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to the developing countries’.39 It is this item, therefore, which is most relevant 
to the persuasion thesis, with its emphasis upon general conceptions of 
Europe. The second heading requested by London was: ‘The Decisions 
necessary to ensure the early success of the negotiations for enlargement of 
the European Communities’.40 Three subjects were encompassed by it: 
Community finance, New Zealand and fisheries.41 
 
On Community finance, the French inspired outline proposal had done much 
to prescribe the final area of agreement, and Heath’s principal concern at the 
summit would be to secure the lowest possible starting contribution.42 The 
aim was to minimise British payments in the early years of membership (at 
which time London would also be paying off international debt accrued 
during the sterling crises of the 1960s).43 During the eleven months of 
negotiation, there had been a gradual shift in Whitehall attitudes towards 
what an acceptable starting contribution would be. In December, Cabinet had 
agreed upon an opening bid of 3% (of the overall budget), and still in mid-
February Con O’Neill was arguing that, ‘I do not believe there is any reason 
why we should move, at least more than marginally, from 3% (unless, much 
later on, we wish to pay something more for [better terms on] New 
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Zealand).’44 By mid-April, however, with British and Community attitudes still 
some distance apart, Rippon suggested to Heath that the figure might be in 
the order of 6%.45 Following the Heath-Pompidou summit, and with the 
success of the negotiations in sight, the AE committee would give Rippon 
authority to accept a starting contribution as high as 9.5%. Even then, it did 
not rule out the possibility of accepting something higher.46 Heath’s 
negotiating brief did not propose an upper limit, and the task for the summit 
was essentially simple: to negotiate the lowest possible figure. London also 
wanted three corrective years, to follow the basic five year transitional period, 
but its attitude on the precise number was again flexible.47   
 
Britain’s negotiating objectives on Community finance by mid-May reflect a 
broader psychological shift in Whitehall attitudes to this subject since the 
start of negotiations. At that stage, the target had been to try and protect 
future British interests within the accession agreement itself. Officials had 
thus advocated a long transitional period, perhaps as much as thirteen years, 
culminating in a review.48 Progressively, however, British tactics had come to 
focus upon the need only for acceptable transitional arrangements. Rather 
than seek to protect long-term British interests on this issue during the 
accession negotiations, the analysis was now that this could be left to future 
governments, negotiating from a stronger position within the Community.49 
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This is reflected above all in its attitude towards a review provision, which 
had been an important component of London’s opening bid.50 The 
Community had shown no willingness to concede such a provision, and in 
the briefs for the Paris summit officials argued that the objective should now 
be dropped: ‘to continue to press a formal review provision will simply 
increase suspicions that we have no intention of paying the scale of 
contributions on which we eventually settle’. Yet, as officials went on to make 
clear, this did not mean abandoning hope of changes to the financial 
mechanism, on the contrary: ‘we shall in practice be able as a member to call 
for a review at any time’.51 
  
By the middle of May, New Zealand appeared to pose the greatest danger to 
the success of the accession negotiations.52 This was in part because the 
French outline proposal on Community finance, tabled at the May ministerial 
meeting, had marked a significant step forward on that issue, but more 
particularly because there remained a considerable gap between Britain and 
France over the terms. In order to satisfy Auckland, and therefore public 
opinion at home, London believed that it would be necessary to secure a 
guarantee for at least 70% of current New Zealand dairy imports by the end 
of a five year transitional period, as well as a review provision that would 
enable special arrangements to be continued for a further period thereafter.53 
According to British reports, the Five and the Commission were prepared to 
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guarantee between 45 and 62% of current imports in the fifth (and final) year 
of a transitional period. This was itself a source of concern, but France had 
adopted a much tougher posture, maintaining that guarantees should cease 
altogether after five years, with a correspondingly low figure in the fifth year 
(perhaps just 17% of present quantities).54 Heath’s briefs for the summit 
recommended that he try to secure a ‘record of understanding with 
Pompidou’, which would go as far as possible to meeting New Zealand’s 
requirements.55 
 
The Quai d’Orsay’s thinking on both Community finance and New Zealand 
was spelt out in a letter to Pompidou from Foreign Minister, Maurice 
Schumann on 17 May. Looking ahead to the June ministerial meetings, 
Schumann explained that, on Britain’s starting contribution, he intended to 
begin by proposing a figure of 11.5%, and then to move, during the course of 
the negotiation, to 9.5%. On the guarantee to be offered to New Zealand, 
Schumann’s ideas continued to leave Britain and France a considerable 
distance apart. He objected to the willingness of the Five to permit a 
guarantee of around 50%, as this would make it impossible to apply normal 
Community rules thereafter (in other words, the Community would be bound 
offer New Zealand a further period of special treatment). He did, however, 
envisage an extension of the transitional period from five to seven years, but 
the guarantee in the final year should be in the region of 20%.56  
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The summit would see very little discussion between Heath and Pompidou 
on fisheries. Heath’s objective was straightforward enough: to win 
Pompidou’s backing for the principle that the CFP could be adapted so that 
British interests could be accommodated.57 To facilitate an understanding, a 
statement to this effect was included on the annotated agenda.58 Heath’s 
task was to get Pompidou to agree to it.59 
 
Four other items were to be discussed, but none of which played an 
important role in the meeting, and which will therefore not feature 
substantively in the analysis of the summit meeting which follows. The first 
was Community preference, which, as has already been seen, remained on 
the agenda in order that Heath and Pompidou could record their satisfaction 
at the settlement recorded in Brussels.60 The three others concerned the 
creation of Community-wide companies, the co-ordination of investment 
practices among member states, and the arrangements to be offered to 
EFTA countries which were not applicants for membership of the 
Community, such as Sweden and Switzerland.61 
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The summit meetings – 20 May 
 
Heath arrived at the Élysée on the morning of 20 May. He was met there by 
Jobert, who accompanied him to the president’s office.62 For all but a brief 
period during the discussion on sterling, when Chaban-Delmas attended, the 
summit talks were conducted tête-à-tête, with only interpreters present.63 
After welcoming Heath, Pompidou explained that, ‘It was no exaggeration to 
describe their meeting as of great importance for their two countries and for 
Europe. He himself greatly hoped that they would reach a satisfactory 
conclusion and that, as a result, they could subsequently work closely 
together’.64 Warming to his theme, Pompidou continued: 
 
If the two of them could reach a genuine and sincere understanding all 
hopes would be permissible. Speaking frankly, and without wishing to 
appear to place the onus on the Prime Minister, the President felt he 
could say honestly that what was involved was a historic change in the 
attitude of Britain from the outset. If Britain was really decided to make 
this change France, in his person, would greatly welcome it.65 
 
This was the first of the two occasions that Pompidou indicated a degree of 
reservation about the strength of Britain’s commitment to the Community. In 
itself, however, this is an insufficient basis upon which to argue that the 
summit’s outcome depended upon Heath’s ability to persuade Pompidou of 
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London’s European convictions. Indeed, in the light of what was to follow, the 
statement appears better understood as a negotiating tactic: to make sure 
that Heath did not believe the success of the summit to be guaranteed, and 
therefore to make him more willing to provide undertakings on the specific 
issues of concern to Pompidou – above all, sterling.66 Given Pompidou’s 
comments on Panorama, however, Heath was ready to respond to any hint 
of reservation with a firm reassertion of Britain’s European credentials.67  
 
After thanking the president for the warm reception, and appealing to his 
sense of personal leadership by linking their meeting with Pompidou’s earlier 
‘initiative’ in proposing The Hague summit, Heath explained that ‘throughout 
his own student days and during the 30’s the British had always regarded 
themselves as European. Of course, they had Imperial connections as 
indeed had France’, but ‘Historically, Britain had always been part of Europe. 
It was only during the past 25 years that it had come to seem as if our natural 
connection might be with the United States’. This emphasis upon Britain’s 
European outlook was to be used repeatedly by Heath: he would return to 
the point when outlining his vision of the role an enlarged Community could 
play in the world, as well as during the exchanges on majority voting, 
Community preference and Community finance.68 
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With these opening remarks completed, Heath and Pompidou turned to the 
summit agenda. The first item, as the British had requested, was ‘The need 
and scope not only for enlarging and deepening but also for developing a 
distinctively European personality in world affairs’.69 With its focus upon 
general conceptions of Europe, it is this heading which is most relevant to 
the persuasion thesis. In directing Heath towards the subject, however, 
Pompidou gave no indication that it would be a vital area of discussion. 
According to the British record, Pompidou ‘invited the Prime Minister to open 
on “the first and widest ranging” point, since this had been included at British 
suggestion’.70 The French record is slightly at variance, but again with no 
stress from Pompidou such as to suggest the forthcoming passage of 
discussion would be pivotal: ‘You then have to talk about your conception of 
Europe. I will afterwards make some remarks on this subject’.71  
 
At this prompt, Heath embarked upon a sustained tour d’horizon of his vision 
for an enlarged Community and the role it could play in international affairs. 
‘The countries of Europe’, he began:  
 
represented the most important civilization in the world and the one with 
the most world influence. Until thirty years previously, only Europe had 
counted. Now they were living in a world of two great Super Powers ... 
Within this world, individual European countries could not hope to exert 
influence. But through an enlarged Community which would enable the 
countries of Europe to work constructively together, this influence could 
be achieved.72  
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In briefing Heath for this item, the Foreign Office had recalled Pompidou’s 
invocation of Anglo-American ties during their meetings in May and 
November 1970, and suggested a number of ways for dealing with the point 
should he raise it again.73 Heath, however, did not wait for his interlocutor, 
and tackled the subject at an early stage: 
 
It was sometimes said that Britain only sought partnership with the 
United States. His frank reply was that there could be no satisfactory 
partnership, even if Britain wanted it, between two powers one of 
which was barely a quarter the size of the other. In Europe, on the 
other hand, such a partnership was possible with countries of the 
same size and within a European Community applying the same rules 
and working to the same principles.74 
 
Heath then gently alluded to the changing balance of power on the continent, 
emphasising the importance of his ideas ‘from the view point of the German 
commitment to Europe’. On the possibility of a bilateral nuclear arrangement, 
the Whitehall studies initiated by Heath in November 1970 had not yet 
progressed far enough for him to make specific proposals, but he hinted at it 
as a future possibility: ‘The President and he both recognised the importance 
of the American “nuclear umbrella”. But they also realised the weight of 
constant pressures that were brought to bear, in the field of European policy, 
upon successive United States Presidents’.75 The British government was 
‘think[ing] in terms of the development of Europe for the long-term future’. 
Reaching the peroration of his statement, Heath pointed to the contribution 
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that Britain could make to the Community through its ‘social stability’, 
‘parliamentary and diplomatic experience’, and the ‘general British outlook 
towards the world’, before concluding with some reflections on the potential 
for future Anglo-French cooperation in helping ‘the developing countries’ of 
Africa and Asia.76 
 
Pompidou then responded. His remarks at this stage render implausible the 
view that the summit hinged upon Heath’s ability to convince him of Britain’s 
‘European’ attitudes. The president explained that ‘his own thoughts on 
Europe reflected the same concern as those of the Prime Minister’; ‘there 
was a sense of nostalgia for the role that our countries had played in the past 
and a conviction that they could not find a worthy place for themselves in 
Europe except through unity’. He had not missed Heath’s hint regarding 
cooperation in the nuclear field, but he had little interest in pursuing the 
matter. While Britain had developed its deterrent with US support, ‘and had 
no doubt derived substantial advantages from this’, France had done so on 
its own, with the consequence that it ‘naturally felt free to take a more 
independent attitude’. ‘Thus, speculation about some kind of Anglo-French 
nuclear entente was not for the present’. On transatlantic relations more 
generally, Pompidou observed that in “making Europe”, the Community was 
‘bound to create difficulties with the United States’, to which enlargement 
would add, but he did not ask for any assurances from Heath about the 
stance Britain would take in this regard. The question that had so vexed de 
Gaulle turned out not to be a decisive concern for his successor. Pompidou 
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even spoke warmly about the positive contribution Britain could make to the 
EC: ‘If the political and intellectual prestige and authority of Britain were 
added to those of Europe, this would greatly enrich the Community’.77 It is, 
however, the final passage in Pompidou’s single contribution under this 
heading which goes furthest to dispel the persuasion thesis. The reason is 
that at this point he did cast a modicum of doubt upon the depth of Britain’s 
commitment to the Community by invoking its historic relationship with the 
continent, but the way in which he concluded the point makes clear that he 
was not calling into question the principle of British entry:  
  
The President apologised for speaking at some length, but he wished to 
speak also with absolute frankness. Although Britain, as the prime 
minister had said, had always been in Europe there was a feeling on 
the continent that her purpose had always been to divide Europe. This 
was understandable. Britain had tried to prevent any one power from 
uniting the continent to Britain’s own disadvantage. They had done this 
against France at the time of Napoleon and with her against Charles V 
and Hitler. Now the task was not to divide but to unite. He approached 
this task with confident hope.78  
 
While Heath intervened once more to ‘assure the President that he need 
have no anxiety about the part that Britain would play within the Community’, 
it was evidently not necessary for him to do so. Pompidou’s comment had 
signalled that he was not making the question of Britain’s commitment to 
Europe a pivotal issue in the summit. It was approximately half way through 
the first of four sessions of talks, and the discussion under this first agenda 
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item had come to an end. One of the earliest proponents of the persuasion 
thesis, Hurd, posits that, ‘The agenda items provided the material of the 
discussion, but its essence was different. Mr Heath showed President 
Pompidou that the time had come to reverse the veto pronounced by 
President de Gaulle’.79 Yet it is precisely the reverse which is true. As 
Pompidou’s remarks under the first item demonstrate, de Gaulle’s veto, in 
terms of a principled objection to British membership, no longer applied. And 
as will now be seen, the essence of the summit lay in the detailed 
discussions on the many specific French and British interests which 
remained to be examined. 
 
The next four items to be tackled were the French priorities: majority voting, 
sterling, Yaoundé, and the role of French within the Community. Pompidou’s 
language now became distinctly more assertive, as he looked to obtain 
British concessions. Turning first to majority voting, which came under the 
broader heading of Community institutions, Pompidou remarked that the 
Five, ‘sometimes regarded ... [the French] as “obsessed” with the subject’. 
‘This was because they believed profoundly in the light of their past history 
that there could be no normal progress in Europe without regard for national 
feelings and vital national interests’. Turning specifically to the question of 
majority voting and the Luxembourg compromise, Pompidou explained that, 
‘France had made clear the very firm interpretation she placed on the text 
agreed in Luxembourg and he had incorporated it in the Annotated Agenda 
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in the hope of obtaining the Prime Minister’s complete agreement to it’.80 The 
French view, Pompidou believed, would ‘conform to the British “genius”’, as 
well as ‘to the Prime Minister’s own thinking’.81 As leader of the opposition, 
Heath had openly acknowledged the importance of the principle that a 
Community decision should not be applied against a country believing its 
vital interests to be at stake.82 An obvious point of difficulty, however, was 
that this appeared to contradict his broader emphasis upon Britain’s 
Communautaire outlook. To deal with the tension, Heath hit upon an 
innovative solution: he recalled a conversation with Jean Monnet – the 
architect of the original European Coal and Steel Community – in September 
1960, in which Monnet had said that if a majority vote were ever applied 
against the vital interests of another member state, the Community itself 
would collapse. Thus placing himself in harmony with one of the 
Community’s founding fathers (not to mention a French one), Heath could 
assent to the French view whilst appearing true to the EC’s original 
principles. Britain, he said, had accepted the Treaty of Rome, its regulations, 
institutions and voting system, ‘but they had always recognised that the 
protection of vital national interests was part of the facts of life’. Heath ‘felt 
confident that he and the President could agree on this’.83 The record of this 
exchange – to avoid subsequent misunderstandings – would thus make 
explicit Heath’s assent to the French interpretation of majority voting rules.84 
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The next subject, sterling, would prove altogether more contentious. As has 
been seen, the Élysée was conscious that Heath would hold the advantage 
in technical discussions due to London’s better appreciation of how the 
sterling balances worked. Pompidou would thus present the issue as a 
matter of principle. In line with this, he also sought to argue that it was a 
matter concern to the whole Community, not just France.85 Pompidou thus 
delineated two points which made sterling’s reserve functions unacceptable. 
The first was that the currencies of all member states should enjoy equal 
status: ‘no currency should have advantages, whether technical or juridical, 
over the others’. The second, linked issue was that the exceptional position 
of sterling was made possible only by ‘artificial machinery’, namely the Basle 
facility. This was an international agreement in 1968 which gave the principal 
holders of sterling balances a 90% dollar guarantee, by ensuring that an 
emergency source of funds was available from other Western 
governments.86 Maintaining that ‘These concerns were not simply 
nationalistic French ones’, Pompidou said that the Community as a whole 
‘firmly desired that Britain should give undertakings, first, to stabilize the 
official sterling balances ... and then progressively and gradually to run down 
these balances’.87 The faster this could be achieved, ‘the better’, but without 
creating ‘excessive difficulties for Britain’; this was ‘no part of their purpose’. 
 
Adopting the standard line that Britain was ready to examine the problem in a 
Community context, but that it was not possible to find a solution within the 
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timeframe of the accession negotiations, Heath raised the potential use of 
SDRs, which had been suggested by officials. Pompidou, however, was 
unconvinced: ‘even if they thought in terms of such a global solution, there 
was no need to exaggerate the extent of the problem’. With the official 
sterling balances totalling approximately 2.2 billion, Pompidou felt that Britain 
could certainly take action to stabilise them, and then, through its own 
devices, to begin the process of running them down. He suggested that a 
reduction of 5%, or 100 million, in 1973 would not present excessive 
difficulties. Heath conceded that it should be possible to take measures 
aimed at stabilising the balances in advance of entry, but argued that it was 
not possible to approach the question of reductions in the way that Pompidou 
proposed. London already had significant financial obligations for the 
repayment of international debts, and this would be added to, should Britain 
join the Community, by contributions to the Community budget. Reductions 
could thus only be envisaged if it was clear that the balance of payments as 
a whole could support the additional burden.88  
 
With the end of the first session of talks approaching, Pompidou began to 
draw this opening exchange of views to a close. He asked Heath to confirm 
that he understood his stance correctly: that while he could accept the 
principle of stabilising the balances, he ‘needed to take a global view of his 
balance of payments problem’. When Heath assented, Pompidou offered a 
reciprocal gesture of goodwill: if he and Heath ‘could satisfy each other on 
the sterling problem’, France, which had previously not participated, would 
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be prepared to join the Basle facility. The meeting then adjourned for lunch, 
with the discussions on sterling suspended until the following day.89 
Compromise would be needed, if an understanding was to be found.  
 
At the beginning of the afternoon session, the role of French within an 
enlarged Community and the arrangements for Yaoundé associates were 
discussed successively. On both issues, Heath’s concessions in this 
passage of discussion would in the end prove satisfactory to Pompidou, but 
the president chose not to make this clear until the second day.90 Taking the 
future role of French first, Pompidou underlined ‘the importance that he 
attached to this matter for intellectual, national and even European reasons’, 
but went on to concede that ‘it was not a fundamental problem’, and that 
‘they could not solve it’.91 However, if Heath ‘had something to say’, 
Pompidou ‘would be happy to listen’. Heath thus took up the FCO proposal, 
and pledged that the British government ‘would always send to Brussels 
officials qualified to conduct business in French’.92 On Yaoundé, Pompidou 
outlined the difficulties as he saw them, pointing in particular to the dilution of 
Community development funds if Nigeria were to be treated, like other 
members, on a per capita basis. Heath at first gave only a general assurance 
about the importance of ‘protect[ing] the existing associates’, but Pompidou 
returned to the specific case of Nigeria, stressing the ‘problem of imbalance it 
would create’. At this point, Heath acknowledged that Nigeria might soon 
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‘derive [a] substantially higher income from oil revenues’, and suggested that 
it could be treated separately for aid purposes: rather than relying upon 
monetary transfers, Britain could continue with its existing practice of 
providing technical support and training.93 
 
With all four French priorities now having been examined at least once, 
Heath and Pompidou turned to the principal British concerns: Community 
finance and New Zealand. On Community finance, they initially reviewed the 
basic principles of the proposal tabled at the May ministerial meeting, and 
quickly reached an understanding on two of the remaining variables: 
Pompidou acknowledged that there should be ‘one or two’ corrective years, 
and Heath assented to Pompidou’s preference that British contributions 
should increase in equal steps during the five year transitional period (rather 
than in a curve). From this point onwards, the talks on this issue would focus 
solely upon the question of Britain’s starting contribution. For the first day, 
the discussion of this aspect would be based upon the technical formula of 
percentage abatements from a nominal ‘key’ contribution. Using this method, 
Heath’s opening proposal amounted to a British contribution in the first year 
of between 6 and 6.5%. Pompidou, however, said that he ‘could not conceal 
that the Prime Minister and he were not wholly on the same wavelength’. 
Given British receipts from the budget, and the current healthy position of the 
British balance of payments, such a figure ‘seemed singularly 
disproportionate’. ‘With a broad grin’, Pompidou explained that he was 
thinking in terms of an abatement equivalent to an 11-11.5% contribution (the 
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same figure that Schumann had envisaged as an initial negotiating position 
at the June ministerial meetings).94 This was to be as far as the discussion 
could progress on the first day; a query from Heath about the figures 
Pompidou had quoted for British budgetary receipts led to the question being 
remitted to officials for clarification.95 And thus, as with sterling, the crucial 
exchanges would await the second day. 
 
New Zealand was the final subject addressed on the first day of talks. As 
with Community finance, Pompidou began by making some general remarks 
about the subject. He then asked Heath ‘two practical questions’ relating to 
the principles on which an agreement should be reached. The first was 
whether butter and cheese, the two dairy products concerned, could be 
separated for the purposes of negotiation; and second, whether the British 
government intended to make New Zealand a ‘permanent’ exception – in 
Pompidou’s view, this would be the logical consequence of a review clause – 
or whether it would be prepared to accept a transitional period of more than 
five years, but at the end of which guarantees would fall to zero.96 In 
response to the first question, Heath said that he thought it should be 
possible to make such a separation (indeed Whitehall had long since thought 
in such terms); on the second, he explained that, in relation to butter at least, 
the British would need a review provision. Heath concluded by insisting that, 
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in comparison to the size of an enlarged Community, the scale of the 
problem was small and ‘it should be possible to solve it’.97 
 
With the second session reaching its close, Pompidou now moved to 
summarise the state of their talks at the end of the first day and to suggest 
how they might proceed on the second. In so doing, he made a striking 
proposition in relation to New Zealand. Three lesser items (the arrangements 
to be offered to EFTA non-applicants, the promotion of Europe-wide 
companies, and co-ordination of investment practices within the Community) 
remained to be examined, as well as fisheries, ‘but’, Pompidou explained, 
‘they had considered all the controversial issues’: 
 
... the following morning they should review these again and consider 
what could be said in a Communiqué. They would wish to re-examine 
the Finance Regulation in the light of what their advisers reported and 
also the New Zealand question. But he could tell the Prime Minister 
frankly that if, as he believed, they could arrive on all these matters at 
something that satisfied them both, he did not intend to allow Europe to 
fail over the issue of New Zealand.98 
 
What this appeared to mean was a quid pro quo: Pompidou would be willing 
to meet British requirements over New Zealand in return for concessions by 
Heath on the major French concerns. As Heath looked ahead to the second 
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day, therefore, one issue above all would have stood out as the obstacle to a 
satisfactory agreement on New Zealand: the continuing stand-off over 
sterling. 
 
The summit meetings – 21 May 
 
The talks on 21 May began with fisheries.99 Pompidou had made brief 
reference to this subject on the previous afternoon, explaining that Britain 
‘would not have difficulties’ with France in this area. Their ‘fishing industry 
was ‘extremely backward’, and ‘It was the Dutch who were well organised on 
a highly industrialised basis’.100 The annotated agenda stated that: ‘The 
French Government is ready to consider an adaptation of the Fishery 
Regulation to [meet] the needs of an enlarged Community’.101 In brief 
discussion at the start of 21 May, Heath requested that this also be included 
in the agreed record of conclusions. Pompidou assented, and they moved on 
to examine the three secondary items which had not been considered on the 
previous day. This amounted to no more than an exchange of views. Heath 
and Pompidou then examined what could be said, on the basis of their talks 
so far, in the agreed record of conclusions. It was at this point that Pompidou 
made clear that he was satisfied with the undertakings Heath had already 
made on Yaoundé associates and the role of French, observing that ‘this left 
three main questions’.102 The remainder of the summit would thus be 
consumed with the three subjects for which agreement was still outstanding, 
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and the three issues which above all define the summit package deal: 
sterling, Community finance, and New Zealand. 
 
Pompidou began this final phase of talks by recapitulating his stance on each 
of item. For sterling, he redoubled his emphasis upon the points of principle: 
‘The fact that Britain genuinely and unreservedly accepted that the reserve 
status of sterling was incompatible with the ... concept of the equality of 
Community currencies both in the perspective of monetary union, but also at 
the present time [of global monetary instability], was of capital importance to 
the French government’. After their discussion on the previous day, he 
understood that Heath was prepared to see the sterling balances stabilised, 
and even reduced. This was good as far as it went, but Pompidou wanted a 
clear statement of intention from Heath. While Pompidou had himself 
mentioned a reduction of £100 million in 1973, he was now prepared to 
relinquish this position: he ‘was not wedded to the concept of figures ... what 
mattered was the question of principle’. 
 
The Prime Minister should understand that he had no intention 
whatever of disturbing the British balance of payments, nor did he claim 
any right to direct the British Government’s financial policy. But he was 
profoundly convinced that the pound as a reserve currency was a relic 
of the British Empire of an earlier era and was incompatible with the 
British decision to become a member of the European Community. 
Words must be found to express their purposes, but he wished to be 
clear in his mind on British intentions and on their ‘fundamental 
choice’.103 
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He again pointed to the problem of the ‘dollar guarantee’ extended to Britain 
through the Basle arrangements. This, for him, was what distinguished it 
from other Community currencies and produced its ‘abnormal character’.104 
 
On Community finance, the investigation by officials had found against the 
French estimate for British receipts in 1973. At first, however, this seemed 
only to make Pompidou more defensive. He produced new figures which 
suggested that unless Britain’s opening contribution was ‘at least 7½ per 
cent’, existing member states would have to make larger contributions in 
Britain’s first year of membership than if the Community remained at Six. ‘He 
was saying this as an indication of the problem and not as implying that it 
represented a solution’. While they could, ‘if the Prime Minister wished, 
continue to discuss this question ... it might be difficult to take the discussion 
too far since he had no mandate to negotiate’ on behalf the Community. 
Turning to New Zealand, Pompidou reminded Heath of his pledge on the 
previous day, ‘that at the end of their talks, if the outcome in other respects 
had been favourable, the French would try to be helpful ... taking account of 
the moral, sentimental and political aspects of the problem as much as the 
economic ones’.105  
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Heath then responded to Pompidou’s points in the same order. Given the 
manifest importance which the president attached to a commitment to run 
down the sterling balances, Heath could do little other than offer the sort of 
categorical assurance that the president was looking for. Before doing so, 
however, he was determined to secure a reciprocal promise regarding the 
equality of currencies principle. Heath thus asked for confirmation that if the 
deutschmark – which some considered to be ‘becoming a reserve currency’ 
– or the franc were ever in a comparable position to sterling, the same rules 
which Pompidou was applying to Britain would also be applied to them. In 
this context, Heath stressed the temporal nature of the dollar guarantee 
through the Basle facility: ‘he and most of his colleagues wished that this had 
never happened and had no desire to retain it’. If the British economy was 
strengthened as a result of joining the Community, Heath hoped that the 
Basle mechanism could be left to expire.106 The implication of these remarks 
was that if Britain could maintain the value of the pound by its own means, 
and other countries still chose to use sterling as a reserve asset, its position 
would be little different to that of the deutschmark. Recognising the validity of 
Heath’s hypothetical proposition, Pompidou intervened to defend his earlier 
arguments. In doing so, he made a significant but unwitting concession. 
There was, Pompidou insisted, a clear difference between sterling and the 
deutschmark:  
 
There was no mechanical arrangement that encouraged people to hold 
marks. Clearly, there could be no objection to a currency being strong 
because the economy of its country was strong. The problem with 
sterling was that the special machinery that had been set up gave it a 
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special character. The position would be quite different if money were 
attracted to Britain because of a new-found strength in the British 
economy ... France had no desire to diminish the value of a currency 
but sought simply to have the same machinery for all the members of 
the Community. They accepted that it would take time if existing sterling 
area machinery were to be dismantled. But, if the British economy 
developed rapidly after entry into the Community, it was probably that 
anything said now would prove unrealistic, since there would no longer 
be a requirement for special machinery. 
 
On this basis, Pompidou’s earlier stress upon the need for equality of status 
between European currencies appeared unsustainable; the problem was 
simply the dollar defence of sterling – an advantage which was not available 
to other member states. Capitalising upon the inadvertent shift, Heath made 
sure to press the point to its logical conclusion. The following passage 
describes what occurred: 
 
The Prime Minister thanked M. Pompidou for a particularly interesting 
and important contribution. He would seek to resume the President’s 
thought as follows. If sterling were standing on its own feet and viable 
solely because of the strength of the British economy, and if in 
consequence there were no Basle Agreements and thus no dollar 
connection, was he correct in assuming that at that point the President 
would not consider that there was any sterling problem? President 
Pompidou said that he wished to reflect: this was a very important 
question. After a pause of about twenty seconds, he replied “I see 
none”.107  
 
While a victory for Heath on the equality of currencies principle, the fact 
remained that for the foreseeable future, London would remain very much 
dependent upon the Basle facility. As such, Heath agreed to Pompidou’s 
request for an undertaking to run down the sterling balances after entry. Yet 
by making a commitment in principle only, without reference to either timing 
or quantities, the obligation (set out in the agreed record of conclusions) was 
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far from an onerous one for Britain.108 How is Pompidou’s readiness to 
accept an agreement of this nature to be explained? It clearly points against 
Rücker’s conclusion that sterling represented a ‘test of confidence’ in Anglo-
French relations, which Heath passed at the summit.109 Rather, Pompidou 
wanted the summit to succeed, and recognising the force of Heath’s 
arguments against a commitment in terms of figures, was content to accept 
an understanding in general terms.110 
 
There was little time to discuss Community finance and New Zealand before 
lunch, and the important, final exchanges on these subjects had to wait until 
the afternoon session. This began at 4pm and was to last for nearly two and 
a half hours. The result was a delay in the scheduled 6pm press conference, 
and with a large assembly of journalists awaiting news of the outcome, the 
sense of drama grew with each extra minute that passed.111 The principal 
characteristic of the last session of talks was a sustained application of 
pressure by Heath over Community finance. To recap the position reached at 
the end of the first day, Heath had proposed a formula for the first year of 
membership which corresponded to a British contribution of between 6% and 
6.5% of the total budget. Pompidou then responded with a proposal equating 
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to a contribution of between 11 and 11.5%.112 For the final session, the 
convoluted and technical method of calculating in terms of abatements from 
a British ‘key’ was abandoned. Instead, there would be a simple negotiation 
over percentages. Heath impressed upon Pompidou that Britain had already 
gone far to meet French requirements through its acceptance of the financial 
regulation and the mechanism by which it should adapt to it during the 
transitional period. He was now looking for some leniency on the starting 
figure; this was necessary to ensure that the British balance of payments 
was not threatened in the early years of membership, as well as ‘to create a 
feeling of general confidence in Parliament and British public opinion’. He 
could accept that the figure might be larger than the one he had suggested 
on the previous day, ‘but it could not be much larger’. Heath ‘hoped it would 
be possible to come to a satisfactory understanding’. Pompidou replied that 
‘he too greatly desired that’, but he demurred once more over how far they 
should go in specifying the final area of settlement. ‘He wondered ... whether 
they could or should try to agree on a figure for the British contribution. This 
would make the Brussels talks seem meaningless’.113 At this point, however, 
Pompidou made the concession previewed in Schumann’s letter to him of 17 
May: he ‘was prepared to reveal that the French would be ready to go down 
to slightly below 10 per cent for the initial British contribution. He wished to 
underline the extent of the change this represented in the French position’. 
Until this moment, ‘they had always stuck firmly to the principle of an initial 
British contribution in double figures’.114  
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Whilst it appeared very difficult to induce further concessions from Pompidou 
in the present context (he evidently wanted to leave the matter for the 
negotiations), Heath made a final plea on the importance of a low starting 
contribution: 
 
He wished to say to M. Pompidou that, during the past two days, they 
had had very frank and sincere exchanges about the future they both 
wished to see for Europe. They both agreed in feeling that some great 
achievements lay ahead of them. The President could claim a large 
measure of responsibility for this through the initiative he had taken at 
The Hague Conference. And it now seemed that the process would be 
completed under French leadership. It was important to ensure that the 
discussions at Brussels should not become embittered and that their 
negotiators should not become involved in excessive argument. ... If we 
were now to be expected, as the President had suggested, to make an 
initial payment of around 10 per cent we should in fact be contributing 
in the first year nearly half of our total contribution over the whole 
transitional period ... This was a very a very big step for Britain to be 
expected to take.  
 
Pompidou replied that ‘in this matter, his purpose was not to erect barriers to 
British entry and particularly not financial barriers’: 
 
He agreed that they would not want the discussions [in Brussels] ... to 
take place in an unsatisfactory atmosphere. But he did not feel 
qualified, or indeed inclined, to reach agreement now on a common 
figure. They were in a Community: from the outset, though dealing with 
partners who were so anxious to see Britain in the Community that they 
were prepared to regard discussion as unnecessary, they [France] had 
consistently sought to maintain the unity of the Six. He felt that M. 
Schumann could not possibly go to Brussels and say, in effect, that 
there was no need to do anything more since everything had been 
done in Paris. 
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But Pompidou did not leave the matter quite there. Conscious, perhaps, of 
the desirability of concluding the summit in a positive bilateral atmosphere, 
he offered Heath a political assurance of French moderation when the 
negotiations resumed in June. He said that, ‘the French Government would 
seek, with their partners, to rally to the British viewpoint to the extent 
necessary to ensure that the cost to Britain of the first year of membership 
should not be such as to endanger the British balance of payments’.115 And 
upon this understanding, Pompidou ‘greatly hoped’ that the matter could be 
left. Heath assented: ‘It was a mark of the confidence that had been 
established between them that he fully accepted what M. Pompidou had said 
about his intentions and what he and the French government would do to 
achieve a settlement in the negotiations’.116 
 
And thus, the talks were left to conclude on New Zealand. Having reached 
satisfactory understandings on all other subjects, Pompidou now pledged to 
make good his promise from the previous afternoon: that ‘he would not allow 
Europe to fail’ on this issue.117 He ‘said that he knew there would be a flood 
of protest on this subject from the French producers of butter and cheese’. In 
line with Heath’s requirements, Pompidou accepted that there should be a 
five year transitional period culminating in a review, but he did not seek to 
specify a percentage figure for the level of the guarantee. Even more than 
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with Community finance, the summit talks were to leave this issue on the 
basis of a personal assurance from the French president, rather than a 
specific agreement. Pompidou suggested that, ‘The matter could be left to 
the negotiators, on the understanding that while it might be difficult for 
political reasons for the Government of France to accept something, he (the 
President) could accept it if it resulted from a Community decision’.118 Heath 
attempted to inject a little more specificity into the accord, referring to a ‘low 
final figure’ for cheese, but only a ‘slight degression’ for butter, but this left 
plenty of room for subsequent interpretation. To focus too much upon the 
precise nature of the understanding would, however, be to obscure the 
crucial point; the reason that Heath was prepared to leave Paris without a 
firm commitment from Pompidou on figures, was because of the confidence 
established between the two men during the summit talks as a whole. By the 
end of the second day, Heath trusted in the sincerity of Pompidou’s pledges 
regarding French moderation on the two main issues, and it was thus that he 
returned to London in little doubt that final agreements on these subjects was 
attainable in June.119 Hitherto, the doubts about the success of the 
negotiations had always hinged upon the attitude of France. The Heath-
Pompidou summit made clear that there was now no longer reason to 
suspect malicious French intent, and that Paris would now work 
constructively to facilitate British membership. 
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At approximately 7pm, Heath and Pompidou emerged into the Salle des 
Fêtes, and sat either side of small drinks table in front of 300 journalists 
eagerly anticipating the summit verdict.120 Pompidou spoke first: he 
explained that he and the prime minister ‘had been working very hard’; they 
had talked for more than ten hours, and had given very through 
consideration to all the subjects in front of them. Throughout the enlargement 
negotiations, France had held to the position that it was ‘for the Community 
that we are negotiating’. For this reason, he and Heath had not solved every 
problem – they were not qualified to do so. But they had discussed 
everything and ‘compared views’, they had examined the respective interests 
of both countries, and on this basis he felt that ‘it would be unreasonable now 
to believe that an agreement is not possible during the conference in 
Brussels in June’.121 Then, in the passage which has come to define this 
press conference, Pompidou explained that: 
 
There were many people who believed that Great Britain was not 
European and did not wish to become European, and that Britain 
wanted to enter into the Community only to destroy it. Many people also 
thought France was prepared to use all kinds of means and pretexts to 
propose a new veto to the entry of Great Britain into the Community. 
Well, ladies and gentlemen, you see tonight before you two men who 
are convinced to the contrary. 
 
Heath followed and, in typically stilted fashion, affirmed it to be their mutual 
conviction that the path was now clear to agreement in June.122  
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In the days that followed, the new spirit of Anglo-French bonhomie was 
almost as significant a point of comment as the shared belief in the prospect 
of success in the negotiations. On 22 May, the lead editorial in The Times 
asserted that: ‘President Pompidou and Mr. Heath have recast relations 
between Britain and France and thereby profoundly affected the future of 
Europe’.123 And on 24 May, Le Monde, after suggesting that Pompidou’s 
decision should not necessarily be seen as a ‘reversal’ of Gaullist ‘doctrine’ – 
pointing in particular to the former president’s approach to Soames in 
February 1969 – argued that: ‘There is always a time when events come to a 
head and guards are lowered. Sooner or later, the continent’s two oldest 
nations were bound to settle their differences and put an end to friction that 
has brought nothing but vexation to them and the rest of Europe’.124 In his 
report on the summit to Home, Soames too was exuberant about a new 
period of warmth between London and Paris – the aim which had 
underpinned his appointment as ambassador in 1968:  
 
It is a truism to say that, since the withdrawal from power of general de 
Gaulle and perhaps even before, there has been an improvement in 
Anglo-French relations from the nadir of December 1967. This, 
grudging at first and almost fatally undermined by the “Soames affair”, 
has since acquired an encouraging momentum as the months have 
passed. ... Now that this process of rapprochement has received the 
seal of approval at the highest level we can again talk about the entente 
cordiale without embarrassment.125 
 
For all the poignancy of the moment, there remained much work to do before 
any celebrations could begin. In his statements to Cabinet and the House of 
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Commons on 24 May, Heath said that the political will was now in place 
which should carry the negotiations to a successful conclusion.126 But the 
specifics of agreement still had to be settled, and it is to how the June 
ministerial meetings formally resolved the major negotiating problems that 
the final part of this chapter will turn. 
  
The climax of the negotiations: the June ministerial meetings 
 
The two ministerial meetings which took place in June were held in 
Luxembourg. The first, a one day meeting, formally recorded agreement on 
the Community’s sugar proposal, which had been tabled at the May 
ministerial meeting, but was only welcomed by Rippon pending consultations 
with the sugar producing countries. It also, in highly unusual circumstances, 
disposed of sterling as a problem of relevance to the enlargement 
conference. The climax of the negotiations then came at a two-day 
ministerial meeting, commencing on 21 June, at which the terms for 
Community finance and New Zealand were formally settled, and, as a result, 
the main diplomatic obstacles to British accession were seen to be 
overcome.127 As will be seen, it was to be recognised as an historic day for 
Western Europe. 
 
The decisive moment in British efforts to induce acceptance of the 
Community’s proposal came at a tense conference at Lancaster House in 
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London on 2-3 June. Rippon did secure approval of the Community’s offer, 
but only by agreeing to a joint communiqué stating that Britain and the 
Commonwealth governments ‘regard the offer as a firm assurance of a 
secure and continuing market in the enlarged Community ... for the quantities 
covered by the [present] Commonwealth Sugar Agreement’.128 At the 
ministerial meeting on 7 June, Rippon formally accepted the proposal, and at 
the same time circulated the communiqué agreed with the Commonwealth 
governments. Such a procedure held no legal basis, and Schumann made 
clear that it only committed Britain, but it solved a political problem for 
London and enabled the sugar issue to be laid to rest.129   
 
If this appeared a convoluted means of dealing with a delicate political issue, 
the procedure adopted for resolving sterling was more simple, and 
underlined the extent to which this had always been an Anglo-French, rather 
than an Anglo-Six concern.130 While Heath had met Pompidou’s desire for a 
British commitment on the run-down of the sterling balances, they had not 
agreed on how the matter was to be resolved at a Community level. Thus, at 
a meeting of the Six’s permanent representatives on 27 May, Boegner tabled 
a paper restating the French position ex ante.131 In conversation with 
Soames the following day, Jobert explained that if France had suddenly 
withdrawn its previous demands, ‘they would have been faced with all sorts 
of questions from the Five’, which, given the need to treat the Heath-
Pompidou agreement confidentially, ‘they would have found impossible to 
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answer’.132 To dispose of the matter, a plan was pieced together between 
Armstrong and Jobert, using Soames as an intermediary, which was then put 
into effect at the ministerial meeting on 7 June.133 Schumann invited Rippon 
to make a statement, at which point Rippon read out an anodyne text 
regarding London’s intentions before and after its entry to the Community.134 
The British government, he said, were ‘prepared to envisage an orderly and 
gradual run-down of official sterling balances after our accession’. They were 
‘ready to discuss after out entry ... what measures might be appropriate to 
achieve a progressive alignment of the external characteristics and practices 
... [of] sterling with those of other currencies in the Community in the context 
of progress towards economic and monetary union’. And, prior to accession, 
London would manage its ‘policies with a view to stabilising the official 
sterling balances’.135 Rippon then withdrew, leaving the Six to consider the 
content of the statement. At this point, the French Finance Minister, Valéry 
Giscard d’Estaing, quickly made clear that he was content with what Rippon 
had said.136 For the Five, there can have been little doubt that this was 
anything other than a bilaterally orchestrated method of dealing with a 
problem that had been resolved at the Heath-Pompidou summit. Apparently 
happy, however, simply to see the matter disappear, the other delegations 
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followed Giscard’s lead and accepted the British statement, leaving just 
Raymond Barre, the European Commissioner responsible for financial 
questions, to lament a commitment to ‘zero plus zero plus zero’.137 
 
Within Whitehall, attention now shifted to what was hoped would be the most 
important ministerial meeting of the negotiations on 21 and 22 June.138 Given 
the ease with which sterling had been disposed of, the FCO felt it necessary 
to make representations to the Five, impressing upon them that agreements 
on Community finance and New Zealand had not been prepared in advance 
and that Britain still needed them to show moderation over the terms for both 
issues. The AE committee had agreed Rippon’s negotiating authority for the 
ministerial meeting on 3 June, but it was not discussed in Cabinet for another 
fortnight.139 Rippon’s statement on the latter occasion was clearly intended to 
inform, rather than consult, other ministers. On New Zealand, Rippon 
underlined that ‘the critical requirement in any arrangements ... was that the 
New Zealand Government should be prepared to accept them as tolerable’, 
and that for Community finance, ‘The major issue in dispute was the United 
Kingdom contribution in the first year of membership’. Rippon said that he 
thought, ‘The figure finally agreed might be between 7½ per cent and 9 per 
cent’. In contrast to December 1970, there was no dissent over the terms 
envisaged for Community finance; in the aftermath of the summit, with the 
government on the brink of an historic success, the atmosphere militated 
strongly against any minister resurrecting earlier qualms over the cost of 
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membership – a point which will be returned to at the end of the chapter, in 
the context of Cabinet’s approval of the terms of entry.140 Finally, on 
fisheries, the aim remained to secure an agreement that the CFP could be 
adapted in the context of enlargement in order that such an agreement could 
be presented to parliament, along with the other main issues, before MPs 
were asked to vote on the principle of British accession in the autumn.  
 
The principal characteristic of the second June ministerial meeting, beyond 
its fundamental success, was the link established between the terms for 
Community finance and New Zealand respectively.141 That the French 
intended to create such a link became clear in the final fortnight before the 
ministerial, during a series of exchanges between Schumann and 
Soames.142 The Quai d’Orsay explained it in terms of domestic French 
politics: the government could not appear to be conceding to British 
demands in all areas.143 The consequence for Britain was that Rippon would 
be unable to spend two days pressing for concessions on both subjects – 
better terms on one would mean less good terms on the other.144 In their final 
discussion before the ministerial meeting, Schumann proposed to Soames a 
deal comprising a guarantee for New Zealand at 63% of present quantities 
after five years, and an opening budgetary contribution of 9%. Ignoring all 
suggestions of linkage, Soames said that London would need ‘better on 
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both’. He pressed for a contribution of 6.5% in 1973 and said that he thought 
New Zealand would require a guarantee ‘in the seventies’.145  
 
The Community’s opening offer on New Zealand was to represent an 
advance on Schumann’s bilateral proposal, but not by much. Tabled in the 
early hours of 22 June, towards the end of the ministerial meeting’s first day, 
the Community offered a 66% ‘milk equivalent’ guarantee at the end of five 
years (75% on butter and 20% on cheese). The New Zealand Deputy Prime 
Minister, Jack Marshall, was present throughout the meeting, and it was 
clear that this would not satisfy his government. A further difficulty was 
created by the specifics of the review provision, which stipulated that 
guarantee arrangements beyond the initial five year period could only be 
agreed on the basis of unanimity in the Council of Ministers – thus allowing 
for a veto.146 On the afternoon of 22 June, Rippon made a counter-proposal 
involving a milk equivalent guarantee of 71% (80% for butter and 20% for 
cheese),147 and excluded all reference to unanimity in the terms of the review 
provision.148 He had also secured a commitment from Marshall that if 
agreement could be reached on this basis, Marshall would then recommend 
acceptance of the offer to the New Zealand Cabinet.149 
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The night of 22-23 June saw settlements on New Zealand and Community 
finance gradually pieced together.150 A proposal on finance emerged from 
the Community at just after 12am. It involved a contribution in the first year of 
8.64%, rising to 18.92% in 1977. There would then be two years of 
correctives, leaving the financial mechanism to operate without limitation 
from 1980.151 The offer would eventually be accepted by Rippon, but not 
without an attempt to secure lower percentages for the basic transitional 
period. On New Zealand, the Community informed the British delegation that 
it was willing to accept the 71% guarantee figure contained in its counter-
proposal. As regards the review, the Six accepted that the final agreement 
should not refer to unanimity, but suggested that, in return, the Community 
spokesperson (Schumann) should be allowed to read into the transcript of 
the meeting that the decision would be taken unanimously. The compromise 
was accepted by the British.152 The final hours thus saw a final effort to lower 
the percentages for Britain’s transitional contributions for Community finance, 
but the Community insisted that this was not possible without altering the 
terms for New Zealand, which was now a political impossibility.  
 
On fisheries, it did not prove possible to secure the Community’s acceptance 
of Britain’s so-called ‘six-mile proposal’  (that all waters up to six miles from 
the British coast should be the preserve of British fishermen until such time 
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as adequate adaptations to the Common Fisheries Policy were made).153 It 
was agreed that the matter should be considered again in July, at the final 
ministerial meeting before the summer break.154 In the event, concerns that 
settlement on this basis would result in less satisfactory terms than those 
being pursued by the three other candidates, led British negotiators to 
reconsider their tactics.155 Agreement was not reached in July, and thereafter 
the talks on this issue would become increasingly intertwined with those of 
Denmark, Ireland and Norway.156 The Community produced proposals on 9 
November, but a disastrous negotiating meeting on 29 November, produced 
almost no progress.157 At this point, concerns began to grow that the delay 
over fisheries might postpone the timetable for parliamentary ratification of 
British entry.158 Bilateral Anglo-French diplomacy was again employed to 
facilitate a solution, and at the next ministerial meeting in December, the 
fundamentals of an agreement were reached.159  
 
In June 1971, the absence of agreement on fisheries was but a small 
blemish on the record of success. With the settlements on the two premier 
British negotiating concerns, Community finance and New Zealand, following 
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on from the agreements on sugar and sterling at the start of the month, 23 
June was held to mark the decisive moment in the accession negotiations, 
and an historic moment in the life of the European Community. The Times 
reported ‘an atmosphere of elation in Luxembourg’ as the ministerial meeting 
neared its conclusion.160 The final session began at approximately 4.30am to 
officially record agreement.161 As Rippon entered the room, the delegations 
of the Six broke into impromptu applause.162 According to the British record, 
Schumann declared that the ‘the negotiation had begun on 30 June 1970’ 
and that ‘It was on 22 June 1971 that it had been completed and completed 
as the Conference now knew successfully’. While technically inappropriate, 
the underlying sentiment was appropriate to the occasion.163 Rippon 
responded in kind, ‘the Conference’, he declared, ‘had served the cause of a 
united Europe’.164 Heath sent a telegram from London to congratulate 
Rippon ‘most warmly on this splendid result’.165 Home likewise: ‘You have 
done famously. This ... is a very historic day’.166 The celebrations continued 
throughout the day. On his return to Bonn, the German Foreign Minister, 
Walter Scheel, announced that, ‘The enlargement of the EEC could be the 
decisive political event of this decade in Europe’, and the Italian Prime 
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Minister, Emilio Colombo, hailed the Luxembourg meeting as ‘the crowning 
achievement in a very constructive period in European history’.167 
 
In Cabinet the next morning, Rippon detailed the agreements reached in 
Luxembourg. There was only a ‘brief discussion’, during which it was agreed 
that Rippon ‘had succeeded in negotiating most satisfactory terms’. It was 
‘urged that the Government should commend the arrangements as 
satisfactory and should not take a defensive line’. It was another week, 
however, before Cabinet was formally asked to approve the terms, at the 
same time as considering the government’s draft white paper, which would 
set out the results of the negotiations and recommend to parliament British 
entry to the Community on that basis.  Heath asked whether it was the 
collective will of Cabinet that the white paper should make such a 
recommendation, and, again with little discussion, ministers agreed that it 
should.168 The absence of any detailed scrutiny of the terms should not, by 
this stage, be seen as surprising; they fell comfortably within the negotiating 
limits given to Rippon by the AE committee on 3 June, and were in 
accordance with his report to Cabinet on 18 June.169 When put in the context 
of the negotiations as a whole, however, the disappearance of ministerial 
interest in Community finance must be seen as significant. In December 
1970, Cabinet’s discussion of Britain’s opening bid on adaptation to the 
budgetary mechanism resulted in a clear difference of view about whether 
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the cost of membership by the end of the transitional period – that is, when 
Britain would be paying close to its full contribution – would constitute an 
acceptable price for the benefits of EC membership. Heath had not sought to 
resolve the matter on that occasion, but concluded by saying that: ‘A more 
detailed examination of all the relevant factors would be required before it 
could be decided whether the balance of payments burden implied by such 
terms would or would not be a tolerable one’.170 Six months later and no 
further consideration of the question had occurred. Had Cabinet returned to 
the matter, there seems a good chance that Heath and Rippon could have 
won the internal debate by arguing that, as a member of the Community, 
Britain would be able to insist upon changes to the budgetary mechanism 
and so alleviate the financial burden.171 After the May ministerial meeting, 
however, once the negotiations had begun to gather momentum, it became 
virtually inconceivable that any minister might raise objections on this score, 
for the reason that they would thereby be calling into question a potentially 
historic success for the government as a whole – with all that might entail in 
terms of loss of momentum and future electoral prospects. Yet by not 
returning to the issue at all, the Heath Cabinet took the decision to 
recommend to parliament British entry to the Community without having 
reconciled its own division on this most fundamental aspect of the terms.172 
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Conclusion 
 
The conclusion of this thesis in June 1971 should not be taken to imply that 
the story of British EC entry was then complete. The negotiations were not 
finally concluded until January 1972 and, more crucially, with the publication 
of the white paper on 7 July, the government initiated a year-long campaign 
to secure parliamentary ratification for entry on the terms negotiated. On 28 
October, a six-day debate culminated with a vote on the principle of 
membership, resulting in a favourable majority of 112.173 In January, the 
European Communities Bill began its passage through parliament, receiving 
its third reading in the Commons on 13 July, with Royal Assent following in 
October.174 Britain thus entered the Community alongside Denmark and 
Ireland (Norway having rejected membership) on 1 January 1973. The 
second June ministerial meeting, however, coming on top of the Heath-
Pompidou summit the previous month, was the event which made clear that 
the negotiations, and therefore the application, were going to succeed, and 
accordingly brings this study to its natural conclusion. 
 
Since the French veto of December 1967, British diplomacy towards the 
Community had centred upon the need to overcome French opposition to 
enlargement. And even after the withdrawal of the French veto on 
negotiations in December 1969, the principal reason to doubt the prospects 
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for success rested on the possibility that Paris might adopt negotiating 
stances that would prevent agreement.175 The impasse of March-April 1971, 
alongside Pompidou’s public statements, led many to conclude that the 
summit in May 1971 was the moment at which Heath convinced Pompidou 
that his reservations about permitting British entry were unnecessary. 
Alternatively, it has been seen as the moment which settled technical 
difficulties relating to the major negotiating issues. This chapter has 
advanced a new explanation for the Heath-Pompidou meeting and its 
relationship with the successful ministerial meetings of June 1971. It has 
shown that explanations of the Heath-Pompidou summit in terms of the 
persuasion thesis are implausible. Pompidou’s depiction of the meeting in 
this light was related primarily to domestic interests; a desire to appear 
consistent with the views of his predecessor.176 Pompidou’s remarks in the 
first session of the summit talks demonstrated that he was not seeking 
reassurances about the principle of admitting Britain to the Community.177 
Explanations of the summit in terms of the resolution of negotiating 
difficulties have implied that the impasse in the negotiations was genuine. As 
was seen in Chapter 5, however, it was, on the contrary, a deliberate move 
on the part of the Élysée. Rather, the May 1971 summit saw Pompidou trade 
upon British anxiety about the outcome of the accession negotiations in order 
to obtain a number of specific concessions on French political concerns. In 
return, he provided Heath with firm assurances regarding his government’s 
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flexibility when the negotiations resumed in June.178 Pompidou was thereby 
able to secure some final advantages for France before facilitating the 
success of the negotiations. At a public level, it also enabled Pompidou to be 
seen as repairing Anglo-French relations after a decade in which bilateral 
antagonism had been the norm.179 The resolution of the major issues in June 
demonstrates that the political will of member governments had always been 
the critical determinant in the success of the negotiations. That political will 
may well have existed in France for some time, but it was only in May, 
having obtained the advantages which the summit meeting gave to him, that 
Pompidou chose to reveal it unequivocally. The Heath-Pompidou meeting 
must therefore continue to be seen as the crucial moment in the success of 
the second application, but its function in that outcome was both more subtle 
and more qualified than has previously been recognised. 
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Conclusions 
 
 
This thesis has had two principal objectives: the first to examine and explain 
the role played by the Wilson and Heath governments respectively in 
carrying the second EC application to a successful conclusion after the short-
term failure of December 1967; and the second to investigate how the case 
for entry was perceived and debated within government, paying attention to 
both economic and political aspects.1 These conclusions are divided into two 
sections, which reflect the separate lines of analysis. 
 
The revival and success of the second application: Wilson, Heath and 
pursuit of EC membership 
 
In his memoirs, Edward Heath asserted that ‘The application by Harold 
Wilson and the Labour government was an abject failure’.2 In publishing this 
view in 1998, Heath was far from being the first writer to discount the 
contribution of his predecessor to British entry. He applied the narrative, 
already well established, of his own decisive role in the accession 
negotiations, persuading Georges Pompidou that Britain was truly committed 
to a European future.3 This version of events emerged partly as result of 
apparent French equivocation in the spring of 1971, as manifested in the 
Brussels impasse,  and partly from the emphasis Pompidou himself placed 
                                                            
1
 For the idea of a short term failure, see: N.P. Ldlow, ‘A Short-Term Defeat: The Community 
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 Heath, Course, p.358. 
3
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upon general conceptions of Europe in his statements immediately before 
and after the summit meeting.4 A clear link was thus created between 
Heath’s personal Europeanism and the success of the British membership 
bid. While it is the dominant depiction of the accession negotiations within 
British historiography, this interpretation was by no means universally 
accepted: even before the summit, in April 1971, the Paris embassy 
maintained that Pompidou had no intention of wielding a further French 
veto.5 Neither O’Neill nor Kitzinger discussed the persuasion thesis in their 
accounts of the negotiations; indeed both postulated the hypothesis that 
Pompidou took the crucial decision to permit British membership at The 
Hague summit of December 1969, a view which is strengthened by Ludlow’s 
recent analysis of intra-Community diplomacy in the latter half of 1969.6  
 
Through its detailed examination of the diplomacy leading up to the Heath-
Pompidou summit, and the summit meeting itself, this thesis strongly rejects 
Heath’s narrative of the summit and its contribution to British entry. Rather, it 
has sought to present a broader and more balanced view of Britain’s part in 
the success of the application, in which attention is focussed as much upon 
the events leading to the opening of negotiations in June 1970, as those 
which culminated in the decisive negotiating meetings of June 1971. It is 
accepted that Britain had only limited capability to influence events, and that 
the reactions of the Five to the French veto, followed by the resignation of de 
Gaulle in April 1969, were critical determinants in the ultimate success of the 
                                                            
4
 The Times, 18 May 1971, p.1; Pompidou, Entretiens, pp.126-29. 
5
 TNA/FCO30/1151, Soames to Greenhill, 21 April 1971. 
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application, but all the more reason, therefore, for taking a longer view of 
how membership was secured at a diplomatic level.  
 
In contrast to the Macmillan government’s more passive response to the 
1963 veto, in 1968-69 Wilson and the Foreign Office sought to keep the 
enlargement question alive and maintain the momentum achieved through 
Britain’s approach to Europe in 1967. Brown’s memorandum to Cabinet in 
February 1968 aimed both to reduce British ‘isolation’ and to apply continued 
pressure to France in the hope that this might weaken its will to sustain the 
veto.7 Wilson was consistently sceptical about the possibility that de Gaulle 
might change his views, but nonetheless encouraged Foreign Office tactics 
with a view to ensuring that any successor would feel strong misgivings 
about trying to continue the General’s policy of opposition to British 
membership.8 It was thus that Britain supported the Harmel Plan and Wilson 
considered launching his own, more dramatic, initiative in the form of a 
British Fouchet Plan.9 To what extent British activisim may have helped to 
sustain the Community’s crisis of 1968-69 is a question beyond the scope of 
this thesis. The important finding here is firstly that London believed it could 
influence relations between the Six in this period, and was increasingly 
confident of its ability to do so: the Foreign Office thus enunciated the logic of 
the ‘double veto’, suggesting that it could frustrate the internal development 
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 TNA/CAB129/136, C(68)42, 23 February 1968. 
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of the Community for as long France continued to oppose enlargement.10 
The persistent thorn in the side of the British approach was the mediatory 
attitude of Germany under Chancellor Kurt Georg Kiesinger. It was thus that 
in early 1969 the tactical objective at the centre of Wilson’s visit to Bonn was 
the aim of prising Kiesinger away from his close relationship with de Gaulle, 
and into closer co-ordination with Britain, the Benelux countries and Italy.11 
 
It was this thinking, along with a more basic mistrust of de Gaulle, which 
most influenced Wilson’s response to de Gaulle’s suggestion to Christopher 
Soames in February 1969 that Britain and France begin talks about the 
future organisation of Western Europe. This is one among several new 
insights which this thesis has offered into the events surrounding the 
Soames affair. It also shows that the way in which internal opinion divided 
over how to handle the approach reflected a pre-existing, but still formative 
debate about whether to adopt a more conciliatory attitude towards France. 
The principal stimulus for these ideas was Soames, but they attracted 
sympathy from both Chalfont and Palliser, and even Wilson too.12 In the 
week between de Gaulle’s offer on 4 February and his departure for Bonn on 
11 February, the prime minister was caught between an innate suspicion of 
the General’s motives and a genuine desire to pursue conversations.13 Once 
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he accepted the FCO analysis, however, and decided to give Kiesinger full 
information, his goal became more than simply to protect the diplomatic 
position which London had built up over the previous year. In keeping with 
the ideas of separating Kiesinger from de Gaulle, Wilson utilised the 
General’s proposals in a manner designed to contribute to French isolation.14 
There is no basis, therefore, in Wilson’s efforts to exculpate himself of 
responsibility for the bitter French reaction which followed.15      
 
Furthermore, this thesis has shown that the Soames affair catalysed the 
tensions which already existed over policy towards France, into a major 
debate about British strategy going forward. Whether it would have been 
possible to resurrect conversations with de Gaulle can only be a matter of 
conjecture, but this was increasingly the mood of the prime minister and 
important figures with the Foreign Office, namely, Chalfont and Greenhill.16 
Stewart, Hancock and Robinson continued to resist the ideas, but Wilson’s 
request for an up-to-date study of the Munchmeyer Plan and Stewart’s 
decision to allow a departmental review illustrate that the momentum was 
now with the revisionists.17 The prime minister’s shift, in the space of two 
months, from seeking to isolate de Gaulle to a desire to resuscitate bilateral 
conversations reflected his irritation with the advice that had been given to 
him in February, particularly in the light of subsequent evidence that French 
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thinking might have been undergoing change.18 While there will be a 
temptation to see Wilson’s actions as reflecting a desire to undermine the 
EC, this is to misunderstand the nature of the British application for 
membership itself. What mattered was less the institutional form that Europe 
should take, be it supranational or intergovernmental, but the simple fact of 
Britain regaining its place at the heart of European affairs alongside France 
and Germany. The aversion of Stewart and Hancock to talks with France 
should not be seen to be a consequence of communautaire attitudes, but 
rather an antagonistic approach to Anglo-French relations whilst de Gaulle 
remained in power.19 Similarly, Soames and Palliser both favoured talks with 
France, despite their strongly pro-Community convictions.20 
 
De Gaulle’s resignation, the election of Pompidou and the replacement of 
Kiesinger by Brandt all contributed to the much more favourable international 
context, resulting in the revival of the second application in the second half of 
1969. This was given substantive form through France’s agreement to lift the 
veto on enlargement negotiations at The Hague summit in December 1969. 
It was also the Labour government’s determination to maintain the 
application for membership which meant that, in June 1970, Edward Heath 
was able to pick up the reins of a British accession bid that already had 
significant momentum behind it. With negotiations commencing just twelve 
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days after the election, Heath inherited a Whitehall machine already 
prepared for the complex and technical task of negotiations, with the major 
negotiating briefs quickly presented to incoming Conservative ministers.21 
The more malign outcome of The Hague summit from the British perspective 
was its agreement upon a definitive regulation for Community finance. This 
erected a major new obstacle to British entry and would prove to be the 
principal battleground of the Brussels negotiations. More than this, it would 
be a major source of tension between Britain and its Community partners in 
the decade after 1973.22 A priori, it marked a failure of the objective which 
Britain had openly declared in 1967: to participate in the negotiations leading 
to a permanent financial mechanism itself.23 By 1969, the potential scale of 
the problem had increased, both as a result of devaluation and the 
mushrooming cost of CAP support operations.24 Even in the summer of 
1969, the Foreign Office believed that it should still be possible for Britain to 
participate in negotiations on a definitive regulation, and in the autumn 
attempts were made to stiffen the Five against conceding an arrangement to 
France that could not be altered in the context of enlargement.25 The 
attempts failed and the final regulation further exacerbated British difficulties 
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by apportioning all customs duties, in addition to agricultural levies, to 
common funds.26  
 
The potential balance of payments burden confronting Britain was 
demonstrated by the February 1970 white paper, which estimated a balance 
of payments cost of between £100 million and £1,100 million per annum by 
the late 1970s, with internal forecasts putting the figure in the region of £700 
million per annum.27 With the largest component of this cost, contributions to 
the Community budget, now given permanent form, The Hague deal 
provided the opponents of entry with a robust argument to deploy against the 
application.28 Indeed, the balance of payments cost was the point on which 
Wilson himself principally focussed in opposing entry on Tory terms during 
the parliamentary battle of 1970-72.29 Yet in the early months of 1970, during 
internal discussions, Wilson himself defended terms for Community finance 
that were as onerous, if not more so, than the terms negotiated by the 
Conservatives in 1971.30 It is in part for this reason that it is wrong to 
interpret the white paper and the subsequent parliamentary debate as a sign 
that Wilson may have been preparing for a possible retreat over Europe.31 
Wilson’s public equivocation in the first months of 1970 was motivated by the 
combination of deteriorating public approval for the accession bid and his 
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intention to hold a general election later in the year.32 His actions within 
government, and his refusal to take a sceptical line on British entry for 
electoral advantage, demonstrate a continuing determination to bring the 
negotiations to a successful conclusion.33 
 
The most important contribution of this study to historical understanding of 
British entry is in relation to the accession negotiations and how a successful 
outcome was secured. Even for those who judge that Pompidou took the 
critical decision on enlargement at The Hague summit, there remains a need 
to explain why the negotiations reached impasse in March 1971, and the 
function of the Heath-Pompidou summit in resolving it. Crucially, this study 
has shown that the impasse in the negotiations was a deliberate move by 
Pompidou, designed to establish the need for a bilateral meeting with 
Heath.34 In his memoir, Heath asserts that ‘there were still some officials in 
the Foreign Office who wanted to isolate the French by working with the Five 
against them’, and distinguishes himself from these alleged FCO tactics by 
referring to his instruction to Soames on 1 March 1971 that he should 
‘explore [with Michel Jobert] the possibility of my meeting President 
Pompidou’.35 Yet the archival record reveals a very different picture. In fact, 
the Foreign Office, guided by Soames’s conversation with Jobert in mid-
February, became convinced of the case for a bilateral meeting at the start of 
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March.36 Heath, it is argued here, only decided in favour of such a meeting 
after his visit to Bonn in early April; with Brandt revealing his readiness to 
intervene personally in the negotiations should the impasse still prevail in the 
summer, Heath was able to feel confident that, even if a meeting with 
Pompidou failed, a potential fall-back position was still available.37    
 
Utilising both British and French sources, this thesis is the first study to 
provide a comprehensive analysis of the Heath-Pompidou summit, and 
surpasses all previous interpretations in its explanation of the summit’s 
relationship to the decisive ministerial negotiating meetings in June. While 
Pompidou’s public statements fostered the view that the outcome hinged 
upon Heath’s ability to persuade him that Britain was now firmly committed to 
the Community, this thesis has argued that such statements were motivated 
principally by a desire to appear consistent with the views of de Gaulle: that 
Britain could join the EC once it had demonstrated itself to be European.38 
The summit talks themselves contradict this explanation. Pompidou 
demonstrated at an early stage that he was not bringing into question the 
principle of British membership, rather he sought a series of specific 
concessions to French interests: the use of majority voting in the Council of 
Ministers, the future of the sterling balances, protection for the benefits 
former French territories in Africa derived under the Yaoundé Convention, 
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and assistance in preserving the role of French as a working language in the 
enlarged Community. Pompidou’s ability to secure British concessions on 
these issues was critically dependent upon Heath’s anxiety about the French 
negotiating position on Community finance and New Zealand, and it was in 
the final session of talks, once Heath had given what ground he could to the 
president’s political concerns, that Pompidou delivered his firmest 
assurances about French flexibility when the negotiations resumed in June.39 
Yet as the substance of the talks demonstrate, Heath’s concessions to 
Pompidou were far from onerous; the most significant being a commitment in 
principle to run down the sterling balances, but without any specificity in 
terms of quantities or timeframe.40 There was nothing in the deal that only 
Heath was capable of delivering. A different prime minister, but one who 
shared a strong commitment to the objective of British membership, should 
have been able to do the same. This is not to deny Heath an important role 
in the success of the application; as has been argued, his determination to 
carry the negotiations through to a successful conclusion was significant. But 
it is to dispose of the narrative which has so often dominated accounts of 
British entry, that of Heath’s decisive personal intervention.  
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The case for Europe: politics, economics and the British budgetary 
question 
 
In keeping with earlier studies on the decision to apply for membership, this 
thesis has emphasised the continuing primacy of the political case for 
membership, resting upon the desire to maintain and strengthen British 
influence with its principal international partners.41 As Cabinet had concluded 
in spring 1967, and again in February 1968, there was no alternative 
international framework which offered Britain equivalent advantages.42 This 
political analysis included important economic aspects; British leaders 
desired influence as much in international monetary and trade matters as 
they did on questions of security. But these should be distinguished from the 
pure economic arguments relating to the potential of Community 
membership to improve British economic performance. The main contribution 
of this thesis to the literature on case for joining the Community relates to this 
part of the debate. For those sceptical about the economic advantages, it 
was possible to point to the fact that the Community’s Common External 
Tariff was to be substantially lowered as a result of the Kennedy Round, 
whilst the contention that Britain’s inferior economic performance during the 
1950s could be attributed to its position outside the EC appeared far from 
convincing when the February 1970 white paper indicated that other EFTA 
members had been enjoying economic growth rates similar to those within 
                                                            
41
 TNA/CAB129/136, C(68)42, 23 February 1968; TNA/CAB128/43, CC(68)15th, 27 February 
1968; TNA/T312/2456, Figgures to Dowler, 10 July 1969; Hansard, HCP, Cmnd.4289, 
February 1970; TNA/CAB148/101, DOP(70)13, 21 July 1970. On the decision to apply see: 
Ellison, United, p.201; Parr, Britain’s, pp.129-151; Young, Labour, pp.143-50. 
42
 Parr, Britain’s, pp.129-151; TNA/CAB129/136, C(68)42, 23 February 1968. 
301 
 
the Six.43 Nonetheless, when viewed in trade terms alone, it was difficult to 
argue other than that the Community represented the most advantageous 
trading framework available to Britain in the long-term. With the increasing 
cost of membership, however, and against a background of persistent 
balance of payments difficulties in the 1960s, the short-term economic 
consequences of entry became even more onerous than they had been in 
1967. Indeed, the possibility of devaluation, accompanied by restrictive fiscal 
measures to ensure financial stability, created a strong argument for 
postponement in 1969-70.    
 
Official Treasury concerns were represented to both Labour and 
Conservative chancellors. In the summer of 1969, in the context of the 
potential revival of the application, Jenkins was advised that it would be 
better to delay, rather than proceed to early negotiations, but there is no 
evidence that these representations had any impact.44 In late 1970, in the 
context of Britain’s opening bids, Barber was also counselled in the 
economic dangers, and the painful measures which the government might 
have to introduce to protect sterling.45 Whether Barber was responsible for 
precipitating the Cabinet discord of December 1970 is unclear, but for the 
first time in the Conservative Cabinet the argument was advanced that 
‘severe measures’ might be necessary which could ‘largely offset the 
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stimulus to faster growth created by our entry’.46 With the principal 
component of the balance of payments cost being Britain’s contributions to 
the Community budget, the counter-argument provided was that if the burden 
at any stage became too onerous, Britain could insist upon the question of 
budgetary contributions being reopened. The issue was never formally 
resolved: at the time, Heath deferred it for subsequent consideration, but in 
the event did not return to it.47 For both Wilson and Heath, the principal 
explanation for their determination not to allow the cost of membership to 
provide an argument for delay is to be found in the extent of their personal 
commitment to the issue. While this is perhaps uncontroversial for Heath, 
Wilson too had invested much in the application, and to suspend the pursuit 
of membership just at the moment that the opportunity of negotiations had 
finally arisen, would have been difficult to contemplate. It would also have 
meant a further indefinite period of British exclusion from the Community, in 
which London would continue to find itself on the margins of European 
affairs, watching on as the Community continued its development 
independently.  
 
Any analysis of the cost of membership must also bring to the fore the 
longer-term implications of the Community finance issue. George has located 
the budgetary wrangles of the late 1970s and early 1980s within his 
‘awkward partner’ narrative of Britain’s relationship with the EC, implying that 
London’s persistent haggling in this field is indicative of a more pervasive 
                                                            
46
 TNA/CAB128/47, CM(70)45th, 10 December 1970 
47
 Ibid. 
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lack of commitment to the Community idea.48 Yet France, too, had acted no 
less determinedly in its pursuit of a national objective by insisting upon a 
permanent finance regulation as the price for lifting the veto on 
negotiations.49 The question can thus be better located within Milward’s 
concept of a clash between British and French visions of how the Community 
should operate, with London, despite its avowed acceptance of the acquis 
Communautaire, resolving from an early stage that if budgetary payments 
should became too onerous, it would challenge the system which gave rise 
to them.50 As early as October 1969, even before The Hague deal was 
struck, Con O’Neill wrote of the prospective definitive regulation: ‘We would 
simply have to undermine it and find a way round it by insisting that, 
whatever the nature and character of the [Six’s] agreement ... the burdens of 
the Common Agricultural Policy must, through one device or another, be 
equitably distributed and not all heaped on us’.51 It was an approach that 
would dominate London’s European policy for much of the next fifteen years, 
ensuring that, while the membership question had been resolved, Britain’s 
troubled relationship with the Community was set to continue.52 
                                                            
48
 George, ‘Awkward’, pp.84-88, 131-34, 135-65. 
49
 For Pompidou’s awareness of the difficulties a definitive regulation would create for Britain 
see: Rücker, ‘triangle’, p.105. 
50
 See Milward, United, p.483. Barber’s statement at the opening meeting on the 
negotiations professed to accept the ‘the Treaties establishing the three European 
Communities and the decisions which have flowed from them’: Hansard, HC Papers, 
Cmnd.4401, June 1970. On Community finance specifically: TNA/FCO30/1120, Paris to 
FCO, tel.238, 25 February 1971 (recording a conversation with Soames and Pompidou); and 
TNA/PREM15/2241, RoC Heath and Pompidou, 15.30, 20 May. On British readiness to 
challenge the system: TNA/CAB128/47, CM(70)45th, 10 December 1970; TNA/CAB133/422, 
PMVP(71)8(i) (Revise), 18 May 1971. 
51
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52
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pp. pp.130-137. 
304 
 
Bibliography 
 
 
 
Archival Sources 
 
United Kingdom 
 
The National Archives, Kew, London 
 
CAB128 Cabinet Meetings 
CAB129 Cabinet Memoranda 
CAB130 Cabinet: Miscellaneous Committees 
CAB133 Cabinet Office: Commonwealth and International Conferences 
and Ministerial to and from the UK 
CAB134 Miscellaneous Committees (General Series) 
CAB148 Defence and Overseas Policy Committees and Sub-
committees 
CAB164 Cabinet Office: Subject (Theme Series) Files 
CAB199 Cabinet Office: Co-ordination of Accession to the EEC: 
Registered Files of the EEC Bill Team and the EEC 
Referendum Unit 
 
DEFE24 Ministry of Defence: Defence Secretariat Branches and their 
Predecessors 
 
FCO26 FCO: Information, News and Guidance Departments 
FCO30 FCO: European Economic Organisations Department and 
successors 
FCO41 FCO: Western Organisations Department 
FCO49 FCO: Planning Staff and Planning Department 
 
PREM13 Prime Minister’s Office: Correspondence and Papers, 1964-70 
PREM15 Prime Minister’s Office: Correspondence and Papers, 1970-74 
 
T295 Treasury: Overseas Finance (Exchange Control) Division 
T312 Treasury: Finance Overseas and Co-ordination Division 
T340 Treasury: National Economy Group (General) 
 
 
France 
 
Archives Nationales, Paris 
 
Papers for the presidency of Georges Pompidou 
 
Fund for Jean-René Bernard 
 
 
 
305 
 
Private Papers 
 
Brown, Lord George, Bodleian Library, Oxford  
Hetherington, Alistair, British Library of Political and Economic Science, 
London 
O’Neill, Sir Con, Bodleian Library, Oxford 
Soames, Sir Christopher, Churchill College Archives Centre, Cambridge 
Stewart, Michael, Churchill College Archives Centre, Cambridge 
Wilson, Harold, Bodleian Library, Oxford 
 
 
Published Primary Sources 
 
Books and articles 
Edward Heath, Old World, New Horizons: The Godkin Lectures at Harvard 
University, 1967 
(London: Oxford University Press, 1970). 
Edward Heath, ‘Realism in British Foreign Policy’, Foreign Affairs, 48, 1 
(1969), pp.39-50.  
Edward Heath, ‘European Unity over the Next Ten Years: From Community 
to Union’, International Affairs, 64/2 (1988), pp.199-207. 
Georges Pompidou, Entretiens et Discours, 1968-74 (Libraire Plon, 1975). 
Michael Stewart, ‘Britain, Europe and the Alliance’, Foreign Affairs, 48, 4 
(1970), pp.648-659. 
 
Newspapers and periodicals 
Economist, Financial Times, Guardian, Time Magazine, The Times, 
Observer 
 
Oral History 
British Diplomatic Oral History Programme, Churchill College Archives 
Centre, Cambridge 
European Oral History: Voices on Europe, Historical Archives of the 
European Union, Florence 
 
Parliamentary debates 
Hansard, House of Commons Debates, 5th Series, various volumes 
Hansard, House of Commons Papers (Papers by Command), various 
volumes 
 
Public opinion data 
‘British attitudes to EEC, 1960-63’, Journal of Common Market Studies, 5, 1 
(1966), pp.49-61. 
‘Public Opinion and the EEC’, Journal of Common Market Studies, 6, 3 
(1968), pp.231-249. 
D. Zakheim, ‘Britain and the EEC-Opinion Poll Data, 1970-72’, Journal of 
Common Market Studies, 11, 3 (1973), pp.191-233. 
 
 
 
306 
 
Websites 
European Navigator: www.ena.lu 
Political Science Resources: www.politicsresources.net 
 
 
Diaries and memoirs 
 
Diaries 
Benn, Tony, Office without Power, Diaries 1968-72 (London: Hutchinson, 
1988). 
Castle, Barbara, The Castle Diaries, 1964-70 (London: Macmillan, 1990). 
Crossman, Richard, The Diaries of a Cabinet Minister: Volume Three, 1968-
70 (London: Hamish Hamilton and Jonathan Cape, 1977).  
King, Cecil, The Cecil King Diary, 1965-70 (London: Jonathan Cape, 1972) 
King, Cecil, The Cecil King Diary, 1970-74 (London: Jonathan Cape, 1975). 
 
Memoirs 
Barber, Anthony, Taking the Tide: A Memoir (Norwich: Michael Russell, 
1996). 
Carrington, Lord, Reflect on Things Past (London: Collins, 1988) 
Castle, Barbara, Fighting All the Way (London: Macmillan, 1993). 
Greenhill, Denis, More by Accident (York: Wilton 65, 1992). 
Halisham, Lord, A Sparrow’s Flight (London: Collins, 1990). 
Heath, Edward, The Course of My Life (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 
2007). 
Home, Lord, The Way the Wind Blows (London: Collins, 1976). 
Hurd, Douglas, Memoirs (London: Little, Brown, 2003). 
Howe, Geoffrey, A Conflict of Loyalty (London: Macmillan, 1994). 
Jenkins, Roy, A Life at the Centre (London: Macmillan, 1991). 
Jobert, Michel, Mémoires d’Avenir (Paris: Bernard Grasset, 1974). 
Maudling, Reginald, Memoirs (London: Sidgwick and Jackson, 1978). 
Prior, Jim, A Balance of Power (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1986). 
Stewart, Michael, Life and Labour (London: Sidgwick and Jackson, 1980). 
Thatcher, Margaret, The Path to Power (London: HarperCollinsPublishers, 
1995). 
Wilson, The Labour Government: 1964-70: A Personal Record (London: 
Wiedenfeld and Nicolson, 1971) 
Whitelaw, William, The Whitelaw Memoirs (London: Aurum Press, 1989). 
 
 
Secondary Sources 
 
Books 
Addison, Paul, and Jones, Harriet (eds), A Companion to Contemporary 
Britain, 1939-2000 (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2005). 
Ashton, Nigel, Kennedy, Macmillan and the Cold War: The Irony of 
Interdependence (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002). 
Association Georges Pompidou, Georges Pompidou et l’Europe (Brussels: 
Editions Complexe, 1995). 
307 
 
Bell, Patrick, The Labour Party in Opposition, 1970-74 (London: Routledge, 
2004). 
Berstein, Serge, and Rioux, Jean-Pierre, The Pompidou Years, 1969-1974 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000). 
Bogdanor, Vernon (ed.), From New Jerusalem to New Labour: British Prime 
Ministers from Attlee to Blair (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010). 
Booker, Christopher, The Great Deception: The Secret History of the 
European Union (London: Continuum, 2003). 
Bozo, Frédéric, Two Strategies for Europe: De Gaulle, the United States and 
the Atlantic Alliance (Oxford: Rowman and Litterfield, 2001). 
Broad, Roger, Labour’s European Dilemmas (Basingstoke: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2001). 
Campbell, John, Roy Jenkins: A Biography (London: Weidenfeld and 
Nicolson, 1983). 
Campbell, John, Edward Heath: A Biography (London: Jonathan Cape, 
1993). 
Crowson, N.J., The Conservative Party and European Integration since 
1945: At the Heart of Europe (Routledge: Abingdon, 2007). 
Daddow, Oliver J., Britain and Europe since 1945: Historiographical 
Perspectives on Integration (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 
2004). 
Daddow, Oliver (ed.), Harold Wilson and European Integration: Britain’s 
Second Application to Join the EEC (London: Frank Cass, 2003). 
Diallo, Thierno, La Politique Étrangere de Georges Pompidou (Paris: 1992). 
Dinan, Desmond, Europe Recast: A History of European Union 
(Basingstoke: Palgrave: Macmillan, 2004). 
Dockrill, Saki, Britain’s Retreat from East of Suez: The Choice between 
Europe and the World? (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002). 
Dorey, Peter, The Labour Governments, 1964-70 (Abingdon: Routledge, 
2006). 
Deighton, Anne (ed.), Building Postwar Europe: National Decision-Makers 
and European Institutions, 1948-63 (London: Macmillan, 1995). 
Dutton, David, Douglas-Home (London: Haus Publishing, 2006). 
Ellison, James, The United States, Britain and the Transatlantic Crisis, 1963-
68 (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007). 
Ellison, James, Threatening Europe: Britain and the Creation of the 
European Community, 1955-58 (London: Macmillan, 2000). 
George, Stephen, An Awkward Partner: Britain in the European Community, 
3rd edn, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998). 
Gillingham, John, European Integration, 1950-2003: Superstate or New 
Market Economy? (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003). 
Giauque, Jeffrey G., Grand Designs and Visions of Unity: the Atlantic Powers 
and the Reorganization of Western Europe (Chapel Hill: University of 
North Carolina Press, 2002). 
Gowland, David, Turner Arthur, and Wright, Alex, Britain and European 
Integration since 1945: On the Sidelines (Abingdon: Routledge, 2010). 
Hitchcock, William I., France Restored: Cold War Diplomacy and the Quest 
for Leadership in Europe (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 
1998). 
308 
 
Hennessy, Peter, The Prime Minister: The Office and its Holders since 1945 
(London: Penguin, 2000). 
Hanhimäki, Jussi, The Flawed Architect: Henry Kissinger and American 
Foreign Policy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004). 
Harst, Jan van der (ed.), Beyond the Customs Union: The European 
Community’s Quest for Deepening, Widening and Completion, 1969-75 
(Bruxelles: Bruylant, 2007). 
Hurd, Douglas, An End to Promises: Sketch of a Government, 1970-74 
(London: Collins, 1979). 
Hutchinson, George, Edward Heath: A Personal and Political Biography 
(London: Longman, 1970). 
Hynes, Catherine, The Year that Never Was: Heath, the Nixon 
Administration and the Year of Europe (Dublin: University College Dublin 
Press, 2009). 
James, Harold, International Monetary Cooperation since Bretton Woods  
(International Monetary Fund, 1996). 
Kaiser, Wolfram, Using Europe, Abusing the Europeans: Britain and 
European Integration, 1945-63 (London: Basingstoke, 1996). 
Kaiser, Wolfram, and Elvert, Jürgen (eds), European Union Enlargement: A 
Comparative History (eds), (Abingdon: Routledge, 2004). 
Kaiser, Wolfram, Leucht, Brigitte, and Rasmussen, Morten, The History of 
the European Union: Origins of a Trans- and Surpanational Polity 1950-72 
(Abingdon: Routledge, 2009). 
Kaiser, Wolfram, Christian Democracy and the Origins of European Union 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007). 
Kitzinger, Uwe, Diplomacy and Persuasion: How Britain Joined the Common 
Market (London: Thames and Hudson, 1973). 
Laing, Margaret, Edward Heath: Prime Minister (London: Sidgwick and 
Jackson, 1972). 
Leffler, Melvyn P. and Westad, Odd A. (eds), The Cambridge History of the 
Cold War, Volume 1: Origins (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2010). 
Lord, Christopher, British Entry to the European Community under the Heath 
Government of 1970-74 (Aldershot: Dartmouth, 1993). 
Loth, Wilfried (ed.), Crises and Compromises: The European Project, 1963-
69 (Baden-Baden : Nomos-Verlag, 2001). 
Ludlow, N.Piers, Dealing with Britain: The Six and the First UK Application to 
the EEC (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997). 
Ludlow, N. Piers, Les Administrations Nationales et la Construction 
Européenne : une approche historique (1919-1975) (Bruxelles: P.I.E.-
Peter Lang, 2005). 
Ludlow, N. Piers, The European Community and the Crises of the 1960s: 
Negotiating the Gaullist Challenge (Abingdon: Routledge, 2006). 
Ludlow, N. Piers (ed.), European Integration and the Cold War: Ostpolitik-
Westpolitik, 1965-1973 (Abingdon: Routledge, 2007).  
MacIntyre, Terry, Anglo-German Relations during the Labour Governmnents, 
1964-70: NATO Strategy, Détente and European Integration (Manchester: 
Manchester University Press, 2007). 
Morgan, Austen, Harold Wilson (London: Pluto Press, 1992). 
309 
 
Möckli, Daniel, European Foreign Policy Cooperation during the Cold War: 
Heath, Brandt, Pompidou and the Short Dream of Political Unity (London, 
I.B. Tauris, 2009). 
Milward, Alan S. The Reconstruction of Western Europe, 1945-51 (London: 
Methuen & Co., 1984). 
Milward, Alan S., The European Rescue of the Nation State (London: 
Routledge, 2nd edn, 2000).  
Milward, Alan S., The United Kingdom and the European Community, 
Volume 1: The Rise and Fall of a National Strategy, 1945-63 (London: 
Franck Cass, 2002). 
Milward, Alan S., Politics and Economics in the History of the European 
Union (Abingdon: Routledge, 2005). 
Moravcsik, Andrew, The Choice for Europe: Social Purpose and State Power 
from Messina to Maastricht (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1998). 
Newhouse, John, De Gaulle and the Anglo-Saxons (London: Andre Deutsch, 
1970). 
Nolfo, Ennio di (ed.), Power in Europe? II: Great Britain, France, Germany 
and Italy and the Origins of the EEC 1952-57 (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1992). 
Nuttall, Simon J., European Political Co-operation (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1992). 
Patterson, Peter, Tired and Emotional: The Life of Lord George-Brown 
(Chatto and Windus, 1994). 
Parr, Helen, Britain’s Policy towards the European Community: Harold 
Wilson and Britain’s World Role, 1964-67 (Abingdon: Routledge, 2006). 
Pimlott, Ben, Harold Wilson (London: HarperCollinsPublishers, 1992). 
Pine, Melissa, Harold Wilson and Europe: Pursuing Britain’s Membership of 
the European Community, (London: Tauris Academic Studies, 2007). 
Reynolds, David, Britannia Overruled: British Policy and World Power in the 
Twentieth Century, 2nd edn, (Harlow: Pearson Education Limited, 2000).  
Rollings, Neil, British Business in the Formative Years of European 
Integration, 1945-73 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007). 
Roussel, Eric, Georges Pompidou, 2nd edn, (Perrin, 2004). 
Rossbach, Niklas, Heath, Nixon and the Rebirth of the Special Relationship: 
Britain, the US and the EC, 1969-74 (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 2009). 
Roth, Andrew, Heath and the Heathmen (London: Routledge and Kegan 
Paul, 1972). 
Schenk, Catherine, The Decline of Sterling: Managing the Retreat of an 
International Currency (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010). 
Schulz, Matthias, and Schwartz, Thomas A., The Strained Alliance: U.S.-
European Relations from Nixon to Carter (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2010). 
Seldon, Anthony  and Ball, Stuart, The Heath Government, 1970-74: A 
Reappraisal (Harlow: Longman, 1996). 
Simonian, Haig, The Privileged Partnership: Franco-German Relations in the 
European Community, 1969-1984 (London: Oxford University Press, 
1985). 
Thorpe, D.R., Alec Douglas-Home (London: Sinclair Stevenson, 1996). 
Tomlinson, Jim, The Labour Governments, 1964-70, Volume 2: Economic 
Policy (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2004). 
310 
 
Toomey, Jane, Harold Wilson’s EEC Application: Inside the Foreign Office 
(Dublin: University College Dublin Press, 2007). 
Trachtenberg, Marc (ed.), Between Empire and Alliance: America and 
Europe During the Cold War (Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield, 2003). 
van der Harst, Jan (ed.), Beyond the Customs Union: The European 
Community’s Quest for Deepening, Widening and Completion, 1969-1975 
(Bruxelles: Bruylant, 2007). 
Varsori, Antonio (ed.), Inside the European Community: Actors and Policies 
in the European Integration, 1957-72 (Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlag, 
2006). 
Wall, Stephen, A Stranger in Europe: Britain and the EU from Thatcher to 
Blair (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008). 
Young, Hugo, This Blessed Plot: Britain and Europe from Churchill to Blair 
(London: Macmillan, 1998). 
Young, Kenneth, Sir Alec Douglas Home (London: J.M. Dent and Sons, 
1970). 
Young, John W., Britain and European Unity, 1945-99, 2nd edn, 
(Basingstoke: Macmillan, 2000). 
Young, John W., The Labour Government’s, 1964-70, Volume 2: 
International Policy (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2003). 
Young, John W., Twentieth-Century Diplomacy: A Case Study of British 
Practice, 1963-76 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008). 
Young, Simon, Terms of Entry: Britain’s negotiations with the European 
Community, 1970-72 (London: Heinemann, 1973). 
Wallace, Helen, and Winand, Pascaline (eds), Visions, Votes and Vetoes: 
The Empty Chair Crisis and the Luxembourg Compromise Forty Years On 
(Brussels: P.I.E.-Peter Lang, 2006). 
Wilkes, George (ed.), Britain’s Failure to Enter the European Community, 
1961-63: The Enlargement Negotiations and Crises in European, Atlantic 
and Commonwealth Relations (London: Frank Cass, 1997).   
Wise, Mark, The Common Fisheries Policy of the European Community 
(London: Methuen & Co., 1984). 
Ziegler, Philip, Wilson: The Authorised Life of Lord Wilson of Rievaulx 
(London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1993). 
Ziegler, Philip, Edward Heath: The Authorised Biography (London: 
HarperPress, 2010). 
 
Articles and chapters in edited collections 
 
Ashton, Simon R., ‘British Government Perspectives on the Commonwealth, 
1964-71: An asset or a Liability?’, Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth 
History, 35/1 (2007), pp. 73-94. 
Bossuat, Gérard, ‘De Gaulle et la second candidature britannique aux 
Communautés Européennes, 1966-69, in Loth, W. (ed.), Crises, pp.511-
538.    
Bernard, Jean-René, ‘L’élargissement de la Communauté. vu de Paris’, in 
Association Georges Pompidou, Georges, pp.235-252. 
Campbell, Alan ‘Anglo-French Relations a Decade Ago: a New Assessment’ 
(Parts 1 and 2), International Affairs, 58/2 (1982), pp.237-253, and 58/3 
(1982), pp.429-446. 
311 
 
Ceadel, Martin, ‘British Parites and the European Situation, 1950-57’, in 
Nolfo, Power, pp.309-332. 
Dujardin, Vincent ‘The Failed Attempt to Re-launch the WEU and the Issue 
of the First Enlargement’, Journal of European Integration History, 12/1 
(2006), pp.25-41. 
Ellison, ‘Perfidious Albion? Britain, Plan G and European Integration, 1955-
1956’, Contemporary British History 10/4 (1996), pp.1-34. 
Ellison, James, ‘Dealing with de Gaulle: Anglo-American Relations, NATO 
and the Second Application’, in Daddow (ed.), Harold, pp.172-187. 
Ellison, James, ‘Britain and Europe’, in Addison and Jones (eds), A 
Companion to Contemporary Britain (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2005), 
pp.517-538. 
Ellison, James, ‘Separated by the Atlantic: The British and de Gaulle, 1958-
67’, Diplomacy and Statecraft, 17/4 (2006), pp.853-870. 
Ellison, James, ‘Defeating the General: Anglo-American Relations, Europe 
and the NATO Crisis of 1966’, Cold War History, 6/1 (2006), pp.85-111. 
Gfeller, Auriéle E., ‘Imagining European Identity: French Elites and the 
American in the Pompidou—Nixon Era’, Contemporary European History, 
19/2 (2010), pp.133-149. 
Hamilton, Keith, ‘Britain, France and America’s Year of Europe, 1973’, 
Diplomacy and Statecraft, 17/4 (2006), pp.871-895.  
Kaiser, Wolfram, ‘‘What alternative is open to us?’: Britain’, in Kaiser, W. And 
Elvert, J. (eds), European, pp.9-30. 
Kaiser, Wolfram, ‘The Bomb and Europe. Britain, France and the EEC Entry 
Negotiations (1961-63), Journal of European Integration History 1/1 
(1995), pp.65-85. 
Knudsen, Ann-Christina L., ‘The Politics of Financing the Community and the 
Fate of the First British Membership Application’, Journal of European 
Integration History, 11, 2 (2005), pp.11-30. 
Ludlow, N. Piers, ‘Le Paradoxe Anglais: Britain and Political Union’, Revue 
d’Allemagne et des Pays de Langue Allemande, 29/2 (1997), pp.259-272. 
Ludlow, N.P., ‘A Waning Force: The Treasury and British European Policy, 
1955-63’, Contemporary British History, 17/4 (2003), pp.87-104. 
Ludlow, N.P., ‘A Short-Term Defeat: The Community Institutions and the 
Second British Application to the EEC, 1966-7’, in Daddow (ed.), Harold, 
pp.135-150. 
Moravcsik, Andrew, ‘De Gaulle Between Grain and Grandeur: The Political 
Economy of French EC Policy, 1958-70 (Parts 1 and 2), Journal of Cold 
War Studies, 2/2 (2000), pp.3-43, and 2/3 (2000), pp.4-68. 
O’Hara, G., ‘‘This is What Growth Does: British Views on the European 
Economies in the Prosperous ‘Golden Age’ of 1951-73’, Journal of 
Contemporary History, 44/4 (2009), pp.697-718. 
Palayret, Jean-Marie, ‘De Gaulle Challenges the Community: France, the 
Empty Chair Crisis and the Luxembourg Compromise’, in Wallace, H. and 
Winand, P. (eds), Visions, pp.45-77. 
Palliser, Michael, ‘L’élargissement de la Communauté. vu de Londres’, in 
Association Georges Pompidou, Georges, pp.227-231. 
Parr, Helen, ‘Gone Native: The Foreign Office and Harold Wilson’s Policy 
towards the EEC, 1964-67’, in Daddow (ed.), Harold, pp.75-94. 
312 
 
Parr, Helen, ‘A Question of Leadership: July 1966 and Harold Wilson’s 
European Decision, Contemporary British History, 19/4 (2005), pp.437-
458. 
Parr, Helen, ‘Saving the Community: The French Response to Britain’s 
Second EEC Application in 1967’, Cold War History, 6/4 (2006), pp.425-
54. 
Parr, Helen, ‘Anglo-French Nuclear Collaboration and Britain’s Policy 
towards Europe, 1970-73’, in van der Harst (ed.), Beyond, pp.35-59.  
Parr, Helen, and Pine, Melissa, ‘Policy towards the European Community’, in 
Dorey, Labour, pp.108-129. 
Peden, George, ‘Economic Aspects of British Perceptions of Power’, in Nolfo 
(ed.), Power, pp.139-159. 
Pine, Melissa, ‘British Personal Diplomacy and Public Policy: The Soames 
Affair’, Journal of European Integration History, 10/2 (2004), pp.59-76. 
Poggiolini, Ilaria, ‘How the Heath government revised the European lesson: 
British transition to EEC membership (1972)’, in Varsori, A., Inside, 
pp.313-346. 
Ruane, Kevin, and Ellison, James, ‘Managing the Americans: Anthony Eden, 
Harold Macmillan and the Pursuit of ‘Power-by-Proxy’ in the 1950s’, 
Contemporary British History, 18/3 (2004), pp.147-167.  
Spelling, Alex, ‘Edward Heath and Anglo-American Relations, 1970-74’, 
Diplomacy and Statecraft, 20, 4 (2009), pp.638-658. 
Schaad, Martin, ‘Plan G – A ‘Counterblast’? British Policy towards the 
Messina Countries’, Contemporary European History, 7/1 (1998), pp.39-
60. 
Stoddart, Kristan, ‘Nuclear Weapons in Britain's Policy towards France, 
1960-1974’, Diplomacy and Statecraft, 18/4 (2007), pp.719-744. 
Vaïsse, Maurice, ‘La politique européenne de la France en 1965, pourquoi la 
chaise vide?’, in W. Loth (ed.), Crises, pp.193-214. 
Warner, Geoffrey, ‘Why the General Said No’, International Affairs, 78/4 
(2002), pp.869-882.  
Westad, Odd A., ‘The Cold War and the International History of the 
Twentieth Century’, in Leffler, M.P. and Westad, O.A. (eds), The 
Cambridge History of the Cold War, Volume 1: Origins (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2010). 
Young, John W., ‘Churchill’s ‘No’ to Europe: The ‘Rejection’ of European 
Union by Churchill’s Post-War Government, 1951-52’, The Historical 
Journal, 28/4 (1985), pp.923-37. 
Young, John W., ‘British Officials and European Integration, 1944-60’, in 
Deighton, A. (ed.), Building, pp.87-106.   
Young, John W., ‘Technological Cooperation in Wilson’s Strategy for EEC 
Entry’, in Daddow, Harold, pp.95-114. 
Young, John W. ‘The Diary of Michael Stewart as British Foreign Secretary, 
April-May 1968’, Contemporary British History, 19/4 (2005), pp.481-510. 
Young, John W., ‘A Case Study in Summitry: The Experience of Britain's 
Edward Heath, 
1970-74’, The Hague Journal of Diplomacy, 1/3 (2006), pp.261-293. 
 
 
 
313 
 
Unpublished theses and papers 
 
Almlid, Geir, ‘Negotiating for EC membership, 1970-72: A comparative study 
of the approach taken by the British and Norwegian governments’ 
(University of East Anglia, 2008). 
Geary, Michael, ‘Enlargement and the European Commission: an 
assessment of the British and Irish applications for membership of the 
European Economic Community, 1958-73’ (Europan University Institute, 
Florence, 2008). 
L. Jaubertie, ‘Négocier avec la Grande-Bretagne, Round III: Pompidou, 
Heath, les administrations nationales et l’entrée de la Grande-Bretagne 
dans le Marché Commun, 1969-1972’, (École Nationale des Chartes, 
Paris, 2008). 
Ludlow, N. Piers, ‘Part of a political deal: How the Hague Bargain Over-rode 
the Technical Difficulties of Negotiation’.  
Martin, Garret, ‘Untying the Gaullian Knot: France and the Struggle to 
Overcome the Cold War Order, 1963-1968’ (London School of Economics 
and Political Science, 2006). 
Rücker-Guitelmacher, Katrin, ‘Le triangle Paris-Bonn-Londres et le 
processus d’adhésion britannique au marché commun 1969-1973. Quel 
rôle pour le trilatéral au sein du multilatéral?’ (Sciences Po, Paris, 2009). 
Scott, Andrew, ‘Heath, Nixon and the Anglo-American Relationship, 1970-74’ 
(University of Cambridge, 2008). 
 
 
 
 
